Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

79. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

Washington, January 3, 1963.

SUBJECT

• US Policy Toward Algeria

JCSM-6-63

1. Reference is made to:

a. A memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-22413/62, dated 22 December 1962, subject as above.¹

b. National Security Action Memorandum, Number 211, subject as above.

c. JCSM-10-62, dated 8 January 1962, subject: “Military Assistance for Post-Independence Algeria.”

2. The development of a specific military assistance program, supporting reference 1 b above, is contingent upon French intentions in Algeria with respect to continued economic assistance, French willingness for the United States to play a supplementary role, and upon Algerian desires and needs for a US program. Any US military assistance program for Algeria must be designed so as to satisfy not only the Algerian Government but, at the same time, not impair our relations with France.

3. Concurrently, any US military aid program for Algeria must be examined for its effect on our relations with Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco. In the latter two countries, the continued use of our military bases remains important. Libya, Tunisia, and, in particular, Morocco would view a significant rise in Algeria’s military capabilities as a threat to their border claims in the Sahara as well as an effort on the part of Algerian leaders to gain a dominant role in the North African area. Any actions by the United States to strengthen the offensive power of the Algerian armed forces with prestige items such as tanks and jet aircraft would adversely affect relations with these countries and thus indirectly jeopardize our bases. While a US military assistance program for Algeria could serve to lessen Bloc influence to some extent, it can be expected that the Algerian Government will seek military assistance from the Bloc, and the Bloc will be responsive to these requests.

4. Even though the lack of information and the political realities in North Africa are limiting factors in the development of Algerian programs, the US military may still be able to play an important role in assisting Algeria in reconstruction and economic development. This can be done by developing and organizing the Armed Forces primarily along the lines of an internal security force as opposed to a force whose offensive strength could serve as a threat to Algeria’s neighbors. The present Armed Forces of Algeria (about 100,000) are beyond the needs of Algeria and aggravate the situation by imposing a financial burden. The present Government has indicated that it plans an Armed Force of 25,000-35,000; however, precise information regarding the make-up of this force is not known. One of the principal problems facing the Algerian Government is to find a way to reduce the size of the armed forces without losing their support. A program to ensure jobs for the released military personnel would serve to lessen the impact on the already staggering unemployment problem. Properly employed, the Algerian Armed Forces could become an effective, constructive force to assist in rebuilding Algeria, in developing the Algerian economy, and in providing an important stabilizing influence.

5. In the light of the above, the following are some potential courses of action which DOD, in conjunction with other US agencies, could pursue in converting the Algerian Armed Forces to a more constructive role and adapting it to the legitimate needs of Algeria.

a. Provide vocational training for those military men who are to be released from duty. The training should be in skills which can be utilized in the economy after release and should be conducted, where possible, in concert with civic action programs designed for reconstruction and economic development.

b. Assist in programs which will reduce the armed forces and streamline them for an internal security mission only. This would require, primarily, assistance in reorganizations for the mission and attendant training.

c. Assist in the development of civic action programs in support of economic development designed to win the support of the people.

6. In order to develop plans for assisting the Algerians, it is recommended that:

a. The Department of State advise France that the United States is willing to cooperate with France in providing limited economic and military assistance to Algeria as a supplement to French efforts.

b. Subsequent to the Department of State action above, USCINCEUR be invited to participate in any US negotiations with the French to determine the status of the French programs for Algeria, particularly in regard to military assistance and French desires for US support.

c. Following the above two steps, and if still appropriate, the Algerian Government should be informed that the United States is willing to assist and is prepared to send a survey team to determine the nature and scope of the assistance which the United States could provide.

7. After the above courses of action have been taken, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be in a position to make further recommendations.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Curtis E. LeMay
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 69 A 3131, Algeria, 1963. Secret.
1. The December 22 memorandum from Bundy informed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Presidential directive in NSAM No. 211, and asked that the Joint Chiefs review their recommendations of January 8, 1962 (Document 57), regarding possible U.S. military assistance to Algeria in light of the current situation and desired future U.S. relations with Algeria. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 69 A 3131, Algeria, 1963)