71. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
While the chief purpose in receiving Ben Bella1 is to get acquainted and to offset any misapprehensions he may have about “neo-colonialist” U.S. policies, we also have a chance to: (1) lay the groundwork for U.S. influence on him; (2) underline the importance of close cooperation with France.
This 46 year old comes with great personal respect for you, dating from your 1957 Senate speech (you could give him a copy of Strategy for Peace). He still clings to a lot of naive ideas and thinks in terms of a melange of revolutionary cliches from Marx, Mao, Nasser and Che Guevara. Basically, however, he’s much more pragmatic than doctrinaire.
Therefore, it should be possible to impress him with our general support of self-determination and social change, our respect for honest non-alignment, and even of our legitimate concern over the Communist threat to new nations (Sekou Toure’s experience is relevant here). He understands why we couldn’t back his rebellion; indeed your 1957 speech gives you credentials to argue that you didn’t oppose it.
The best tactic, however, might be to handle him in low key, asking him questions and responding to his sallies. You might want to query him first about his own plans for Algeria. This could lead naturally to an airing of the outlook for the Evian Accords. We emphatically want France to shoulder the main burden in Algeria (the bill will be immense, and we don’t have the money—at least this year). But too direct an affirmation of the need for close French-Algerian ties might arouse suspicion. Instead you might ask him what he thinks he can get from the [Page 103] French, how many technicians and teachers he thinks he can woo back, whether he can get Paris to continue the Constantine Plan, etc.
Ben Bella recognizes the need for extensive French help, and that Algeria’s natural economic links are with Europe. But as a neutralist he’s going to tap other counterbalancing sources, both east and west. While State believes he has no shopping list in his pocket, he undoubtedly wonders how generally forthcoming we’re likely to be.
We’ve given a lot of relief help already—350,000 tons of food since 1956 through voluntary agencies, a medical team and supplies, ten mobile clinics as an independence gift—and have already approved $40 million more in FY 63 food relief (see Tab C).2
Beyond this, however, we have no real aid program for Algeria. In fact State and AID differ sharply on this issue. AID believes we should leave Algeria to France. They fear that aggressively seeking ways to help Ben Bella over his economic hump would make us frontrunner, whereas we want to leave France in the driver’s seat. They plan to continue emergency feeding and food-for-work projects through the winter. But they are reluctant to volunteer other aid—even in principle—for fear of arousing Algerian hopes of extensive technical assistance or development lending. They claim they can’t round up enough French and Arabic speaking technicians for such a program and don’t have loan money.
State agrees that France must shoulder the chief load, but argues for a U.S. program to support Ben Bella indirectly against an army takeover and to influence development planning as it matures. They feel that the Evian Accords might break down, or at least be greatly modified, and that the Bloc will be all too willing to jump in. They would prefer Ben Bella to turn to us for help if he looks anywhere but in Europe. As for AID’s argument about shortage of funds, they argue that a country as important as Algeria should be near the top of the list for what funds we do have.
While recognizing how we’re strapped, I think State is right. Here we have a chance (albeit a potentially costly one) to buy in on the ground floor in one of the few really important new nations in Africa. Given a $180 million three-year commitment to Tunisia and $40 million yearly to Morocco (plus $12 million MAP for FY 63), it doesn’t make sense for AID to program only $2 million (plus food) for Algeria in FY 63. Agreed that we don’t want the French to unload Algeria on us. But we need some kind of an independent presence, if only on preclusive grounds. Unless AID settles down to imaginative planning, we’ll be in no position to respond quickly to Algerian needs, to identify those sectors where concentrating [Page 104] our resources will best further our interests, or to face the contingency of a breakdown in Franco-Algerian cooperation.
I don’t know whether either you or Ben Bella will want to bring up Cuba (he still seems to be going there).3 But he’s now heard from many sources how sensitive we are on this issue. His entourage in New York says he is going to Cuba to satisfy the leftists at home, perhaps with some vague notion of healing the U.S.-Cuban rift. He professes to believe that Castro is a “madman.” He excluded Communists from the National Assembly, and even Colonel Boumedienne recently said that the “Communists never sincerely aided the Algerian rebellion.”
On the other hand, many Algerians still seem to look at Castro through rose-colored glasses. So Cuba may provide a good text to get across the risk of Communist capture of indigenous national revolutions (I’ve attached a CIA summary).
Finally, you might want to congratulate Ben Bella on his formation of a government and dedication to the principles of parliamentary democracy. He’s allowed an opposition in the new Assembly; almost a third of it has opposed him on one issue or another. Whether or not Ben Bella reverts to one-party government, he’s a better bet than the army (Major Slimane, whom you’ll see at luncheon is along as the Army’s man). Although our ability to influence the outcome of Ben Bella’s struggle to retain power is negligible, we lose nothing by encouraging him along his current moderate course.
We propose an innocuous joint communique after our talk, in order to limit Ben Bella’s opportunities to free-wheel with the press (Draft at Tab III-B). You should also skim Scope and Talking Papers and Tab III-D rounding up recent Ben Bella statements on his attitude toward the US, the Evian Accords, socialism, etc. It gives a good feel for the man.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Algeria, 9/1/62-10/15/62. Secret. A handwritten covering note from Komer to Bundy reads: “This is long, but State briefing book is lousy so I summed up their 30pp. in my three. I also wanted to clue JFK on State/AID hassle over aid to Algeria. Only he can decide it, in last analysis, and now is best time to educate him.” Department of State briefing material for Ben Bella’s visit in October 1962 is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2176.↩
- The National Assembly of Algeria, which was elected on September 20, designated Ben Bella as Prime Minister of Algeria on September 26. On September 29, the Assembly approved his list of cabinet officers and the United States formally recognized the “newly established Government of the Republic of Algeria.” For texts of the statement issued by the Department of State and messages from the Secretary and President to Ben Bella and Foreign Minister Khemisti, see Department of State Bulletin, October 15, 1962, p. 560. The Embassy in Algiers was established on September 29 with Porter as Charge d’Affaires ad interim. On October 4, the President formally invited the new Prime Minister to visit the White House when he came to the United States for the admission of Algeria to the United States. (Letter from Kennedy to Ben Bella, October 4; Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Algeria)↩
- None of the tabs is attached to the source text.↩
- On October 6, following instructions from Washington, Porter told Khemisti that the U.S. Government was deeply disturbed by press reports that Ben Bella planned to visit Cuba immediately after being received by President Kennedy in Washington. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.51S11/10-662)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩