70. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sloan) to William R. Polk of the Policy Planning Council0

Dear Bill: I want to thank you for supplying me with a copy of your memorandum concerning the possibility of providing military assistance to Algeria which you sent to Mr. Rostow.1 Advance information of [Page 101] this type is extremely helpful. A review of this subject is both timely and important if we are to take the initiative rather than waiting to react to Soviet efforts.

If it is decided to form an interagency working group on this or similar African policy problems, it would be useful if ISA could be represented. In this particular case, I would designate Colonel Howard C. Junkermann and Colonel Joe Whitfield to represent my office.

I have several comments concerning the memorandum which you may find helpful in your deliberations.

I question the concept of any alternative which envisions the probable use of an Arab country acting as an agent for the Soviet Bloc to furnish aid to Algeria. Further, the furnishing of U.S. equipment through a friendly power such as Pakistan would be such a thin subterfuge as to be practically worthless. For example, we were accused of being a party with the French in the Algerian rebellion because the French used U.S. manufactured equipment. The idea of incorporating other friendly powers such as Sweden, U.K., Italy, Japan, etc., which have an industrial base capable of supporting either partially or in toto the required armaments for training, has considerable merit. However, in such cases, it would be appropriate for the U.S to be disassociated with the effort. Of course, France is the logical choice to furnish such assistance but she may be unwilling to meet the needs in a forthright fashion.

Accordingly, I believe that the time has come, if we are unsuccessful after exploring the problem with friendly industrial nations, for the U.S. to speak firmly and clearly to the French about the matter, indicating we are prepared to offer Algeria military assistance if they do not. In this case it would be better for the U.S. to act directly than through a third party.

Sincerely yours,

Frank K. Sloan2
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Algeria 000.1-121, 1962. Secret. Drafted by Colonel Junkermann.
  2. Polk’s memorandum discussed several potential sources of military equipment for Algeria, noting that the most disadvantageous to the United States would be for the Soviet Bloc to provide military equipment and instruction directly to the Algerians, which would have a profoundly dislocating effect on the U.S. strategic position in Africa. On the other hand, potential damage to French-U.S. relations placed direct provision of U.S. military equipment near the bottom of the scale of desired actions. The best arrangement would be to have France supply such equipment, but current French attitudes made this unlikely. Better from the U.S. point of view would be to have a friendly Muslim country or another European country act as a source of supply. (Ibid.)
  3. Printed from a copy that indicates that Sloan signed the original.