Office of the Historian

140. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)0

Washington, September 28, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • SAC Bases in Morocco

Mr. McNamara and I have concluded that the political difficulties of negotiating an extension of our present use of the bases in Morocco beyond 1963, when we are committed to withdraw, and the high political or economic price that would be demanded for such an extension make it advisable to negotiate for the retention after 1963 of U.S. maintenance elements only. Our objectives in such negotiations will be to preclude Soviet use or occupancy of the bases and to permit their occasional use for transit and their availability for post-strike recovery operations. Accordingly, I have sent the attached letter to the Department of State.1

[Page 215]

I have seen the discussion paper of August 6, 1962, prepared by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force concerning the personnel and cost requirements for the maintenance elements at the bases after 1963. In my judgment, the total number of personnel at the three bases should not exceed 500, and the Air Force should proceed in its planning on this basis.

Roswell L. Gilpatric2
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 65 A 3501, Morocco, 400.3295, 1962. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.↩
  2. The September 28 letter to Acting Secretary of State Ball provided the Department of State with the following information to help the Department respond to Ambassador Ferguson’s request for guidance on U.S. post-1963 objectives for the SAC bases in Morocco. The U.S. goal was to ensure the availability of the Moroccan bases for possible re-entry, with Moroccan permission, in times of emergency. To this end, the United States wished to retain maintenance elements at each of the bases after 1963, but their size and nature would depend on the uses to which the Moroccans put the bases and the forms of U.S. assistance. Therefore, it must be determined soon what use would be made of the bases by Morocco after 1963. (Ibid.) Gilpatric also sent a copy of the letter to Carl Kaysen at the White House.↩
  3. Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.↩