139. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
You will want to use your meeting with Ambassador Ferguson1 Wednesday as an occasion for reviewing our Moroccan policy. It’s very important that he have a clear sense of how far you are willing to go on bases and aid.
Since you approved our helping Hassan build his air transport force last April, we have delivered the first tranche of equipment and have begun training. The Moroccans appear quite pleased, and we’ve been successful so far in precluding further Soviet air force activity. However, the Moroccans have bought about 20 Soviet tanks and other army equipment with a few technicians. Some helicopters have arrived too, but the Moroccans claim these are destined for Algeria.
The chief outstanding issues now are the status of the Navy communications facility at Kenitra, our three SAC bases—and the FY ’63 aid level. The JCS came up recently with another plea that we try to hold on to the SAC bases past end-1963. McNamara has in fact rejected this, and Ferguson has been clued. All McNamara will go for is an attempt to get [Page 213] caretaker status for the three bases or perhaps a civil airport at Nouasseur, unless we can get more free. However, he is not putting this in writing because he’s not anxious to challenge the Chiefs frontally on it, while he still has the B-70 argument on his hands.
DOD has also approved pressing for arrangements to maintain the Kenitra base, its two outlying transmitter sites, and a USAF communications facility. We have an urgent need for these facilities. In return DOD is willing to train Moroccans in naval operations at Kenitra and to contribute $5 million in naval hardware. Our initial approach to King Hassan on 16 July, however, (which involved keeping there 2200 US personnel, 1300 less than present strength) met with some fudging. Hassan “accepted in principle” that some formula would be found but said he did not wish to decide or discuss details until his meeting with you next March.
Because the Navy has to decide finally by then whether to build alternate facilities, we’d rather have Ferguson re-open the dialogue now, while recognizing that we probably won’t be able to close the deal until Hassan comes here. To arm Ferguson for this effort, we suggest you give him attached letter2 introducing him as your personal spokesman.
Negotiations on the bases will soon get mixed up with the question of the FY 1963 aid level (summary of recent levels attached).2AID is planning $20 million in supporting assistance (down from $30 million last year) plus $5-8 million in loans from PL-480 Title I sales and a $1.6 million development grant for technical assistance. (Title II and III programs are estimated at $30 million total, but the Moroccans don’t include this in their definition of the aid level.) Because the Embassy believes the aid level must be at least $40 million for us to keep our base rights, AID is also allowing $12-15 million in development loans. The hitch is that we probably won’t find enough sound projects to absorb that much development lending, so the pressure will be on to increase supporting assistance. AID wants to hold this line at $20 million this year to press the shift from supporting assistance to development loans, but we will clearly have a major sore point unless we find suitable projects.
A minor issue bearing on the base and aid level talks is Hassan’s interest in building a shipyard at Tangier. He thinks this would help pull the economy of Northern Morocco out of the doldrums, and his lieutenants hint that the Soviets have offered $30 million for the project. AID says the project would be an economic flop because the world shipb ding capacity is already excess. We believe we should not respond [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on this one, because so far we don’t see the Soviets gaining any significant military advantage from it. However, the Moroccans may inject this into our negotiations.
[Page 214]All in all, we’ll have to continue to pay handsomely if we want both to make a stab at keeping certain base rights and to compete effectively with the Bloc. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Morocco (and the whole Maghreb) is certainly the most important piece of real estate in Africa, and one where the end of the Algerian war opens new avenues for US influence, as well as new opportunities for the Bloc.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Morocco, 7/62-12/62. Secret.↩
- President Kennedy appointed John H. Ferguson to be Ambassador to Morocco on August 21. Kennedy met with Ferguson at 11:54 a.m. on August 21. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Books) No memorandum of this conversation has been found.↩
- Not attached to the source text.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩