209. Memorandum for the File0
At the conclusion of the meeting on Monday, July 30th,1 the President requested that Messrs. McCloy and Lovett2 be asked to come down from New York to study the seismic results and also that DCI study them and the three of us serve as an advisory group. Mr. Bundy decided to ask them to come on Wednesday.
On Tuesday Secretary McNamara and I spent approximately three hours with Drs. Northrup,3 Romney, and others, and DOD General Counsel Norton, reviewing the results of the Vela seismic improvement program. We developed the attached table4 as representative of the changes in the basic detection capability and the appraisal of natural events by number which would remain unidentified under the system as it existed or was known in March 1962, the March ‘62 system with the present technology and knowledge, and the so-called national system. Also are noted the probabilities of success and the deficiencies.
On Tuesday evening Mr. Lovett came to my home at 7:00 o’clock. We discussed the situation generally and he remained in my home for dinner in my absence and read the transcripts of the Joint Committee hearings of July 19th and 23rd, a number of documents given to him by the White House, and other material which I had assembled for him.
On Wednesday morning, August 1st, Mr. Lovett reviewed the content of these documents with Mr. McCloy and at 10:00 o’clock Messrs. Lovett and McCloy met with the same group of scientists that McNamara and I had met with on Tuesday.
On Wednesday at 11:30, the President convened a small meeting, attended by the Secretary of State, Mr. Gilpatric for Defense, the Vice President, Foster, Bundy, Arthur Dean, Murrow, to further discuss negotiating policies at Geneva and also the statement the President should make at his press conference at 4:00 o’clock. A statement substantially [Page 532] along the lines read by the President was agreed upon; the final draft was prepared and was cleared by those in attendance at 2:30 in the afternoon.5 In this meeting McCloy and Lovett strongly urged the President not to engage in detailed negotiations until and unless the Soviets change their position on zero on-site inspections and indicated that there existed a climate which would permit negotiation. I strongly supported this recommendation. It was agreed that we should follow this course. Mr. Dean felt that we should present a comprehensive program indicating the revised arrangement of stations as well as a minimum number of on-site inspections. In this connection it was stated that Secretary McNamara concluded that six on-site inspections per year was sufficient.
Note: After this meeting I called Secretary Gilpatric questioning McNamara’s position. Gilpatric told me that McNamara had felt that some number between six and twelve was acceptable and the President had seized on the number of six as representative of McNamara’s position. I urged that this be straightened out, indicating that if this information was given to anyone on the Hill, serious difficulties would result.
The meeting was adjourned and was reassembled at 4:45, with a larger group in attendance.6 At this meeting it was definitely decided that:
- (a)
- We should not agree to negotiate unless the Soviets change their position on on-site inspections.
- (b)
- That a complex of stations totaling about 80, of which 25 would be seismic and five of which would be in the USSR, would represent an acceptable modification to the original Geneva plan.
- (c)
- On-site inspections were a must, there was no decision as to the required number.
- (d)
- International supervision and inspection of national stations meant that we must have an international supervisor in residence on each station. The President wished to remain flexible in this regard. However, he was urged to accept this definition as a must.
A difference arose between Arthur Dean and Secretary Rusk, the latter favoring immediate acceptance of an atmospheric ban but Dean maintaining that this should be a holding position and we should exhaust the possibilities of a comprehensive ban before proceeding with a discussion of an atmospheric ban.
The meeting adjourned about 6:00 o’clock. I was requested to contact Senator Russell and members of the Joint Committee prior to Mr. Dean’s [Page 533] appearance on the Hill on Thursday, which I did the following morning, and transcripts of my conversations are available.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 7/1/62-12/31/62. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.↩
- See Document 206.↩
- Robert A. Lovett, former Under Secretary of State and former Secretary of Defense, who served as a member of ACDA’s General Advisory Committee and a consultant to the Kennedy administration.↩
- The Air Force superiors of Dr. Doyle Northrup, technical director of the Air Force Technical Application Center (AFTAC), severely criticized Northrup for his handling of the AFTAC’s newly developed information on seismic detection. (Memorandum of July 27 discussion by McCone, drafted July 31; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record, 4/7/62-8/21/62) See the Supplement.↩
- Not attached.↩
- For text of President Kennedy’s opening statement on nuclear testing at his press conference on August 1, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, p. 591.↩
- For a fuller account of this meeting, see Document 208.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩