Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

61. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 17, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

• Department of State
  • Secretary Dulles
  • Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary
  • Gerard C. Smith, Asst Secretary–Policy Planning
• Department of Defense
  • Secretary McElroy
  • Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary
  • Mansfield D. Sprague, Assistant Secretary
  • John N. Irwin II, Deputy Asst Secretary
  • Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of the Navy
  • James H. Douglas, Secretary of the Air Force
  • Wilbur M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army
  • General Randolph McC Pate
  • General N. F. Twining, Chairman, JCS
  • Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations
  • General T. D. White
  • General Maxwell D. Taylor
  • Rear Admiral Charles O. Triebel, USN
  • General Cutler

Secretary Dulles said he would like to commend the cooperation which the Department of Defense had given in connection with the Lebanon affair, pointing out that needed equipment had been supplied to the Lebanese government in exceptionally fast time. He pointed out that it would be best if the Lebanese forces could handle the problem themselves. If we have to intervene, it will be only the choice of the lesser of two evils—the greater of the two evils being the political repercussions of our failure to come to the aid of our friends, the Lebanese.

Secretary McElroy then opened the discussion on the Strategic Concept. He said that Defense officials and the JCS had two discussions on the matter. They had given a good deal of thought to the type of military backing that the US should have for its diplomatic aims.

Secretary McElroy felt that, perhaps, Defense had failed to give the Secretary of State a clear picture of our limited war capabilities. He suggested that some situations could best be handled by non-US forces. Of course, it would be preferable if these were UN forces. But until that became possible, he wondered if some type of volunteer forces, including non-white forces, should not be recruited. This idea is being examined now in the Department of Defense. Also being examined is whether the US needs the numerous strategic weapons systems which it now plans for. It does not follow that, if our strategic weapons can be cut down, we would automatically build up our limited war capabilities. Over the long run one might be able to reduce over-all defense expenditures, but not now. He speculated as to whether we should let our allies know more about our limited war capabilities—but, perhaps, we don’t have enough to do this.

Secretary McElroy then introduced Rear Admiral Triebel, who gave a briefing on the Joint State-Defense-JCS limited war capabilities study. As this study is available in the Department of State, this briefing will not be detailed here.

Upon conclusion of the briefing, Secretary McElroy asked what the basic problem was. Is it because our allies do not know about our limited war capabilities or are our capabilities insufficient?

Secretary Dulles said there were two problems: (a) the Strategic Concept; and (b) our limited war capabilities.

These capabilities are relevant if our strategic concept contemplates limited war. The Joint State-Defense-JCS study shows that we do have a doctrine for limited war, and we seem to be in reasonably good condition in regard to limited war capabilities and in the matter of relations with our allies in this respect.

Secretary Dulles said that, although there is no US commitment to come to Iran’s defense, there is a gap in our military capabilities in regard to Iran. He referred to the concern reported by General Taylor last winter that Iran would be used as a funnel for an attack. We must face up to this problem in connection with the forthcoming visit of the Shah of Iran.

The Secretary said that the big problem involving the strategic concept is in relationship to NATO. In our thinking we assume that there can be no limited war in Europe. He said he did not quarrel with this assumption—he shared this judgment. However, we in the State Department detect a growing concern, voiced by responsible European officials as well as demagogues, that the US, when it comes squarely under the threat of ICBM attack, will not launch an all-out nuclear attack on the Soviet Union if another NATO nation is attacked.

Secretary Dulles referred to Duncan Sandys’ concern to this effect, of which he had been advised at Copenhagen. The Secretary then read pertinent excerpts from Sandys’ paper which had been presented to the British Cabinet.

Secretary Dulles also reported Ambassador Houghton’s judgment that, during the forthcoming visit to Paris, de Gaulle would make two points in justification of a French nuclear weapons production program. First, the prestige of being in the nuclear club; and, second, France’s fear that the US would not call upon massive retaliation to save Europe when the cost in US casualties became clear to US leaders.

Secretary Dulles said that none of us doubts that President Eisenhower will order a strategic nuclear attack in that event. But his term has but two years to run and who knows what his successor’s views will be. Secretary Dulles said he knew of one potential successor who might not be as firm as President Eisenhower on this score.

Secretary Dulles said he felt that the time was near when our European allies are not going to be satisfied with a strategic doctrine depending on a US decision to invoke all-out nuclear war in the event of an attack on Europe. He felt that the European countries would go their independent ways unless we find with them a concept they consider more dependable.

The Secretary said he did not think limited war in Europe was possible. The important thing, however, was what the allies think and do. The Europeans are just starting to think about this problem in a fuzzy manner. Two alternatives seem to be opening to them. One was to develop independent nuclear weapons production capability, such as the British and the French are trying for. It is only logical that others will follow. Maybe this course is right. But it is dangerous not to have an agreed strategic concept which is satisfactory to all the NATO partners. It is dangerous for them to prefer that each one have its own nuclear capability.

In the case of the French, a nuclear weapons program is something of a gesture. They cannot afford a real program. They must depend on us or accept risks of another kind. Even the United Kingdom cannot afford such a program. Certainly Italy cannot. In the case of Germany, there are strong public opinion controls. The Brussels treaty only prevents production of nuclear weapons on German territory. The French-Italian-German (FIG) program may get into nuclear weapons production.

The second alternative is to drift into neutralism.

Secretary Dulles said that he and others had thought about the possibilities of “area” defense with tactical weapons. He did not believe a war in Europe could be confined to a limited area. However, in order to give our allies a credible policy, we should think of how to create a situation where our allies would have greater rights in regard to the future use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. If we insist that, with the exception of possible hostilities in Yugoslavia and Berlin, the only conceivable type of European war is all-out nuclear war, the result will be a feeling of futility—a brief effort to manufacture nuclear weapons, followed by an abandonment of that effort because of its expense, and then a drift to neutralism. That is the likely course of events under present circumstances. We can hold on one or two years.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that Sandys’ statement was no mere informal effort. It had been formally submitted to the Cabinet, which had apparently acquiesced in Sandys’ subsequent publication.

Mr. Quarles asked what Sandys’ alternative was. The Secretary replied that it was total disarmament, which no responsible official considered seriously.

Secretary Dulles said that he quoted Sandys as representative of leading statesmen in Europe. He could quote plenty of others to the same effect. Indeed Sandys’ doubt is a rational doubt. No one knows what a future President will do. There may be future moods of isolation in the US. No nation likes to have its national existence depend on a decision which may involve the destruction of another nation—so thought is being given in Europe to alternatives. Sandys’ alternative is fantastic. But Prime Minister Macmillan thought it was good propaganda.

The Secretary said there seemed to be two serious alternatives under consideration—separate national nuclear weapons programs or neutrality. The Secretary said he had no definite answers to this problem. He did feel that a strategic concept, which was wholly dependent on a US decision to incur nuclear devastation, would not be gambled on by our allies. We must think of alternatives. He has no cure for the problem and no special competence in this field.

Secretary McElroy asked if the Europeans think that we would withdraw our forces from Europe. If they do, that would really be bad. But our forces in Europe are developing an increased tactical weapon capability. In the event of war, how would it be possible for the US nuclear forces not to be drawn into action.

Secretary Dulles recalled a Sunday afternoon in December 1950. It then seemed possible that the American divisions in Korea would be wiped out. Radical alternatives were considered, but no thought was given to using nuclear weapons. Who was to say that the same situation might not come up in the future in regard to our divisions in Europe.

Mr. Gates asked if this situation warranted a reconsideration of preventive war. Secretary Dulles said it did not in his judgment. This might be a logical alternative, but it was not practical in view of the beliefs of the American people and their form of government. He said he wanted to make it perfectly clear that he was not backing down nor did he have any feeling of fear. Mr. Quarles said that we didn’t have any freedom of choice about preventive war. Mr. Gates said he had in mind preventive strikes after a European ally is attacked. Secretary Dulles said that is different. If our allies thought that “we could shoot the works” without getting badly hurt they might have more confidence in us. Mr. Quarles said that is our present policy. General Twining confirmed this. General Taylor said that he had some doubts that this was our policy.

Mr. Sprague asked how it would help European nations’ confidence to have control over nuclear weapons since they would not have enough weapons to give them parity with the Soviet Union. In this situation, would not the same doubts about non-use of nuclear weapons crop up?

Secretary Dulles agreed and said he felt that European nations would not long pursue individual programs to manufacture weapons. He feared they would then attempt to “stay out” of the conflict.

Mr. Quarles said that, as a matter of logic, if countries become neutral they are in more danger than if they are in the alliance. If this is true, why would they drift to neutralism?

Secretary McElroy said that it appeared that we could not match the USSR in Europe without resorting to at least tactical nuclear weapons, but use of such weapons would bring all-out nuclear war unless the hostilities were quickly stopped by common consent.

Secretary Dulles said he thought a war in Europe could not be limited. Many people think that US involvement in a European war would be more likely if it developed gradually than if the US was faced suddenly with a “cold blood” decision looking to all-out war, which might lead to the end of the US.

Secretary Dulles recalled being in Japan at the beginning of the Korean war when it was thought that no US ground forces would be needed—only some air support. Later it was felt that small ground forces would be needed to stiffen the Korean forces. Later large US forces were required. In the first World War, American participation was in the beginning to be only logistical. Later large manpower contributions had to be made. Once in a fight, emotions may lead to decisions different from those facing a nation in “cold blood” when a decision may have to be taken which would involve destruction of all life in the northern latitude.

Secretary McElroy said the important thing is the continued deployment of US troops in Europe. He recognized the possibility of American divisions being sacrificed in a European war, but failure in such situations to bombard the USSR would sit terribly with Americans. Secretary Dulles pointed out that the same was true in the case of the alternative.

Secretary McElroy pointed out that if we lost Western Europe, we would be isolated by the Communists.

Mr. Quarles said it would be poor tactics for the Soviets to destroy US forces in Europe. It would be a sure way to incur the destruction of Russia. Even if the Soviets felt that in the first instance we would not fight, an attack on American troops would lead to the opposite result.

Mr. Douglas asked if we would be able to hold allies if we could assure them of tactical nuclear weapons sufficient to meet Soviet attack with conventional forces. He recalled Secretary Dulles’ point that it was important to force the Soviets to first use of nuclear weapons. Mr. Douglas said that this would avoid having to meet conventional attack with strategic bombardment.

Secretary Dulles said that our allies’ concern is based on doubt that they can count on a nuclear response from the US. He mentioned thinking in the State Department about a NATO authority which might hold custody of nuclear weapons and suggested that this might be a useful project to explore.

General Taylor said that that was the objective of our program—to spread nuclear weapons laterally and to our allies. We have no illusions that 175 divisions can be stopped without the use of large yield nuclear weapons. But we have to believe and act as if we believed that there is an intermediate response to a Soviet attack in Europe short of all-out nuclear war.

Secretary McElroy asked if we had been too preoccupied and made too many statements in regard to our strategic bombing capabilities. Have we deemphasized our tactical nuclear and carrier forces and Marine divisions? Perhaps not enough attention had been paid to the fact that somewhere between 25% and 40% of the defense budget was going to our limited war capabilities. Perhaps our allied visitors should see our limited war capabilities rather than concentrate on visits to SAC and Cape Canaveral.

General Pate pointed out that during the past two years the Marines and the Navy had had ten joint exercises involving seven different nations.

Mr. Sprague pointed out that George Brown (UK laborite), a recent visitor to the Pentagon, had told him that too few people knew about US limited war capabilities.

Secretary Dulles observed that from the briefing he had gathered that we do have plans for the use of small nuclear weapons—that we are not gambling everything on high yield weapons. This means to him that there are some possibilities in regard to “area” defense. General Taylor said that this is what we are shooting for—small, light weapons with little fall-out.

Secretary Dulles said that there was time enough—if our allies knew that we had more to our strategy than trans-polar strategic nuclear exchanges with megaton weapons.

Governor Herter asked if the number of our limited war effectives would be reduced if there was a concurrent threat of general war. Admiral Burke said that in such a situation, which would be like the Suez situation, we would be increasing both our capabilities for limited and general war simultaneously. General Twining said in such a situation we would limit mobilization. Governor Herter asked if our limited war air and sea lift capabilities would be prejudiced by a simultaneous general war threat. Mr. Gates observed that our capabilities for air and sea lift for general war and for limited war were compatible. General Taylor was inclined to disagree with this conclusion and stated that one could not be sure where we would stand in regard to sea and air lift if there was both a limited and general war threat at the same time.

Mr. Quarles pointed out that if events developed in that sequence, we could generate more capabilities by mobilization, but he acknowledged that certain transport would have to be pre-empted for general war preparation. General Pate said that under these circumstances the Navy would be in a building-up phase. General Twining said you can’t have capabilities for both situations simultaneously. In the given circumstances, you would have to go all-out for general war preparation and your limited war capability would have to suffer.

General Twining said one cannot say categorically that there could be no limited war in Europe. Anything can happen. But we must keep the Russians believing that a limited war cannot happen there. The Russians apparently believe that now. They have not gained an inch in Europe since we promulgated our present strategic concept. We don’t know how a future President would reply to a nuclear attack in Europe, but we must keep the integrity of our present strategy. We must stay with it for awhile.

Admiral Burke said that it was not a question of our capability but of the allied attitude toward our strategy. They know that in regard to nuclear weapons they are mendicants. If they are attacked “they can only cry”. What they want is a mortgage on our future action. They have hostages in the form of our ground forces in Europe. Is this not enough for the present? They apparently want some control over nuclear weapons. But it is up to us to keep some control over their control. We must look out for the danger of possible “trigger happy” foreigners to whom we may have transferred some control over nuclear weapons. But we will have to take some chances in this respect.

Secretary Dulles said that surely General de Gaulle will raise with him next month the question of a French nuclear weapons capability. The French will want to be on an equal basis with the US and the UK. If we turn down his request for some share in the nuclear deterrent, de Gaulle will press on to develop an independent nuclear weapons capability for France and an independent foreign policy which may even involve making an accommodation with the USSR.

Mr. Gates asked if the cause of European concern was our failure to finish up the jobs in Korea and Indochina. If we did not push for victories there, perhaps the Europeans feel there is little chance that we will take risks in Europe where the dangers were much greater. Secretary Dulles said he doubted that this was the reason. He felt the primary cause of European concern was simply that they could read current articles about the tremendous casualties estimated to occur in nuclear war and logically had been led to wonder if any country would be willing to pay such a high price to come to the aid of its friends. He believes the US would pay such a price—not because of any “love” for our friends, not because of any agreement which we would feel an obligation to honor, but out of the belief that if we did not take this action we would be faced with a worse alternative later. We would be crowded and crowded by the Soviet Union.

Secretary Dulles emphasized that he never shows any sympathy for foreign anxieties in this respect. He personally truly believes that the US will, if necessary, carry out its strategic plans.

Mr. Quarles said in regard to General de Gaulle that we should make clear to him that US policy is not to try to prevent the French from developing a nuclear weapons capability. He believed that our previous policy of trying to stop the French had been greatly resented. He also felt that it was not logical to think of transferring nuclear weapons to the French because they could not obtain enough to have an independent deterrent. France is a member of an alliance and as such should rely on the capabilities of the alliance and not on the few weapons which it may be able to construct. (The tenor of Mr. Quarles’ remarks was that France should be “admitted” into the nuclear weapons club.²)

Secretary Dulles said that General de Gaulle might well take the position that the US’s attitude means that France will have to spend much of its treasure for obsolete weapons during a period of critical financial strain. And France will wonder if this is the type of treatment an ally should receive.

Secretary McElroy thought that France merely wanted to produce weapons and not necessarily to receive US help in producing them. He feels that the French don’t care about the quality of the weapons, but are mainly interested in salving national pride.

Mr. Quarles observed that our law prevents the transfer of nuclear weapons to the French.

Secretary McElroy said that he now had a better understanding of Secretary Dulles’ views and would like to be of help. He reverted to the concept of volunteer forces which might be used until a truly UN force could come into being. He suggested that such force would not wear US uniforms. It would be made up of yellow, black and white people, and would not be identified with national units. The idea would be to try to avoid involvement of national pride in certain types of limited hostilities.

Secretary Dulles felt that this was a very useful concept. He pointed out that some years back a Volunteer Freedom Corps had been explored but abandoned because of practical considerations. For example, where would the forces be located? However, the Indonesia situation justified a restudy of this problem. Prime Minister Macmillan had raised this question with the President during his recent visit. He had in mind recruiting forces out of the North Atlantic alliance to function somewhat like a UN Emergency Force. Macmillan was keen for the idea and wanted to pursue it further with the President. If such a force was not a US national force, it would meet the type of problem we are going to have to face. Even though Secretary Dulles feels that our massive retaliation policy may be losing credibility, the fact is that it has stopped communist aggression and now the primary threat is subversion. The communists have great assets to carry out subversion.

Secretary Dulles cited their control over various informational media. He pointed out that the communists can effectively assist revolts against legitimate governments. He spoke of their capability to manipulate mass emotions. He referred to their participation in the Lebanon affair. In such a situation, it would be extremely valuable if we could turn to some international force.

Another aspect of this threat is inherent in the world-wide movement toward self-government. Actually this gives promise of being in some cases merely a transfer from one form of despotism to another.

Secretary Dulles cited the slow evolution of American political democracy, pointing out how in the beginning only a small percentage of our governmental officials were directly elected by the people. Contrary to this experience, the new countries today are trying to go directly to an advanced form of democracy. The communists are capitalizing on this fact.

Secretary Dulles spoke of Soviet professional capabilities in agitation and subversive work, and the lack of capability of the US in this respect. He spoke of communist organization in Indonesia in labor groups and among teachers.

The combination of the two above-mentioned aspects of the subversive threat in Secretary Dulles’ judgment is more serious than that of overt military aggression. The USSR believes our strategic doctrine even if our allies don’t. Massive retaliation still has a certain life expectancy, but in the case of civil wars we don’t have a good strategic answer. Perhaps the US will have to go in more for manipulation of government structures of other countries. These questions raise serious problems calling for original thinking.

Secretary McElroy suggested that a joint State-DOD study of the “volunteer” problem be undertaken. Governor Herter pointed out that Allen Dulles was presently thinking about a study of the covert capabilities the US had in this field.

Mr. Brucker recalled that in 1953 a study was made of the Volunteer Freedom Corps idea and recommended that it be reviewed.

Secretary McElroy said that what we needed was a force somewhere between the covert type of force and the US Marines. The question of whether or not such a force would be directly managed by the Pentagon was not important. It was felt that the US could do a good deal to help train and equip such a force. He recognized that such a force would obviously be ascribed to the US and its non-national character would be a fiction, but we would have to learn to deny these things as does the USSR. It was decided that the matter would not be pursued with the UK until we had a US position clarified.

Secretary McElroy said in regard to the strategic concept, the DOD would have another go at preparation of the statement.

Secretary Dulles felt that it was not so much a matter of formally modifying the statement of the present strategic concept or of changing our defense budgets. Rather it was “the way these things are presented.” We must find a way to let our allies feel that there is some “intermediate cushion” between unconditional surrender and total war.

Secretary Dulles recalled the “trip wire” theory put forward by the UK which had proved shocking to Europe and had been rejected. We have more than a “trip wire”. There can be intermediate stages in the application of our military force. Let us learn to become somewhat more articulate about these possibilities.

Secretary McElroy said that he would like to direct more of our allies’ attention to our limited war capabilities—to show them some of our new equipment and our reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities.

Secretary Dulles said that it was a matter of psychology—to get away from the “nuclear death” neurosis that has appeared in Europe. There are other ways of defending ourselves and we must get across to the Europeans that we are not neglecting to develop these ways. However, Secretary Dulles said, if a war comes in Europe he believes that it cannot be kept limited.

Mr. Quarles said that is the most important and the most dangerous problem, and that is why we are so sensitive to any changes in our strategic concept. The dilemma is how to improve our allies’ confidence and yet at the same time keep the Soviet certain that any substantial attack by them in Europe will lead to strategic bombardment of the Soviet Union.

1. Source: Strategic concept for the defense of Europe. Top Secret. 14 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548.
2. NSC policy on France is that we should seek to persuade France not to make nuclear weapons. [Footnote is in the original.]