Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

60. Memoranda From Several DOD/ISA offices¹

Washington, June 11, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PLANNING

SUBJECT

• US and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961

This planning study was received on June 2nd and while the time element imposed upon the Office of Department of Defense is appreciated, the Regional Director, Far East would have preferred additional time for thorough study of so important a matter and to allow more people to express their views.

In general this is an excellent planning study and certainly a good thinking exercise. It cannot help but be felt however that a succession of limited wars or simultaneous limited wars on two far-flung fronts could pitch the U.S. economy and way of life to a point where it might become preferable to throw aside normal restraint and restrictions defined for limited war in this study. Limited wars have brought the UK and France to an economic crisis that has only avoided catastrophy through extensive US support. Also it is felt that the study could stand a little more emphasis on the psychological, economic warfare phases. There is no doubt that limited warfare is precarious at best and any use of nuclear weapons, “Tactical, Minor or Clean”, can hardly but raise a doubt that the action will remain a limited rather than an overt conflict.

Specifically, (1) On page 11, at the end of paragraph 2, after the word “southward” recommend that the period be deleted and the following added: “as a concurrent and supporting operation.” (2) It would appear that the present version of US and Allied capabilities was prepared before the recommendations submitted concerning appendix D were considered. It is suggested that attention be invited to the Regional Director, Far East comments on this subject. (3) Attention is invited in conjunction with the immediately previous comment concerning the U.S. capabilities together with strong loyal Vietnamese forces to reestablish the independence and territorial integrity of Laos. This is not considered possible with forces outlined in this study, especially in view of the conclusion on page 3 that the U.S. cannot assume effective employment outside their national territory of the Vietnamese. (4) Another possible conflict exists in the statement on page 13 that the provision of airlift could present a major problem and the general conclusion that the U.S. has the capability of dealing successfully with the situation. It is suggested that conclusion #1 be hypothecated to some degree to account for the present lack of adequate airlift to move ground forces.

L.M. Stevens, II, Capt. USN for
B.A. Robbins, Jr. Capt. USN
Regional Director, Far East

Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of the Near East, South Asia and Africa Region, DOD/ISA (Bergin) to the Director of the Office of Planning

Washington, June 11, 1958

SUBJECT

• U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961

Reference is made to I–14298/8, returned herewith.

This Regional Office has studied the attached document and, in accordance with your request, desires to comment as follows:

This is a well-constructed study and the conclusions and recommendations appear to grow logically from the facts used, the assumptions employed, and the lines of action considered in the formulation of the 12 hypothetical situations utilized in the development of the study.

Although this Office has been asked to limit itself to major points of substance, it feels obligated to comment on the methodology of the study, since the results flow inescapably from it and their validity depends directly upon it. At the outset, it is agreed that the choice of the method of study—the use of a sampling of hypothetical situations—was a reasonable one, probably the only method applicable. The crux of the matter is stated in Para 5, page 10: “The military responses are hypothetical … and have not been war-gamed to develop detailed plans.” This is understandable, but it does not prepare one for the uncompromisingly self-satisfied tone of Conclusion 1, page 2: “The U.S. has the capability to deal successfully....” Somehow this is all too comfortable, and too comforting, and scarcely squares up with what might well develop in the way of “limited war”.

To cite just a single item: our performance to date in creating adequate transportation capabilities for the “quick” application of U.S. force—the sine qua non of a successful response—has been anything but reassuring. One fears the possible soporific effect upon the NSC of such an optimistic assessment as Conclusion 1, page 2.

On the whole—and with the above reservation—the section labeled “III. CONCLUSIONS”, on pages 2–6, is a very well put-together and persuasive passage, and this Region is in general agreement. It is difficult to conceive of how “nuclear strikes deep into Communist China” will fail to bring on a general war.

With the major caveat that Conclusion 1, page 2, may have mischievous results in creating an unwarranted feeling of self-satisfaction about our conventional forces, this Region feels the paper should prove most interesting to the NSC.

Charles K. Bergin
Rear Admiral, USN
Director
Near East, South Asia and Africa Region

Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of the European Region, DOD/ISA (Guthrie) to the Director of the Office of Planning

Washington, June 10, 1958

SUBJECT

• U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961

The following comments on the study prepared by a State-Defense-JCS Working Group are offered in furtherance of your memorandum of 29 May:

GENERAL COMMENTS:

In view of the importance of a study on this subject, it is considered extremely important that the generalized conclusions and recommendations regarding our military capabilities to conduct such operations must be supported by a detailed analysis and study within the Department of Defense. A review of the attached document indicates that there is no such documentation. Instead, the discussion rests primarily on the views of the authors without any factual backup. In light of this fact, it is considered most important that the Department of Defense should not take a position on this paper in the NSC until such a time as the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been formulated and considered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS:

a. Conclusions:

1. The first conclusion that “The United States has the capability to deal successfully with situations requiring limited military operations” is not completely supported by the remaining conclusions and the discussion. It would seem that the conclusion requires qualification.

2. Reference Para. 4. The intent of the first sentence, i.e., “No military tasks were found to be unique to limited military operations,” is not clear. Certainly many of the tasks which may have to be performed under such conditions would be vastly different from those in the event of general war. This raises the question as to whether the present trend of weapons is such that U.S. forces will become increasingly more inflexible. In this connection, it would appear that this Para. was written primarily from a viewpoint of air operations and does not give due recognition to the problems arising in connection with ground forces.

3. Reference Para. 7. It is noted in this Para. that “initial reliance was placed upon Air and Naval forces because they were in position and most capable of fast reaction.” While the Air and Naval forces may be positioned and capable of fast reaction in certain instances, there is a question as to their capability to react effectively under all situations. In this connection it is pointed out that in the early days of Korea the initial U.S. position was to counter the aggression by use of Air and Naval forces. It soon became evident that such action was not sufficient and that ground forces had to be deployed to the Peninsula at an early date. Although this Para. recognises that in many cases the intervention of U.S. ground forces will be essential, the timely availability of these forces is predicated on their proximity or on available air/sea lift.

4. Reference Paras. 9 and 11. These conclusions indicate that for U.S. forces to be most effective, they must be applied quickly. Yet the rapidity with which ground forces can be committed to action is dependent upon availability of sea/air lift, a questionable capability.

5. Reference Para. 15. This conclusion raises a question as to whether or not the U.S. stocks of “low yield weapons” and “clean weapons” are available in sufficient quantities for use in the operations as visualized to allow the U.S. to carry out defense without generating adverse reactions referred to in Paras. 17 and 18. A more complete factual exploration and exposition of the subject seems indicated.

b. Recommendations:

1. Reference Para. 2. This Para. points out that “even though nuclear weapons are not used in limited military operations, public reaction world-wide, based primarily on fear of general war, will be adverse to U.S. military intervention.” This recommendation would seem to be based more on a matter of opinion than on fact and in this connection it is pointed out that the bulk of the free world applauded the decision of the U.S. intervening in Korea at a time when the prospects of World War III were equal to, if not greater than, might be the case today.

2. Reference Para. 4 (See Para. 5., above). It is not made clear just what degree of “cleanliness” will not arouse adverse world opinion.

3. With reference to Paras. 6 and 7, it would appear that effective and prompt U.S. response to limited military aggression requires facilities and capabilities to a greater extent than that now in existence.

In view of the above comments, it is believed that the first conclusion and the first recommendation are not borne out by the supporting comments and recommendations. As pointed out above, it is believed that ISA should suspend further action on the document pending the receipt of the formal views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to their professional judgment as to any military capability to conduct limited operations.

No detailed comments are made with regard to the “hypothetical situations” in view of the comments contained in Para. 8 of the basic memorandum and of the earlier comments furnished your office by this office.

John S. Guthrie
Brigadier General, USA
Director, European Region

Attachment

Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Comptroller, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Washington, May 29, 1958

SUBJECT

• U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961

1. The inclosed study on the above subject, prepared by a State-Defense-JCS working group is scheduled for transmission to the National Secretary Council by the Secretaries of Defense and State on or before 16 June 1958.

2. Your comments on the study are requested not later than 10 June 1958 to assist the Secretary of Defense in determining the Defense position on the study. It is desired that comments be limited to major points of substance, and be related to the study itself rather than to the attachments detailing the hypothetical situations and hypothetical responses. It is also requested that you return the inclosure hereto with your comments, if you have no particular requirement for its retention.

3. It is requested that the study be handled on a limited distribution basis with access restricted to those with a “need-to-know”.

[illegible in the original]

Attachment

Memorandum to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Assistance Program, the Military Advisor, the Directors of the European Region, the Far East Region, and the Near East, South Asia and Africa Regions, and the Director of the Office of Foreign Military Rights Affairs

Washington, May 29, 1958

SUBJECT

• U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961

1. The inclosed study on the above subject, prepared by a State-Defense-JCS working group is scheduled for consideration by the National Security Council at an early date.

2. Your comments on the study are requested not later than 10 June 1958. It is desired that comments be limited to major points of substance, and be related particularly to the study itself rather than to the attachments detailing the hypothetical situations considered. It is also requested that you return the inclosure hereto with your comments.

3. It is requested that the study be handled on a limited distribution basis with access restricted to those with a “need-to know”.

P.H. Greasley
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, Office of Planning

Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Planning, DOD/ISA

Washington, May 29, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SPRAGUE

SUBJECT

• U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961

1. The study on limited military operations which the State-Defense-JCS working group has prepared is being reproduced by the Joint Staff and is expected to be in our hands this afternoon.

2. General Cutler has indicated the desirability of having the limited military operations study available on or before 16 June so that it can be reviewed by the other members of the Planning Board prior to its consideration on Friday 20 June. As you are aware, the Planning Board is also scheduled to take up at that time the residual problems in the basic policy paper. The close relation between the two studies makes it desirable to speed up the processing of the limited military operations study.

3. Attached for your signature is a brief memorandum requesting comments from appropriate elements of OSD. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be concurrently reviewing the study as will the State Department. It is our intention together with State and the Joint Staff to try to produce shortly after 10 June a draft letter to the NSC which both Secretaries McElroy and Dulles would sign, reflecting their views and comments on the study.

4. Signature is recommended.

P.H. Greasley
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, Office of Planning

1. Source: Comments on “U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961.” Top Secret. 10 pp. NARA, RG 218, JCS Files.