Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

55. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 12, 1956, 3:20 p.m.¹

Washington, June 12, 1956, 3:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
• Secretary of State
• Mr. Hoover
• Mr. Murphy
• Ambassador Conant
• Mr. Bowie
• Mr. Elbrick
• Mr. Charles Sullivan
• Mr. Reinstein
• Federal Republic of Germany
• Chancellor Adenauer
• Prof.-Dr. Hallstein
• Ambassador Krekeler
• Ambassador von Eckhardt
• Dr. Von Kessel
• Dr. Karstens
• Interpreters
• Mrs. Lejins (U.S.)
• Mr. Weber (Federal Republic)
• Reporting Officer
• Jacques J. Reinstein

Mr. Dulles said that he was extremely happy as always to have an exchange of views with Chancellor Adenauer. We attached importance to his views and advice and hoped that he attached importance to our views. The Secretary said that more than usual importance therefore attached to this bilateral exchange.

Mr. Dulles said that he understood there was no agreed agenda. He would be glad to take up any items which the Chancellor would like to bring up. If the points covered by the Chancellor did not cover all those he had in mind, he would raise additional points.

Chancellor Adenauer said he was always glad to come to the United States and to have an exchange of views with the Secretary for the same reasons as those which the Secretary had mentioned. He said he wished to mention in the first place something which he had said to Dr. Conant within the last few days. This was that absolute reliance could be placed on the fact that the German obligations to NATO would be fulfilled. There was a good majority in the Parliament for the actions to be taken and the way had been well considered. There were a variety of laws to be passed. The most important was the conscription law. This would be passed before the summer recess of the Parliament inclusive of its passage by the Bundesrat. A law on the length of service for conscripted personnel would be passed in October at the latest.

The Chancellor said that he wished to make a remark in this connection. The press all over the world was very reliable. It was particularly reliable in Germany. Its reliability extended to what it did not report. He asked that, under these circumstances, particular importance be attached to the reports received by the U.S. Government from its Embassy in Bonn.

Mr. Dulles said that he would be glad to do so on a reciprocal basis.

The Chancellor said that it would be wise to keep secret this appraisal of the reliability of the press.

The Chancellor said that he was glad that the support cost question had been settled. He would have preferred to have had it settled earlier. He thought that, had this been done, it would have been settled more cheaply from his viewpoint. He thought that agreements would shortly be reached with the British and French as well. The Chancellor said that in this connection he wished to mention the very successful negotiations which had taken place the previous week and had resulted in the settlement of the Saar problem on the basis of agreement between the German, French and Saar Governments.² The Saar would be united with Germany on January 1, 1957. A price would have to be paid for this, but this would do no harm. He thought that it was good to have this matter settled as the Germans went into an election year.

The Chancellor said that it might be of interest to the Secretary for him to mention the German elections. In the course of the previous year, his opposition had increased and the size of the coalition had decreased. He thought that he had sent word to the Secretary last December that this might happen.³ He preferred to have a smaller reliable majority than a large unreliable majority. He said that the last elections had been contested over the objective of the EDC. Unfortunately, the EDC had not been achieved. He believed that new goals could be set for the German people. If this task were approached industriously and if the matter were well prepared, the elections could be won. In a country like Germany, foreign policy plays an important role both before and after the elections. It is important that people recognize that they have a good and stable foreign policy.

The Chancellor said that a matter of great importance in this connection was the subject of German reunification or, as he preferred to call it, the liberation of 17 million people. He said the Soviets are rather unscrupulous in the selection of the methods that they apply. They had sent letters to President Eisenhower,⁴ Prime Minister Eden, Premier Mollet, the Italian Government, the Turkish Government and to the German Federal Government as well. In his letter to the Chancellor, Bulganin stated that an agreement on disarmament would facilitate the question of reunification.⁵ The Chancellor said that he would do nothing and send no reply to this letter without consultation with Germany’s allies. It would not be however correct to say that the letter had no significance. He said that he personally did not believe a word of it. He did not believe that anything had changed since the 20th Party Congress. However, one could not say this to the German people. Therefore he wished to suggest that the whole matter could be referred to NATO for study and recommendation. All the NATO countries had not received letters, but all the recipients of letters were NATO states. The subject matter was of importance to all NATO countries.

The Chancellor said that if we proceeded in this way, we could achieve another purpose. Without awaiting the report of the three Wise Men,⁶ we could assign an important political task to NATO. The Russians do not like NATO and think that it will gradually vanish. The stronger it becomes the more the Russians would dislike it.

The Chancellor said this brought him to another point. He thought that his views were known on this subject, that is, that no military alliance against a common enemy could be maintained unless the foreign policy of its members were coordinated. He wished to emphasize in his view an increase of the political activities of NATO should not replace but be supplementary to the military functions of NATO. He mentioned the speech which the Secretary had made some time ago in which he had favored the re-activation of NATO. He was heartily in agreement with what the Secretary had said. Mr. Dulles had mentioned that the Cyprus question had never been discussed in NATO. There were a number of other questions which, in his view, could also be discussed and the policies of the members of NATO coordinated.

The Chancellor said that he thought the coordination of the policies of NATO members was the most important task facing the Western nations. When NATO was founded, we all feared a hot war. A hot war would not come if the NATO member countries remained strong. Meanwhile the Russians were applying the strategy of the cold war, of propaganda, and of economic pressures. The actions of various NATO countries during the last few months made him believe that a greater degree of coordination was necessary. He thought that in a number of cases what had happened had not had the bad results which had been feared. However, if one country extended an invitation to the Soviets, if another country sent a delegation, if countries like the Scandinavians invited the Russian leaders to visit them, this created confusion in the West and built up confidence in Eastern Europe that there would be a breakdown of NATO.

The Chancellor said that there was a theater of cold war against the United States in the Far East but he believed that the European theater would be the decisive one for the United States for reasons which he would enumerate. He said he had not had an opportunity to meet the Secretary since his visit to Moscow and he wished to give him a few impressions of his trip.

The Chancellor said that he had no choice but to go to Moscow. The German people would not have understood it had he not gone. Failure to do so would have left 10,000 prisoners of war and 30,000 to 40,000 refugees in the hands of the Russians. For humanitarian reasons he could not have justified this to his own conscience. However, no word had been spoken which he would not have had Mr. Dulles hear. On the contrary, he wished that Mr. Dulles could have been present. From what Khrushchev and Bulganin had told him, partly in very confidential talks, he thought that two important things had emerged.

The first of these was that the Soviets regarded the United States as their main enemy which they feared. They are convinced that Communism under the USSR will dominate the world. All that he had seen in Russia was a mixture of pan-Slavism, nationalism, a conviction of the sacred duty of Russia and Communism, all directed against the United States. He had noticed that on a Saturday afternoon few people had wanted to see the tombs of Lenin and Stalin. However, there had been many people visiting the Kremlin and the churches in it which had been restored by the Soviet Government at great cost. These were portrayed to them as precious national monuments. Similarly, the tomb of Ivan the Terrible was shown to the people and was viewed with great respect. The Chancellor said that he had come to the conclusion that the Soviets wished to present themselves as the historical successors of the Czars and the spreaders of Slavism.

The second thing was that he had been impressed by the great frankness with which Khrushchev had spoken of the difficulties confronting the Soviets. He was very candid as to these difficulties, particularly in the social field. He had said that the Soviet difficulties had been increased by financial problems, by the problem of keeping pace with the United States in the field of armament, and by the great claims being made on the Soviet Union by Red China. Khrushchev had repeatedly pointed out that the increase of the birth rate in China was over 12 million persons a year. He had said to the Chancellor, “Imagine what you can achieve with these millions of people who live on a handful of rice.” He had added that the Soviets could overcome these difficulties by themselves but they could do it faster with the help of the Germans. That was the main point of talks which had lasted for hours, that is, the help which Germany could give the Soviets. Khrushchev had also spoken of other European countries, the Chancellor said, but he was too polite to repeat what Khrushchev had said.

The Chancellor said that, in conclusion, he wished again to stress that the Soviets regarded NATO under U.S. leadership as their main enemy. This was why it was absolutely necessary in his view to maintain the military strength of NATO and to activate it in the political field. If this happened it would encourage the hopes of the peoples enslaved by the Soviet Union.

The Chancellor said that he wished to speak of the weaknesses of NATO. The Federal Republic had chosen as its representatives to NATO Ambassador Blankenhorn, one of the best men in its foreign office. From a great number of talks which he had had with Blankenhorn regarding the activities of NATO, he did not have the impression that all of the NATO countries had selected distinguished men as their representatives. He had also received the impression that a number of NATO governments did not inform their Ambassadors of the world political situation or give them instruction on these matters. The only explanation which he could give was that initially the military aspects of NATO had been the main focus of its activities and that there had been a tendency for these activities to run in the same groove. As the situation had been changed, other governments had not drawn the necessary consequences.

The Chancellor said that he thought the first thing to do was to instill new life into the NATO Council. In the second place, it was necessary that the foreign ministers of the NATO countries should keep their ambassadors to NATO better informed. It was also necessary that the Secretary-General be given greater power. Finally, the state secretaries in the ministries of foreign affairs or their deputies should have regular meetings with the NATO ambassadors to discuss the world political situation. All these measures should be taken as soon as possible without awaiting the report of the Three Wise Men. They would simply involve administrative measures which each individual country could take. If the leading countries were to take them, the others would follow suit. The Chancellor said that if the Secretary could accept the suggestion that the Bulganin letter should be studied and discussed in NATO, this could be the occasion of these reform measures.

The Chancellor said that it was desirable that the Bulganin letters be taken up in NATO for another reason. The Russians had tried in their various letters to split the NATO countries. If the letters were discussed in NATO, the Soviets would give up this effort. The Russians employ extremely crude methods. They would understand crude countermeasures. The Chancellor remarked in this connection that, when he was in Moscow, Bulganin had told him with considerable satisfaction of having received a letter from President Eisenhower. This was the type of simple measure which the Russians took to create the dissatisfaction.

The Chancellor said that he wished to make a comment on the 20th Party Congress. At the beginning, he thought, the condemnation of Stalin was a blow directed against Khrushchev. Khrushchev was clearly on the way toward becoming a new Stalin. The Chancellor could not imagine that Mikoyan could have started the matter without the backing of Bulganin. Then Khrushchev, who is an adroit and sly customer, had put himself at the head of the movement. Perhaps he had condemned Stalin too much. This would eventually be seen by the results in the satellite countries. The Chancellor said that Stalin had once done the same thing in 1937. He had written a number of chapters in a book on the horrors of a one-man dictatorship and said that the Communist Party should return to the principle of collective leadership.

The Chancellor said that Mollet had given him a report of the talks which he and Pineau had had with Khrushchev and Bulganin in Moscow.⁷ The influence and role of Khrushchev appeared to be greater than when the Chancellor had been in Moscow in September. He had had the impression at that time that the two were on an equal level. However this was not Mollet’s impression. By way of proof, the Chancellor said that in the talks with Mollet, although Bulganin entered the room first it was Khrushchev who sat opposite Mollet and who conducted the negotiations. When the Chancellor had been in Moscow, Bulganin had sat opposite him and conducted the negotiations. The Chancellor concluded that during the intervening time the roles of Khrushchev and Bulganin had been reversed.

Another observation which the Chancellor made indicating a change in the Soviet Union was the following. When the German delegation was in Moscow, the Red Army had played no part in the discussions. There had been a large reception in St. George’s Hall, at which there had been a small group of marshals in a corner. The soldiers had played no significant role. On the other hand, Mollet had told him that the Soviet marshals were present at all the meetings and at the receptions. The Chancellor said that this had confirmed an impression which he had had that Khrushchev had established closer relations with the Red Army. He also had the impression that Zhukov was on bad terms with Bulganin because the latter had suggested that Zhukov be banned in Stalin’s time.

The Chancellor concluded that since September Khrushchev had become the leading figure in the Soviet Union and that Bulganin was no longer first or even equal. Also, since September, the Red Army had become a more significant factor. He said that he did not think it was necessary for him to speak on the personality of Khrushchev whom the Secretary had met at Geneva. He thought the Secretary would agree with him that he was a dangerous type of man.

Mr. Dulles thanked the Chancellor for his views on these important matters. He said he would comment in turn on the matters which had been mentioned. Mr. Dulles said in the first place, he had no doubt that the Federal Republic would discharge its obligations as a member of NATO. He was not unaware of the difficulties which the Chancellor had encountered nor was he surprised by them. He had previously noted similar difficulties in Japan, which had recovered its sovereignty earlier. He thought he might repeat in confidence something which he had said to Prime Minister Yoshida two or three years ago. He had said that a nation under present conditions is not fully sovereign unless it contributes a fair share to the forces needed to maintain peace and order. A nation which does not have an appreciable military force of its own is not a fully sovereign state but a protected state which is not entitled to speak fully on foreign affairs. The Secretary said that we all hope the time will come when arms are limited and disarmament prevails. Until then, provision of the forces needed to preserve peace in the world is a measure of a nation’s maturity. He had no doubt that the German people would support the Chancellor’s efforts in this connection not merely because of their obligations to NATO, important though that is, but because unless this were done Germany could not speak on world affairs to the degree to which she is entitled.

The Secretary said he wished next to express his appreciation of the action taken by the Federal Republic to provide support costs for the next year. He knew how difficult these things were, particularly when a government had such a good finance minister.

Mr. Dulles said that he believed both the Federal Republic and the French Republic were entitled to a great deal of gratitude from the rest of the world for having reached what one would hope to be a solution of the Saar problem. The fact that the Saar will, with the assent of the people of the Saar and the assent of France, become integrated with the Federal Republic represents a great achievement for the Chancellor.

Mr. Dulles said that the Chancellor had referred to the forthcoming German elections. As the Chancellor knew, he had to be scrupulously neutral in referring to elections in other countries. He wished to assure the Chancellor that his sentiments of neutrality were the same as four years previously.

The Secretary referred to the problems of NATO to which the Chancellor had devoted a large part of his remarks. He said that he was in general agreement with what the Chancellor had said. An alliance of this kind could not be strong and stable unless there is basic accord among its members on foreign policy. Since the speech he had made to which the Chancellor had alluded a great deal of thought had been given by the United States to what to do about harmonizing the foreign policies of the NATO members. The problem was somewhat difficult from the standpoint of the United States because it has world-wide interests to a greater degree than other nations. While the United States desires greater harmony in the policies of NATO countries, it does not want this at the cost of submitting its world-wide policies to scrutiny and veto in the North Atlantic Council. The Secretary said that he had had an informal talk the previous day at great length with Mr. Pearson, who is studying this problem.⁸ He had suggested to Mr. Pearson that there might be a demarcation between foreign policies relating rather directly to the NATO area and foreign policies which while of interest are not of direct concern to NATO. He had had prepared for him an informal paper for talking purposes in which were listed a number of subjects on which he thought there were unfortunately no common policies among the NATO governments. It might be of interest to the Chancellor if he read this list, on which there should be coordination of policies. He said he would do so adding more comments than he had given Mr. Pearson:

1. The Unity of Germany.

The Secretary said that while we all give lip service to the reunification of Germany, it is not certain that all NATO governments act on the principle that the unification of Germany is indispensable, that it must be achieved quickly, and that it is something without which the peace of Europe cannot be achieved. The Secretary said that he believed that if there were a genuine concert of purpose on this subject, that if all of us impressed upon the Soviet Union that the unification of Germany was the first thing which must be done, this concert of purpose could be achieved.

2. The Rebirth of Freedom of the European Satellites.

The Secretary said that in his opinion the present situation particularly lends itself to the liberation of 17 million Germans and the development of a considerable measure of independence by the so-called satellites. He said that there is a great deal of confusion in the Communist parties. There is a great deal of uncertainty on the part of the leaders in the satellites as to what the future holds for them. There are feelings of ambition which are stirred by the example of Tito. There is a strong desire for a higher standard of living. These are opportunities which have not existed previously and may not continue. There should be common policies to utilize these opportunities.

3. Soviet and Chinese Approaches on the Limitation of Armaments, Trade and East-West Contacts.

The Secretary said that, as the Chancellor had pointed out, it had turned out that no great harm has come from the visits of Khrushchev and Bulganin to London and Mollet to Moscow. These visits were undertaken without consultation in NATO and great harm could have resulted from them. When General Twining had been invited to visit Moscow for Aviation Day, the U.S. had intended to have consultation in NATO about the matter. We had found that the British and French had immediately accepted similar invitations so that there was no occasion for consultation. The Secretary remarked that there are powerful Communist parties in France and Italy. He thought that countries which do not have such parties do not always think of the effect their actions could have on the standing of the parties in these countries.

4. Relations with Peripheral Areas.

Mr. Dulles said that he had in mind colonies and under-developed areas adjoining the NATO area such as North Africa. He did not include all colonies which he regarded as too vast a subject for NATO but those in close-lying areas such as North Africa.

5. Activities of International Communism in NATO Countries.

Mr. Dulles said that at the meeting of the Organization of American States at Caracas in 1954, he had obtained a resolution recognizing that if international Communism gained control in any one of the American states, this was a matter of concern to all and for action by all. He supposed it would be difficult to get acceptance of this principle by all NATO countries but in his opinion the principle was a valid one.

6. The Threat to the Flow of Oil From the Middle East.

Mr. Dulles said that at the present time Western Europe received daily 2-½ million barrels of oil from the Middle East. This oil moves through pipelines which run through Syria or through the Suez Canal, which is under Egyptian control. The industry of Western Europe would be paralyzed and the operation of NATO would be greatly impaired if the USSR or its friends or agents were able to cut off this oil.

7. Further Integration of Western Europe.

Mr. Dulles said that projects such as EURATOM and the common market are vital for the salvation of Western Europe, but there are differences of policy among the NATO countries on these subjects. The USSR is transforming itself rapidly, with the benefit of forced labor, into a modern and efficient industrial state in which atomic energy would be important. It would have an assured common market of 800 million people. He said he did not think Western Europe could survive economically with what in many countries are obsolete plants, with cartels, with small markets, all resulting in high costs. He thought that at the present time the economic danger from the Soviet Union was perhaps greater than the military danger.

8. Differences among NATO Countries.

Mr. Dulles said that he had in mind such differences as the Cyprus problem which could not perhaps now be wisely brought before NATO but which might well have been before the situation had developed to its present dangerous point.

Mr. Dulles said that, while the Chancellor would see that he did not propose to bring all the problems of the world into NATO, he thought the list which he had presented included matters of great importance.

Mr. Dulles said that he agreed with what the Chancellor had said about the quality of representation in NATO, which in many cases had not come up to the standard which had been set by the Federal Republic and the U.S. The U.S. representative in NATO is a former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and has Mr. Dulles’ full confidence. If he has not entered into a discussion of all these problems, it is because there is no common agreement among the NATO governments that these problems should be discussed in the Council. Mr. Dulles said that he had told Mr. Pearson that if there were a common desire on the part of the NATO governments to do so, the U.S. Government would be prepared to keep its Permanent Representative in touch with the thinking of the President and of the Secretary of State regarding these matters. He himself believed that the evolution of NATO should be along the lines which had been discussed.

Mr. Dulles said that the Chancellor had suggested that, as an experiment, the NATO governments should submit to the Council their replies to the Bulganin letters. He thought that the U.S. would be prepared to have the topic raised very promptly and discussed by the Permanent Representatives to see what comes out of the discussion. He remarked that there were certain aspects of the reply which would have to differ in each case. The U.S. would want to say, without blowing its own trumpet, that it had materially reduced the number of its forces even before the Russian had done so. There are also references to Germany and to troops in Germany which should be the subject of a common response by the Federal Republic and the powers which have special responsibilities in Germany.

Mr. Dulles said that he was always afraid, when it came to consultation about documents which are to be public, the result would be based on the policy of the most timid government. He recalled at the last NATO meeting Pineau had fought against any reference in the communiqué which was less than friendly to the USSR.

The Secretary said that within these limitations he believed that the U.S. could accept the Chancellor’s suggestion with regard to the Bulganin letter, to see how it worked. He thought that perhaps it would be possible to give more concrete form to this proposal and there might be an opportunity to discuss it further the following day.

The Secretary said he appreciated the information and appraisal which the Chancellor had given of his visit to Moscow and the development of the Russian leadership. In general, the Chancellor’s analysis lay along the lines of U.S. thinking but it was useful to have an authoritative confirmation of this thinking.

Mr. Dulles said he believed he had covered most of the points which the Chancellor had mentioned but he wished to make one or two additional comments. He thought the American nation as a whole, both its government and people, recognized that the Soviet Government was hostile to the U.S. and is planning by all possible means to extend Communism throughout the world. One might perhaps gather from the press, to which the Chancellor had alluded, that there were great differences within the United States. He himself thought that on the contrary there was an extraordinary degree of unity and resolution. He said that discussions were going on at the moment about the Mutual Security Program. He thought the appropriations would be as great as those of the last year. The doubt was as to whether they would be greater. This doubt arose from two causes. One relates to technical matters involving the accounting methods of the Defense Department relating to how much is in the pipeline. The second reflects questions in the minds of some people as to the resolution of our allies and whether it is worthwhile to help them. However, there is no doubt in anyone’s mind as to the resolution of the Chancellor. There is a feeling that there is softness in some places and perhaps money proposed to be spent for foreign aid could be spent to better advantage otherwise.

Mr. Dulles said that there was no doubt in the U.S. as to the hostile purpose of the Soviet Union nor as to the resolution of the U.S. to meet this challenge. He said that the U.S. would maintain its military power to devastate the Soviet Union. We believe that this would be a deterrent to a general war and we remain ready and determined to help any allies who are prepared to stand firm.

Chancellor Adenauer said that he wished to express his appreciation for what the Secretary had said and to add a few words of explanation to his previous remarks. With respect to NATO, he did not have in mind giving it a veto power. He was thinking of a genuine discussion of a variety of problems. He recalled that there were various matters which had already been discussed which did not involve military matters, for example, embargo policy [East-West trade controls].⁹ When he recalled that the invitation which had been sent to Pineau had originally been extended to Pinay and that it might have gone to Mendes-France, he thought that the subject of visits was one on which consultation would be useful. In this connection, he mentioned that Nasser had wanted to come to Bonn. He had consulted the British Government, which had thought that an invitation would be undesirable. As a result, the Federal Republic had not extended one. The Chancellor thought that this would have been a useful subject for discussion by NATO. As regards the answer to the Bulganin letter, the Chancellor said that he did not have in mind that NATO would work out a text but that it would discuss the matter and that the wording of the replies would be differentiated according to the circumstances.

The Chancellor also commented on the varying accounts regarding what Khrushchev had said to Mollet in Moscow. He said that Pineau had given an interpretation to Khrushchev’s remarks which was impossible even on philological grounds but that there was no doubt in his mind that Mollet had said what the Chancellor had attributed to him.

The Chancellor suggested that the Secretary ask his staff to evaluate whether things were going well in the Soviet Union. He said that the Secretary had referred to the building of atomic energy plants in the USSR. Khrushchev had given him a glowing account of Soviet development of atomic energy. However, Malenkov had told him that this was far from true and that he did not agree as to the possibilities of nuclear energy. Malenkov had said that he thought the British atomic energy program was too optimistic. Malenkov had also told him that because of the shortage of power, the Soviets are trying to develop power on the rivers in the Arctic regions. This, however, was a vast enterprise which would take a long time to develop. With respect to the Secretary’s remarks regarding common markets in the Soviet bloc, the Chancellor remarked that 600 million of the 800 million people involved are Chinese. Even Khrushchev is afraid of the 600 million. The Chancellor said that he thought one should take a calm view of developments in the Soviet Union. Conditions were bad particularly in agriculture. He had seen this for himself. This was also the impression of Pineau, who took an extensive trip in the country. He said that for some months he had been trying to find out about the population of the Soviet Union and its movement. There were three different sources of information which gave conflicting results. He was inclined to view any information received with great skepticism. He had talked with numerous prisoners of war who had been in various parts of the Soviet Union. Their reports were that conditions were bad. They had to feed their Russian fellow workers from the Red Cross packages which they had received.

Mr. Dulles said that he had not intended to give the impression that all was well in the Soviet Union. He knew quite well that the Soviets were over-extended in many fields and that they had a real problem in agriculture. On the other hand, they have a rate of industrial growth which is more rapid than that of Western Europe. He thought it would be a mistake not to be concerned with this competition, having in mind that it would not be normal competition but an instrument of economic warfare. He realized that there was an immense demand in the Soviet Union for all that could be produced, but there is a possibility that this demand would be suppressed as heretofore for purposes of Soviet expansionism.

The Chancellor said that he thought there was a great deal of truth in what the Secretary said. However, he did not believe that Khrushchev would have mentioned the Soviet difficulties so frankly unless these difficulties really existed, particularly the stress which he had placed on social problems and the demands of the Chinese. He said one should not overlook the fact that a new generation is growing up, including the children of the party leaders, who are used to things which they would not wish to give up. He thought that one should watch developments in the Soviet Union very carefully and should do nothing which would in any way help the Soviets.

The Chancellor said that he would like to raise two additional points. The first of these was the Saar agreement. He said that an agreement was concluded in 1946 between the U.S., U.K., and French regarding the Saar. He wished to ask whether the new Saar agreement could go into effect without U.S. and U.K. approval. Otherwise, the Russians might want to give their approval.

The second matter was that of the German assets in the U.S. Many people have expected that the $10,000 bill will be enacted. It would be a great disappointment if the Senate did not settle this matter. He recalled that it was hoped that this would only be a beginning.

Mr. Dulles said that he would have the Saar matter looked into from the U.S. viewpoint.¹⁰ As to the matter of German assets, he had looked into it within the last day or so. The legislation required action by the House of Representatives as well as the Senate, and there was a prospect of delays in that house as well. He said that we would do what we could but that there was a doubt in his mind as to whether any action could be taken this year.

The Chancellor said that he intended to see Senator Johnston and to speak to him about this. He hoped the Secretary would not object.

Mr. Dulles said that he would not. He said that he thought he should mention that he did not believe there was any understanding on the U.S. side as to further steps beyond the return up to $10,000. The Chancellor said that in speaking of hopes he was referring only to the German Government and not to the U.S. Government. The Secretary said that one could have hopes but should not have expectations.

Mr. Dulles suggested that the discussion might be continued the following day after lunch at the Blair House.

It was agreed that the Communiqué would be dealt with on the following day and that meanwhile the following statement would be given informally to the press:

“The Chancellor and the Secretary of State exchanged views on the reunification of Germany, the message addressed by Bulganin to various NATO governments, and the future development and strengthening of NATO. The Chancellor made a personal report on his trip last year to Moscow. This is a brief report of the meeting today. A communiqué will be issued following tomorrow’s conversations.”¹¹

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 711. Confidential. Drafted by Reinstein. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ Appointment Book.
2. Following the defeat of the Saar plebiscite on October 23, 1955, negotiations were resumed between France and the Federal Republic of Germany to reach agreement on the future status of the Saar. On June 4, Adenauer and Mollet at a meeting in Luxembourg agreed that the Saar would return to Germany. Documentation on the Saar is in Department of State, Central File 762A.011.
3. See Document 39.
4. In a June 6 letter to Eisenhower, Bulganin proposed, among other things, that in line with recent Soviet reductions in troops and armaments, the United States, Great Britain, and France also take steps to reduce their forces in Germany. Bulganin’s letter, August 20, 1956, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, pp. 300–301. Eisenhower’s reply of August 4, 1956, is printed in Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1956, pp. 593–595.
5. For text of this letter, dated June 6, see Moskau Bonn, pp. 182–183.
6. In May 1956, the North Atlantic Council established a three-man committee (Three Wise Men) to advise on ways to improve cooperation in nonmilitary fields and to develop greater unity within the alliance. For documentation, see vol. IV, pp. 137 ff.
7. Mollet and Pineau paid an official visit to the Soviet Union May 15–19.
8. Pearson visited the United States June 9–11.
9. Brackets in the source text.
10. Professor Hallstein later stated that this request could be disregarded. [Footnote in the source text.]
11. A handwritten note by Elbrick at the bottom of the source text reads: “Approved for distribution. CBE”.