Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

489. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, July 23, 1956—4 p.m.

69. From conversation yesterday Embassy Counselor with senior officials Prime Minister’s office and Foreign Ministry, Embassy transmits following preliminary and partial summary Hammarskjold-Ben Gurion conversations July 19–20. (While record adequate one session attended by Foreign Minister, Ben Gurion’s notes his private conversations SYG called “sketchy”.)

1. From trend of discussions, Israelis have concluded that decision Hammarskjold to return to area was based on concern that exercise GOI retaliation policy might evolve into large scale hostilities. GOI has discarded earlier-held theory that visit was due to some important development during SYG’s Moscow talks.

2. Although Hammarskjold placed great emphasis Soviet support and cooperation his efforts, when discussions got down to specific points it was not clear as to reality this support. Israelis have concluded that Hammarskjold either exaggerating re Soviet desire peace and stability in the area or that he is not revealing his hand at this time.

3. Unlike previous visit, Hammarskjold took no initiative to discuss Banat Yaacob problem. Finally, Ben Gurion reminded him that he had promised to raise question possible solution with Russians. SYG replied that he had discussed matter with Shepilov, emphasizing need for settlement and his view that Jews had legitimate right to protest against indefinite postponement their economic development. Shepilov reportedly replied in very general terms that Jordan diversion plan was very complex problem which could not be resolved quickly.

Hammarskjold told Ben Gurion that he had discussed matter with Eric Johnston; that Johnston was a “success man” who appeared frustrated that his project had failed; and that Johnston appeared disposed to turn over entire matter to Hammarskjold. SYG said he wanted to cooperate but was not prepared to go that far. Question whether Johnston would return to area was in abeyance.

(In brief conversation with Hammarskjold at luncheon which Foreign Minister gave for him on July 20, I referred to importance of Jordan River plan to peaceful solution Arab-Israel problem and to splendid job which Johnston had done and inquired as to future developments. SYG replied “it is too soon—much too soon for Johnston”, perhaps thus reflecting his disappointment with Moscow discussions this subject.)

4. Ben Gurion inquired of Hammarskjold as to whether he had asked Shepilov why Soviets had supported Arabs in deletion “mutually acceptable” provision of SC resolution.² SYG replied that he had and Shepilov had said that Soviet action was merely “an episode”; that it wasn’t really important; and that Soviets stood by their April 17 declaration³ on this question. (Also see Embdes 24, July 12⁴).

5. Meeting with Foreign Minister and her associates was concentrated on GAA and cease-fire. SYG reaffirmed his position that right of self-defense does not include right to retaliate; stated that he was very disturbed Israel attitude and that if hostilities grew out of retaliation world would hold Israel responsible. Myerson took strong exception, as did Ben Gurion, to this thesis, stating that Israel could not survive, in face Arab unwillingness control border, without deterrent of retaliation. When SYG protested particularly use of organized military forces for reprisals with disproportionate losses to Arabs, Myerson said alternative would be to permit individual Israel settlement to avenge itself on individual Arab village responsible for border incident. This however, would mean action aimed at civilians. Hammarskjold, to surprise of Israelis, reportedly said that he considered settlement action less evil than organized military action. Ben Gurion and Hammarskjold ended discussion with stalemate on retaliation question.

SYG raised question Israel non-compliance Israel-Egyptian GAA re restriction placed on movement, photographic work and communications of UNTSO observers in the DZ. Ben Gurion replied that Israel was within its rights and that he had been considering complete exclusion observers on grounds Egypt excluded them from area its side demarcation line. Prime Minister reportedly agreed defer decision until SYG had talked with Nasser.

6. Ben Gurion claims that he reached rapport with SYG his thesis settlement Israel-Arab problem must grow from indigenous roots and cannot be imposed from outside. SYG quoted as saying Soviets concurred that direct Israel-Arab negotiations constituted most promising approach.

Lawson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.56/7–2356. Secret; Noforn. Received at 9:41 p.m., July 24. Repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem, Amman, London, Paris, Moscow, Beirut, Damascus, and USUN.
2. See Document 376.
3. See Document 291.
4. Despatch 24 from Tel Aviv, July 12, reported a conversation among William L. Hamilton and Ivan B. White of the Embassy and Gideon Rafael on July 11. Rafael had expressed his belief that Hammarskjöld was encouraged about Shepilov’s attitude after a conversation between the two. Shepilov had insisted to Hammarskjöld that the Soviets still supported the idea of a mutually satisfactory settlement. Shepilov had also dismissed the June 4 Security Council resolution as an isolated incident. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.022/7–1256)