Office of the Historian

411. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Secretary of State1

Washington, June 27, 1956.

SUBJECT

  • Shepilov’s Visit to Egypt …

The attached report summarizes the information on the Shepilov visit to Egypt ….

Allen W. Dulles

[Enclosure]

SHEPILOV’S VISIT TO EGYPT …

A. Background of the Visit

1.
The invitation to Dmitriy T. Shepilov to visit Egypt during the Evacuation Week celebration was issued some months prior to June, 1956, when Shepilov was still editor of Pravda. Following the announcement that Shepilov had been appointed to succeed V.M. Molotov as Soviet Foreign Minister, the Egyptian Government professed embarrassment at having Shepilov come on what would seem like an official visit. In an attempt to lend an appearance of political balance to their ceremonies, the Egyptian Government sounded out [Page 752] the British on having Sir Anthony Nutting come as a representative. When Nutting could not attend, an invitation was extended to General Brian Robertson, last British commander in Egypt… . Prime Minister ‘Abd–al–Nasr finally decided to invite all foreign ministers of the Arab states and to revamp the reviewing stand seating arrangements to prevent Shepilov from occupying a position of honor as the ranking foreign diplomat.
2.
In the days immediately prior to Shepilov’s scheduled visit, rumors of his probable purpose centered around these principal points:
a)
that Shepilov would have a new plan for Soviet financing of the Aswan High Dam;
b)
that the USSR would announce support for the 1947 and 1949 UN resolutions on Palestine;
c)
that Shepilov would offer ‘Abd–al–Nasr a Soviet friendship pact.
3.
… the GOE, although expecting Shepilov to present many new social and political proposals, actually had no advance knowledge of any specific Soviet offers… . ‘Abd–al–Nasr intended to listen to all Shepilov proposals but to commit himself to nothing during the discussion.

B. Shepilov’s Proposals

1.
… Shepilov offered the following proposals to ‘Abd–al–Nasr on 17 June 1956:
a)
a Soviet plan to finance the Aswan High Dam over a ten–year period. The USSR offered $400,000,000, interest–free loan, half in sterling, with repayment to be spread over 60 years;
b)
the Soviet bloc would buy all of Egypt’s cotton and pay for it in sterling;
c)
the USSR would require no further payments for arms Egypt has already received;
d)
the USSR would build a new steel factory for Egypt and construct other factories on very favorable terms.
2.
Shepilov told ‘Abd–al–Nasr that the USSR is aware of the strong pressure exerted by the West on Egypt to take actions which would weaken its economy. The USSR desires to help Egypt resist these pressures.
3.
There is no evidence that Shepilov made any proposals or direct comments on the Israel problem, or offered a treaty of friendship.
[Page 753]

C. Egyptian Reaction to the Shepilov Proposals

. . . . . . .

2.
On 22 June, in discussing the financing of the High Dam … the Egyptian Premier stated that nothing could be done until an agreement on the division of the Nile water was reached with the Sudan. Although the Soviets did not make this a pre–condition, he said, there was no other way to build it than by force; this would lead to a Sudanese appeal to the UN and a probable setback for Egypt.
3.
During the week of Shepilov’s visit, Cairo was flooded with communist tracts stating that although the communists are basically opposed to ‘Abd–al–Nasr’s domestic policies, it was now necessary to support him in order to protect Egypt against imperialism and international capitalism… . this line was now being followed by the three major communist factions in Cairo.
4.
As far as can be determined, no specific, firm agreements emerged from the Shepilov–’Abd–al–Nasr meetings. A joint communiqué declaring the complete unity of opinion on all subjects discussed and acknowledging a common interest in developing Soviet–Egyptian relations in political, economic and cultural fields was issued before Shepilov departed.
5.
… ‘Abd–al–Nasr … is apprehensive of Soviet offers and has definite misgivings about committing the nation to long–range economic dependence on the Soviet bloc. ‘Abd–al–Nasr would prefer to receive major economic assistance from the United States and the West. He told a confidant that he would not accept the Soviet offers at this time but would wait until his departure for Yugoslavia (12 July) to see whether the United States would make a firm counteroffer.

D. Comments …

1.
Shepilov apparently presented a series of attractive offers but ‘Abd–al–Nasr seems disposed to think them over carefully, perhaps leaking information on them to the United States, hoping for some balancing offer from the West.
2.
Indications are that ‘Abd–al–Nasr still has as a primary objective the maintenance of an independent position between Soviet and Western blocs. The Shepilov discussions, although an outgrowth of ceremonies originally planned for Evacuation week, provided ‘Abd–al–Nasr with another opportunity to put pressure on the West.
3.
‘Abd–al–Nasr is probably anxious to avoid a break with the United States. His judgment as to how far he can safely go with the Soviet bloc without precipitating such a break, is probably affected, however, by his determination to settle the Israeli issue on Arab terms and to continue his campaign against British and French positions in Africa and the Middle East.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.74/6–2756. Secret. The source text bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw this memorandum and its enclosure.↩