Office of the Historian

410. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1

Tehran, November 7, 1957—5 p.m.

907. Re Deptel 922.2 Following is our estimate current thinking of Shah:

(1)
Soviet penetration in Syria, along with worsening general situation in Middle East, of concern to Shah, who has real stake in Baghdad Pact, and is directly affected by any change in relative strength and influence of US and USSR in area.
(2)
Recent technical developments may indicate to him USSR approaching if not outstripping US in terms military potential. Shah may at times feel that the uncompromising pro-Western stance to which he has hitherto adhered may endanger his position to the degree that deterrent power of West relative to that of USSR has diminished.
(3)
Soviet diplomatic attitude displays eagerness reach accommodation with Iran Government. Soviet Radio now constantly praising Shah and regime and hinting attractive economic aid terms.
(4)
Shah has feeling that due to increasing demands particularly in European economy for oil and what he believes to be vast and easily exploitable Iranian reserves, he is in a commanding position vis-à-vis West.
(5)
Shah hears from his advisers that more US economic and financial aid necessary to enable regime fulfill minimum political commitments. While Shah willing back such requests, he far more interested military hardware and installations. Shah personally appears under psychological compulsions which lead him to desire military forces well over and above what might be objectively required for internal security, prestige, or a rational contribution to regional collective security. Moreover, indications decrease in general level US aid disquieting, since high level aid in all fields believed by him to be not only deserved return for pro-Western attitude of regime, but also barometer of degree of US support and protection.
(6)
Against background above, combination [garble] traditional suspicion and deliberate mischief making have resulted widespread impression in Iran, probably shared by Shah to some extent, that US working with urban middle class leaders against regime. Because of his impression that US has been against Italian oil agreement, opposition attacks on this agreement, about which Shah shows great personal sensitivity, have added fuel to fire.
(7)
Shah beginning realize his rule, which more and more that of absolute monarch, has not attracted and is not attracting degree of popular hope, confidence, and support he would like. A prime reaction is for him to intensify domestic divide and rule policy, and to some extent encourage counter-weight to US influence.
(8)
All factors above combine to tempt Shah make gestures friendship toward USSR. Shah tempted approach Soviets in order: (1) frighten US into more aid and, in his mind, more whole-hearted support his regime, (2) be in position influence Soviets against exerting pressure on him and Iran, and (3) divert public.
(9)
Following developments might reverse Shah’s current trend thinking and diminish temptation make gestures toward Soviets: (a) spectacular demonstration US technical and scientific superiority, (b) solid diplomatic defeat for Soviet policy in ME, specifically in Syria, (c) switch in Soviet propaganda tactics to tough line including personal attacks on Shah, (d) perceptible increase level US aid to Iran, particularly re military hardware and installations.
(10)
Embassy believes Shah will confine self to surface gestures towards Soviets since he will recognize reality Soviet threat regime and Iran independence. At same time, however, Shah and advisers believe selves to be far more clever than Russians, and feel they can play around the trap without springing it if they wish to take necessary risk.3 Embassy still believes Shah too intelligent fall into Soviet trap, although further friendly gestures toward USSR quite likely. In circumstances [Page 953] Embassy believes we should remain calm, reiterate points (1) and (2) set forth in reference telegram, and await opportunities which may be offered by further development.

Chapin
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.88/11–757. Confidential. Repeated to London and Moscow.↩
  2. In telegram 922, November 5, the Department of State expressed concern at “recent adverse developments in US-Iranian relations” and suggested frank discussions among Chapin, the Shah, Ala, and Ardalan to counter this deterioration. The Department was particularly concerned with rumors in Tehran that the United States was “playing with” Iranian opposition leaders and with signs that the Iranian Government was adopting a more friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union. (Ibid., 611.88/11–457)↩
  3. At this point the word “dangerous” is written in the margin of the source text in an unidentified hand.↩