Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

Washington, June 4, 1952—11 a.m.

Rescreening of Prisoners of War

General, Bradley: Do you want to take up the draft message about rescreening? (The draft message attached to Mr. Johnson’s memorandum of June 2 to Messrs. Matthews, Nitze, etc.²) In the first place, we think that since it is in the propaganda field and has a world-wide effect on our allies it really is a political problem. Two things worry us. One is the use of the word “rescreening”. We have offered to let them rescreen after an armistice but that is not what we have in mind now. We don’t expect them to interrogate everybody before an armistice but only a sampling. The Communists are going to do a lot of talking when they go back. You don’t run into this problem in a unilateral interrogation.

Mr. Matthews: On the first point I don’t see any objection to changing the word.

Mr. Johnson: We don’t see any objection. We have already agreed to that. In fact, we have agreed to the Army redraft.

Mr. Nitze: On the second point, if an armistice is to be concluded immediately thereafter, then it would be a complete rescreening.

Mr. Matthews: The chances of the Commies accepting this are less than a hundred to one. As to the propaganda, what they would say when they went home would be bad anyway.

Mr. Bohlen: The key thing is that the results should be accepted by both sides. If you got an armistice, you would not care what they said.

General Bradley: Not if you got an armistice.

Mr. Matthews: It certainly would help with our allies.

General Bradley: There is a divergence of view between the Chiefs. Some think there should be no rescreening.

Mr. Matthews: Some of our people have doubts about paragraph 3(b) which suggests unilateral interrogation. The message, however, only asks for Communist interrogation.

Mr. Johnson: Harrison has almost been saying this already in the meetings and the Commies have turned it down.

Mr. Matthews: He hasn’t specified whether the rescreening would be before or after an armistice.

General Bradley: We think paragraphs 3(a) and (b)³ are both primarily political, but we wanted to put forward some of the dangers that we saw.

Mr. Matthews: There is another point in the message about getting away from daily meetings. I would like to strengthen that part. The last sentence of the message says that we perceive no objection to occasional interruption in the meetings. We would like to change the language to say that we would like interruptions and thereby strengthen it.

General Bradley: Well, that is all right.

Admiral Fechteler: I have no objection to sending the message, but I don’t agree with 3(a) or (b). I want to be sure that Clark has a free chance to comment.

Mr. Johnson: We certainly can make that clear.

Admiral Fechteler: He ought to be able to come and say both alternatives are bad.

Mr. Bohlen: We can say we want his comments before we draw any conclusion.

Mr. Nitze: You can say “additional measures, if taken, should”.

Admiral Fechteler: That would do it.

General Bradley: I don’t think there is any doubt we would like to accomplish these things.

General Collins: Could we say “additional measures, if any are taken, should”?

Mr. Matthews: I have an additional suggestion in paragraph 8. I would suggest we say “It is clear that the question of Chinese POWs is more important than North Korean POWs”.

General Collins: I have a suggestion in paragraph 6. If you take the first sentence of 6 out of context it is bad. We ought to change it to read “alleged facts”. In Part II, paragraph 4, the words “impartial rescreening” should be “interrogations”. In paragraph 5 it should be rescreening.

General Bradley: The next to the last word in paragraph 4 refers to rescreening after an armistice. I think it is all right.

General Collins: If we propose 3(a), the Commies must agree to accept the results. This should be made clear.

Mr. Matthews: I agree.

General Collins: I would also change the phrase that says negotiations could be maneuvered so the difference is more apparent than real.

Mr. Johnson: What I had in mind was that if both agree to abide by the results, there isn’t much difference between that and rescreening after an armistice.

General Collins: I think the proposal is stronger if you just cut out the phrase.

Mr. Johnson: All right.

Admiral Fechteler: In paragraph 3 of Part II, we should change the first sentence to read “To achieve the foregoing results, a suggestion has been made here that impartial interrogation be made by” instead of “consideration being given here”. This would make it clear he doesn’t have to choose one or the other.

General Bradley: That might make it clear to Clark this isn’t firm in our minds.

Mr. Nitze: That is all right because it isn’t clear in our minds.

General Bradley: What do we do if the Commies come up with Poland, Hungary, etc., when we suggest the Swedes and the Swiss.

Mr. Johnson: This isn’t a case of both sides nominating countries.

General Bradley: Well, under 3(b) it is unilateral but what about 3(a)?

General Collins: I favor going ahead with 3(b) without getting Commie approval. It isn’t clear because 3(b) says impartial interrogation.

General Bradley: I think it is clear.

General Collins: I don’t think it is clear that we would do 3(b) without advising the Commies that we were going to do it. I think they might think in Tokyo we would tell the Commies about it at Panmunjom.

Mr. Nitze: We could clarify that.

General Bradley: Well, you might tell the Commies you were going to do (b) if they turn down (a).

General Cabell: What do you do if you go ahead with (b) and the Commies say they have been excluded?

Mr. Bohlen: You don’t go to (b) until they have turned down (a). You really have only one proposal—that we are going to proceed with an impartial interrogation and if they will agree to the results they can send observers.

General Collins: If we have in mind what Chip has said, we ought to spell it out.

Mr. Johnson: That isn’t what we had in mind.

Mr. Nitze: You could do it either way. You could propose (a) and if rejected go to (b), or you could do (a) alone or you could do (b) alone.

Mr. Bohlen: Would it be enough to get Clark’s comments on (a)?

Mr. Matthews: You might as well get his comments on (b) too.

General Collins: I think we ought to get his views on both. I do think we could make the point that Paul has just made. What is your objection to 3(b) Chip?

Mr. Bohlen: I think any rescreening or interrogation is going to be messy. I think it is fine if they agree to abide by the results because then they are in a bad way if they violate their agreement. But if you do it to cleanse your soul it isn’t going to work. Neutral observers will make a hell of a lot of what happened during and before the initial screening.

General Collins: Murders didn’t occur to make the prisoners say they didn’t want to be repatriated.

Mr. Bohlen: We are likely to have all kinds of charges with no advantages.

General Collins: You have told us that the allies are skeptical of the screening. If that isn’t true, let’s drop the whole thing.

Mr. Bohlen: It is true, but I don’t think alternative 3(b) will help you.

General Collins: If the screening was done according to the instructions, then clearly no one was forced to refuse to return.

General Bradley: I think both proposals should be sent to Clark for comment. We all have doubts about them here.

Mr. Matthews: I agree.

(Mr. Nitze read a new paragraph to be added to the message to clarify the possibilities of proceeding with (a) and (b), and this paragraph was accepted.)⁴

Psychological Warfare

General Bradley: We got a paper here a while ago about some psychological stuff for use in the negotiations. Do you have it? (This refers to the proposed message⁵ suggesting that psychological warfare experts be furnished to assist the UN Command in Korea.)

Mr. Matthews: It was handed to me just before we came over but I have not read it.

General Bradley: We thought the idea was good. We are in more of a cold war than a hot war and we would like to have some experts in psychological warfare to help us in this Korean business. We think the idea is OK, but whether the language of the message is or not we don’t know.

General Collins: It is a good idea. We might both look at the wording.

Mr. Matthews: I have a few pencilled changes on my copy. (He read these off to the meeting.)

It was agreed that Mr. Johnson and General McClure would get together on the language.

Syngman Rhee

Mr. Matthews: Could we go on to Syngman Rhee and his troubles. Everybody is worried. Muccio should get back there tonight. We are preparing instructions to him which are coming over here,⁶ and we have drafted a possible message from the Secretary of Defense to Clark (attached)⁷ to parallel our message to Muccio. We have instructed Muccio to stop in Tokyo to consult Clark.

. . . . . . .

Admiral Fechteler: Why do you need paragraph 1 of the draft message? The only reason I would include paragraph 2 is that it contains a reference to the President’s personal message.

General White: I think the last paragraph is about all you need.

General Bradley: I don’t think it would do any harm to give him the background.

General Collins: I am not sure it is necessary to send any message, but if you are going to send one I think the complete message is good.

Mr. Allison: This more or less backs up what he has already done.

General Collins: Should we add that Clark will be furnished with a copy of the instructions to Muccio?

Mr. Johnson: All right.

General Bradley: Is the second sentence clear? Shouldn’t we say “The U.S. Government”?

General Collins: Why not make it two sentences.

Mr. Allison: I think two sentences would be better.

Mr. Matthews: Paul points out that we should say “latter contingency” rather than “such a contingency”.

General Bradley: Does this have the approval of the State Department?

Mr. Matthews: Yes, including the Secretary. We do intend to get the clearance of the President on the instruction to Muccio.

(At this point Mr. Kenneth Young arrived with the draft instruction to Muccio.)

Mr. Matthews: Unfortunately, there is only one copy of this telegram. Shall we have Mr. Johnson read it?

General Bradley: Yes.

Mr. Young read the message.

Mr. Johnson: On the question of holding up the implementation of the economic agreement, it was agreed to deal with that problem separately after clearance all around.

Admiral Fechteler: Did you have something in the message about safety of UNC forces?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Admiral Fechteler: I just question whether you want to put that in. This bastard (Syngman Rhee ?) may be on their side. If you give him the idea that he has the safety of our forces in his hands, you may have trouble.

General Collins: Could we say security of our forces?

Mr. Allison: What Admiral Fechteler means is that Rhee might use it against us. He is bad, but I doubt if he is that bad.

General Collins: The thing that might have the most effect on Rhee is that this business threatens his own neck. If he doesn’t do something we may have to support someone else. If you could put a threat in, it might help.

Mr. Johnson: We have a threat in the message in one sense.

Mr. Nitze: I feel we are threatening the wrong thing. Rhee knows we are going to continue in Korea. The only real alternative is that we might have to support someone else.

General Collins: That’s my point. He knows that if we put in a military government, he would be safe.

Mr. Johnson: We are not as worried about Rhee as about the group around him. If you could take some direct action with respect to them, it might help.

General Collins: The CIA might help.

Mr. Allison: We have discussed that.

Mr. Matthews: I think we should get some threat in.

Mr. Johnson: It’s awfully hard to threaten. You don’t have anyone standing on the side lines to support.

General Bradley: You might use military people, but that would defeat your purpose.

Mr. Matthews: We have thought of that, but you want a civilian government.

General Bradley: Military people might be used for a military government.

General Collins: If a military government is to be set up, I would hate to see it done except under South Koreans.

Mr. Johnson: The attitude of the ROK Army and Navy has been fine.

Mr. Young: The Air Force too.

Mr. Matthews: Is this message agreeable to you then?

General Bradley: Yes.

General Collins: I seem to harp on this point, but I don’t think it is whether it is agreeable to us.

Mr. Matthews: Well, it isn’t a purely political matter. All of us have an interest in it.

[Here follows a brief discussion on Greece and Turkey.]

1. A note on the title page read: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”

   Of the JCS, Generals Bradley and Collins and Admiral Fechteler attended; Bolté was also present. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent. Gleason represented the NSC and General Ruffner the Department of Defense. In all, 20 persons participated.

2. This draft message to Clark, which was not attached to the source text, underwent a number of revisions; see an earlier draft telegram, p. 244 and footnote 6, p. 261. It was sent as JCS 910484 to Clark, June 5, p. 310.
3. In paragraph 3 (a) of the draft under consideration, Clark was instructed to consider prearmistice interrogation of nonrepatriate POWs with Communist observers in attendance; in paragraph 3 (b) the alternative proposed was an interrogation of POWs at the unilateral initiative of the UNC without the Communists observing. In an earlier draft (p. 244) these paragraphs were Part III, paragraphs 1 (a) and (b). In the final telegram (p. 310) they became paragraphs 4 A and B.
4. The draft under consideration was sent as JCS 910484 to Clark, June 5, p. 310.
5. The message was sent as JCS 910473 to Clark, June 5, p. 308.
6. Telegram 907, June 4, p. 302.
7. This message was not attached to the source text; for its text, see infra.