Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/4–2754: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Paris, April 27, 1954—7 p.m..

4103. Repeated information Saigon 477, Geneva priority 137. Embassy officer discussed with Dac Khe this morning, implications communiqué issued April 25 by Cabinet Bao Dai at Paris.¹ Summary Dac Khe’s views follows:

1. Status Franco–Vietnamese negotiations. Vietnamese have asked French delete certain phrase from proposed joint declaration of agreement (on independence Vietnam and its association with France) which, in Vietnamese view, tends nullify earlier expression in declaration regarding equality Franco–Vietnamese relationship. It presently appears that French are willing accept deletion this phrase and therefore, joint declaration should be issued shortly. However, basic treaties independence and association will not be signed prior completion related conventions which are now expected to be concluded in about 15 days. Nor are Vietnamese pressing for the initialing or signature basic treaties, which have been completed, prior conclusion these conventions. Although Bao Dai communiqué stated Vietnamese Government not prepared sign treaties until it has received concrete assurances from France that its independence and unity completely guaranteed, this not considered as conditioning issuance joint declaration which will be issued as soon final agreement reached above-mentioned point phraseology.

2. Franco–Vietnamese position on Geneva. French have failed coordinate fully or satisfactorily with Vietnamese Government on Geneva, and hence conclusion communiqué to effect that neither Bao Dai, nor Vietnamese Government will consider itself bound by any French decision taken Geneva contrary to interests Vietnam. French Government did not call permanent committee High Council French Union prior departure French delegation for Geneva as Vietnam requested; and although Bidault met with representatives of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos Saturday evening April 24, Vietnamese did not consider this as a “working session” or in any way meeting their desire for coordination French and Vietnamese positions on Geneva prior opening Conference. This failure satisfactorily coordinate in advance Franco–Vietnamese positions has given rise Vietnamese fear that French may agree to division Vietnam, or other measures at Geneva, in effect “selling out” Vietnam. Principal intent communiqué to manifest this fear and state why Vietnamese Government desires obtain French guarantees that France will not agree at Geneva to any division Vietnam, nor measure contrary its independence. As yet, Vietnamese Government has received no official indication from French Government this regard.

Regarding Vietnamese representation at Geneva, Vietnamese Government expects send several “unofficial observers” Geneva within several days, but no names mentioned as yet. “They may be Vietnamese who ostensibly must go Switzerland for medical treatment.”

3. Battle Dien Bien Phu. If Dien Bien Phu falls, impact France will be far more serious than in Vietnam and it will be necessary for United States intervene with carrier-based aircraft and take on enlarged training role Vietnamese army if Vietnam to be saved from eventual Communist control.

Embassy comment: From tenor his comments, apparent Dac Khe hopes United States will lend support vis-à-vis France to Vietnamese position, opposing partition Vietnam, or any settlement likely lead ultimate Communist control Vietnam, along lines indicated Bao Dai communiqué. He stated Bao Dai leaving for Cannes at two this afternoon where he will remain temporarily. Dac Khe indicated that while this perhaps not propitious moment for contact with Bao Dai at Cannes by high United States official (possibly Ambassador Heath), such contact might be helpful later on.

Regarding Vietnamese criticism French lack “coordination” and failure call permanent committee High Council, in our opinion, Dac Khe’s observations somewhat unjustified. We gained impression during Geneva preparation period that French officials taking particular care keep Vietnamese informed and to take into account their views. We attribute present Vietnamese reaction principally to fear of negotiated peace at Geneva, rather than to French failure “coordinate”.

Dillon

1. The communiqué issued by the cabinet of Bao Dai on Apr. 25 expressed dissatisfaction with the progress of French-Vietnamese treaty negotiations. For an English language text of the communiqué, see Cameron, Viet-Nam Crisis, vol. I, pp. 241–243. For the French reply, issued the same day by the Secretariat of State for Relations with the Associated States, see France, Direction de la Documentation, Chroniques d’Outre-Mer: Etudes et Informations, No. 5 (May 1954), p. 81. Despite the Vietnamese communiqué, France and the State of Vietnam issued a declaration on Apr. 28 undertaking to conclude two treaties, one affirming Vietnamese independence, the other defining relations between the two countries. For the text of the joint declaration, see L’Année Politique, 1954, p. 569. For the texts of the treaties, initialed in Paris on June 4 but never ratified, see ibid., pp. 572–573. For English translations of the treaties, see Cameron, Viet-Nam Crisis, vol. i, pp. 268–271.