Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

751.00/7–2654: Telegram

No. 652
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

confidential

Paris, July 26, 1954—6 p.m.

348. Following is Embassy’s appraisal of Mendes-France government’s position after Indochina armistice.

1. Having won settlement within time he had specified and having brilliantly defended it before Assembly, Mendes-France is now in very strong position. He is receiving practically universal credit for having ended the war as well as recognition for his intelligence and purposefulness, but that does not mean that he is “popular” premier in sense in which Pinay, for instance, was popular. He is strong because country would want him to have his chance, not because country understands, let alone approves, what he now intends to do. As we indicated in Embtel 5069,² it appears he will have to move fast to exploit his present favorable position for erosion of power sets in quickly in French Parliament. The head of French Institute of Public Opinion gave us his estimate that Mendes’ present strength in the country, and hence his present action potential in Assembly, would last three months at the utmost.

2. At present juncture, political power is vested much more in his person than in coalition which he controls. This is a new situation reminiscent of the earliest days of de Gaulle government and is of greatest importance since Mendes, in contradistinction for instance to Pinay, holds highly personal views both with regard to economic policy and EDC and within certain limits can at present make those views prevail even over opposition of important parties represented in his government. For instance, even though some of those parties may want to put off EDC debate until still another Four-Power Conference, Mendes would in our opinion have the political power to oppose such view successfully if he desired.

3. Mendes-France still does not have a solid coalition behind him and in fact situation in that regard has deteriorated since our last appraisal. For time being, however, this is less bad for Mendes himself than for parties opposing him and for fortunes of EDC; for the two parties most strongly in favor of treaty, MRP and Socialists, are still not represented in govt and former has in fact drifted further away. Chances for Socialist participation have increased of late. MRP, while divided, still has strong majority led by Bidault which opposes him essentially for three reasons: (a) because Mendes continues to imply they were responsible for the mess in Indochina, (b) because they profess doubts about his fidelity to Atlantic Alliance and (c) because they wish to see what he will do with EDC. Nevertheless, Mendes–Bidault feud is unfortunate for EDC since MRP support could allow him to dispense with anti-EDC Gaullists. We have already discreetly indicated this view to MRP leadership.

4. As regards his general attitude in foreign affairs, recent weeks have brought greater clarity. He is receiving credit from nationalist and neutralist elements for having scored diplomatic “victory” over U.S. by bringing the Under Secretary to Geneva, but actually he has gone out of his way to stress his fidelity to basic concept of US–French cooperation and even scored against Bidault in assembly debate by showing relations are better now than when he came into office. However, he has placed distinctly stronger emphasis on Franco-British cooperation and we believe he can be expected to align himself for instance on British position with regard to tactics vis-à-vis Russians re Four-Power Conference. Very likely he would be closer to British position if there were US–UK disagreement.

5. Basic trends operating on present government have been (a) trend to cut Indochina losses and (b) trend away from right and toward left-center coalition. After Indochina armistice, we believe there is now also (c) trend running once more in favor of EDC. But due to fact that Mendes has introduced novel idea of “compromise”, no government could now put up treaty without at least face-saving modifications. There is no reliable evidence up to now that neutralists or other “soft” elements have important influence upon him, let alone that there is trend in such direction. Rather, there is evidence that Mendes-France could on his part have important influence on such elements. Beuve-Mery, for instance, while pushing idea of four-power meeting on Germany, now takes position (Le Monde, July 22) that Germany cannot remain unarmed if there is not disarmament and that one cannot very well oppose German rearmament as long as Soviets arm Eastern Germany and prevent free elections. For Beuve-Mery, that represents considerable shift in position. (Today’s Le Monde actually reconciles itself to early EDC debate despite pending Soviet proposals.)

6. Nobody knows just what Mendes-France will now do re EDC and Four-Power Conference but our first guess, in absence of other information, is that he may do exactly what he said he would do, i.e. formulate government position on “compromise”, discuss it with five other EDC countries in next two weeks and then put the matter up to assembly before summer recess. Entire philosophy of his government is to maintain momentum, set time limits and apply pressure to meet his targets. He is not a man to delay decisions. On other hand, he (or any other likely French Premier) is not apt to oppose Four-Power talks. Tactics of time limits might also be applied, of course, to dealings with Soviets. Whatever he does, however, we do not anticipate that he will break united front of Western Powers even though he will act with self-confidence to which his recent performance entitles him.

Dillon

1. Repeated to London and Bonn.
2. Document 642.