Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199 “Sept. 1953”
No. 613
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Acting Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Knight)1
- Subject: Indochina
Participants:
- The Secretary
- Mr. Ridgway B. Knight, WE
- M. Mendes-France
After the usual amenities the Secretary remarked that Russian acceptance or refusal of the Three Western Powers’ invitation to the Soviets to meet at Lugano on October 15 was one of the favorite subjects of speculation within the Department. He commented that the odds in this informal betting favored Soviet rejection.
M. Mendes-France expressed his interest in our thinking as he himself had been somewhat tempted to conclude that the Soviets would accept, in view of the Communist rout in the German elections and the related major diplomatic defeat for the Soviets. For these reasons he thought the USSR would tend to counterattack and the Four Power Meeting could provide a forum for splitting the Western Powers.
The Secretary expressed the deep interest of the United States in Indochina and pointed to the great importance both to France and the entire Free World of a successful outcome to this painful and long-drawn-out war, which had not only constituted a hemorrhage for France but had been a source of much of the reluctance with which the French people considered the EDC and their association with Germany therein. It seems, however, that for the first time the elements are now assembled which should permit defeating the enemy’s organized resistance and perhaps more important than the reinforcement to the fighting forces in Indochina and the stepped-up program for the armies of the Associated States is the farsighted decision made by the French Government to grant independence to the Associated States. This should remove the mask from the Viet Minh and reveal it as the instrument of international Communism [Page 1380] which it is. Referring to the possibility of increased Chinese support for the Viet Minh, the Secretary said that of course no one could forecast what the decision of the Communist masters would be but that he considered that under the circumstances there was just as much reason for a decision to cease hostilities as to step them up. The Secretary referred to his St. Louis speech and told M. Mendes-France that in his opening statement before the General Assembly he would call in vigorous terms for a cessation of Communist aggression in Indochina as a proof of Soviet peaceful intentions. Finally the Secretary said that he would not be surprised, in view of the probably advanced state of preparations and planning of the Viet Minh, should the fighting season in Indochina start badly and the Viet Minh score some initial successes during October.
The Secretary fully covered the impossibility of negotiating from weakness which could only turn into a Communist triumph and the necessity of building a situation of strength before one could think of negotiations with any possibility of success.
M. Mendes-France expressed his appreciation for the Secretary’s views in the matter of Indochina. He stated his sincere hope that the current program being discussed between France and the US would succeed and made the point that he had never favored immediate negotiations. He did however express the personal opinion which he had had for a long time that a continuation of a stalemate in Indochina as a running sore in France’s side with its resulting effect on EDC and the entire Atlantic alliance might conceivably best suit the Soviets. Otherwise he said, how can one explain that the Viet Minh in 1949–50 did not receive the necessary assistance to clinch victory when it was well within its grasp. Commenting on the possibility of reverses in October, M. Mendes-France expressed grave fears about their effect on French public opinion.
(Subsequently in talking to Mr. Knight, M. Mendes-France expanded at length on this point. M. Mendes-France believes that the “Laniel–Navarre program” goes directly counter to the desire of the vast majority of Frenchmen to see an end to the Indochina war, that this program will only be tolerated as long as it offers the possibility of success, and that any noteworthy reverses could therefore cause a popular “explosion”, in front of which the French Government would probably be powerless. For this reason M. Mendes-France attaches the greatest significance to initial success for the forces of General Navarre.)
M. Mendes-France concluded by saying that in his opinion the difficulties of the French nation were primarily mental “which perhaps [Page 1381] makes the situation worse as those are the illnesses most difficult to cure”.
(Developing this thought later with Mr. Knight, M. Mendes-France stressed the deeply ingrained contradiction in the French mind between steadily increasing impatience over the present political situation in France and the reluctance to take any steps which might affect the vested interests of all categories of Frenchmen. He also spoke at length about the essential need for France to put her own house in order, and the resulting need for sacrifices on the part of all Frenchmen as the only means of so doing, and finally of their unwillingness to make these sacrifices as long as they had the impression that these would be wasted. He seemed to be groping for new formulas to solve these various problems but not yet to have found them.)
- For information concerning the arrangements for Mendès-France’s visit to the Department of State, see Document 608. Knight prepared a memorandum analyzing the views of Mendès-France as a briefing paper for the Secretary prior to this meeting; this memorandum, which was forwarded to Dulles by Merchant on Sept. 3 and was subsequently read by Dulles as noted on the text, is in file 751.00/9–353. In a separate memorandum of conversation dated Sept. 11, Knight indicated that in a talk he had with Mendès-France, the latter stated that it was possible that he might come to power within the next few months. (751.00/9–1153)↩