751.00/8–2253: Telegram
No. 612
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the
Department of State1
secret
Paris, August 22, 1953—8
p.m.
708. Re Deptel 582.2 In light of available information as of today and bearing in mind that political forecasting in fast-moving situation here is always risky, following is our appreciation of overall picture fortified by recent talks with Laniel, Reynaud and Martinaud-Deplat, with Socialist opposition leaders Mollet and Gazier and continuing contact with non-Communist labor leaders:
- 1.
- One basic fact which must not be overlooked is that Laniel Government combines broad parliamentary base and relatively homogeneous character to better extent than any government since 1947. Laniel could thus afford some defections from his majority in Parliament without necessarily risking overthrow. Coalition has so far come through labor crisis substantially intact. MRP, perhaps now most disparate element of majority, has stuck by Laniel even while acting as loyal intermediary for non-Communist strikers. Former Gaullists have behaved like faithful coalition partners.
- 2.
- Opposition can be counted upon to capitalize on all mistakes and embarrassments of Laniel Government. This could be, but has not yet been, as true of Moroccan situation and leak re Navarre plan (as yet unnoticed here except for Communist press) as it was re decrees affecting labor. However, there exists no plan for joint action by opposition elements. Socialists in particular do not seem to desire overthrow of Laniel Government at this time and are not ready to participate in successor government. Non-Communist [Page 1377] labor leaders seem to have exaggerated danger to their unions from prolongation of strikes. Some now even say outcome of strikes in public sector has strengthened them vis-à-vis Communists.
- 3.
- Nevertheless, strike wave has demonstrated again the narrow margin of tolerance of political scene here as well as seriousness of basic economic and social maladjustments of France. Labor dissatisfaction is real and continuing factor of great importance and strike wave has demonstrated that action possibilities of right-center government are limited by accumulated labor grievances. Given the basic continuing fact that France is over-extended politically, militarily and economically, temptation to cut commitment in Indochina continues great. Noteworthy, however, that demands in that direction have not been important factor in recent contest between government and opposition.
- 4.
- Long-term trend may well continue to be toward eventual left-center majority particularly if discouraging trend in IC is not reversed and if Mendes-France thus appears vindicated. He himself has not improved his political prospects for present, however, by reminding union delegation that his own economic program would have brought even more retrenchment and greater sacrifices than those demanded by Laniel. (This has strengthened opposition of Socialist leaders like Mollet to Mendes-France as potential leader of left-center coalition.) Nevertheless, we believe time for coalition devoted to continued French presence in Indochina may be running out unless outlook there changes significantly. In absence of such change, shift to new majority (which need not come soon) is virtually certain to involve basic change in Indochina policy in favor of withdrawal.
- 5.
- Should reversal of majority occur, however, this does not in our view necessarily imply trend toward popular front type of coalition with Communist participation or support. There is no reliable evidence that prospects for such coalition have improved. We must not confuse possible new coalition which might conduct one policy sought by Communists, with a pro-Communist or Communist-supported coalition. Left-center coalition would not be pleasing to Communists in other respects than re Indochina and in fact would probably be very effective in fighting party and undercutting its support.
- 6.
- Following are answers to specific questions in reftel:
- (a)
- Impossible predict whether assembly will be recalled. If requisite 209 verified signatures have accumulated by August 24, extraordinary session would probably be called for end of week but strength of motivating force (strikes) declining.
- (b)
- Apparent settlement of government worker strikes and absence of disorders in Morocco so far indicate that government’s position [Page 1378] is strengthened. Our best judgment is that even if extraordinary session takes place, it would be inconclusive one in which steam would be blown off by opposition and some minor dissatisfied elements of governing coalition but without bringing dangerous showdown involving overthrow of government or disintegration of coalition. Although virtually inevitable that Morocco would be discussed promptly, no indication so far that Indochina debate will take place prior to October 22 date set earlier by assembly.
- (c)
- Should Laniel fall over issue unconnected with Indochina, the most likely successor would be exponent of same right-center majority, at least for present, though perhaps again a new name. Time does not yet seem ripe for change in majority.
- (d)
- Strikes do not appear have any effect either on military or political capability of France to send additional forces Indochina. Moroccan situation has so far had no effect on either of those capabilities but should disorders occur both would be affected. Serious Moroccan disorders might make it militarily and politically impossible to send additional troops to IC. In any event dispatch of additional forces would have important bearing on climate in which October Indochina debate takes place. It is important therefore that government be able give convincing assurances at proper time that Navarre plan promises substantial diminution of French IC effort in early foreseeable future.
- (e)
- Danger of popular front type of coalition has in our opinion at no time been significant in present years. Recent developments have not increased prospects for such coalition and may have diminished them. Possibility must, however, be constantly watched and new evaluation will be possible later in fall. Left-center coalition, which we still think is apt to eventuate sometime in not too distant future, would not necessarily indicate trend toward popular front. Nor is increasing French impatience over Indochina directly related to hypothetical trend toward popular front.
- 7.
- Whether or not Laniel Government falls in near future, and it is quite possible it will last for some time, fate of right-center coalition devoted to holding in Indochina is most of all dependent upon improvement of prospects for reducing of French commitment there. We would hesitate to say that Laniel represents “last chance” of French remaining in Indochina, but our best judgment is that important improvement in picture there within next few months will be necessary to assure continuance of French effort. Unless such improvement occurs, any shift to new left-center coalition would mean that we would have French Government that would probably be soundly anti-Communist, basically for Atlantic cooperation and no less favorable to EDC than recent governments but it would almost certainly be government determined to seek early end of French military effort in Far East.
Dillon