Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

740.5/8–2952

No. 97
Memorandum for the Record, by the Acting Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Parsons)

confidential

[Washington,] August 29, 1952.

Re Polto 227.¹ As this subject will be discussed when Mr. Merchant arrives in Washington about September 4, it may be useful to record the developments which led up to Ambassador Draper’s complaint.

Paragraph 5 of Polto 188, August 20,² revealed, apparently by chance, that M. Monnet had been having talks with the United States on the relationship to the Schuman Plan. As this relationship is obviously a matter of interest and importance to the Government in Washington, this office despatched an inquiry (Topol 111³) on August 22. However, as we were not sure from the passing allusion in Polto 188 whether the talks had actually taken place, our inquiry asked if they were to be inaugurated after the CSC Council meeting. In this way we avoided any implication of criticism for SRE’s failure to report on a negotiation of such importance.

Three days later, on August 25, Mr. Tomlinson telephoned⁴ to explain that he had not wanted to reply to our inquiry until Mr. Draper, who is now his chief, had returned to Paris. He then proceeded to indicate that he had already worked out with M. Monnet plans for U.S. representation to the Schuman Plan and that the High Authority was very pleased with our arrangements. The plans called for a “permanent delegation”. Mr. Tomlinson commented that it was his understanding that the arrangements were fully in line with the basic decisions expressed in Topol 88, August 15, which was initialled by Mr. Tomlinson when he was in Washington.

Later the same day Mr. Tomlinson despatched Polto 202⁵ setting forth in somewhat more positive form the information he had given to Mr. Bonbright over the phone. This message replied to Topol 111 of August 22. It also stated that a “draft communiqué” on the inauguration of relations with the CSC was being sent in a separate message.

On the afternoon of August 26 Mr. Tomlinson telephoned to me in regard to the press communiqué. I told him that the separate message referred to in Polto 202 had not been received. He then said that it was at that moment being encoded. He then gave me the outline of the press communiqué and I took notes on the principal points. He said that the talks with M. Monnet were to conclude the following day and he wished to have our clearance at 9:30 Washington time when he would again telephone to me. I replied that clearance with two other agencies, as well as in the Department, was required and that this was too short notice. He said that in that case he would telephone at 11 o’clock. I agreed to do my best.

Polto 209⁶ was received about 6:30 that afternoon and read in rough form by the principal officers concerned. It was not distributed in the Department or elsewhere until the morning of the 27th.

Some time after 10 o’clock on that morning Mr. Bruce telephoned to me and said that Mr. Lincoln Gordon of DMS had raised such fundamental points with him concerning the press release that he felt we should work out a new draft with Mr. Gordon. Mr. Tomlinson did not telephone until 11:30 at which time I was in Mr. Gordon’s office and informed Mr. Tomlinson in his presence that I did not yet have clearance for him, but that I was hopeful that within three or four hours I would have a cleared text. I said that with luck I could telephone him in less time.

While we were still awaiting clearance from MSA, Mr. Tomlinson telephoned Mr. Bonbright at 3:30. The necessary clearance was received during this conversation and the revised text was dictated to Mr. Tomlinson’s secretary at this time (see my Memorandum of Conversation of August 27 on this subject).

With respect to Polto 227, to my knowledge no one at any time indicated to Mr. Tomlinson that his draft was acceptable to Washington. I can not understand his reference to clearance “seven hours later” as there was no such interval between any of Mr. Tomlinson’s four telephone calls to Washington on this subject. Presumably he is referring to his two calls on August 27 which were four hours apart. I do not agree either with the statement in Polto 227 that the changes made in Washington were inconsequential nor would Mr. Gordon, who raised fundamental objections to the Paris draft, agree with this. In fact, in comparison of the two drafts when read in conjunction with Topol 88, clearly indicates important differences of substance. I would agree that the changes had no effect on newspaper stories because SRE had already discussed their draft with M. Monnet before they cleared it with Washington, and either M. Monnet or SRE let its substance reach the press; likewise, before Washington had an opportunity to clear the text.

If M. Monnet was annoyed and SRE was embarrassed, the remedy is to conduct our business in the future in the proper manner, not to give SRE authority to issue press releases without clearance, as is suggested in Polto 227. This incident demonstrates that even after policy has been set, clearance is necessary because otherwise deviations from that policy would occur.

J. Graham Parsons

1. Not printed; in it Draper reported the hardships which the changes in the wording of the press release concerning U.S. representation to the Schuman Plan had caused him. In Draper’s opinion, the changes were inconsequential, angered Monnet, and wasted the time of several people. Draper concluded that “I am sure you will agree that in the future I shld have at least the nec authority to issue a press release after the policy has been set as it had been in this case.” (740.5/8–2852)
2. Not printed; it informed the Department of State about a tentative agenda for the first meeting of the Schuman Plan Council in early September. (740.5/8–2052)
3. See footnote 2, Document 91.
4. For a record of this telephone conversation, see Document 91.
5. Document 92.
6. See footnote 3, ibid.