Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Bruce Mission files, lot 57 M 38, “UK Association”

No. 95
Memorandum for the Record, by the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the United States Special Representative in Europe (Oulashin)¹

confidential

[Paris,] August 28, 1952.

Subject:

• Memorandum of conversation with M. Jean Monnet in the Office of Amb. Draper—August 27, 1952.²

1. M. Monnet stated that he shared Mr. Draper’s gratification at the news of Sir Cecil Weir’s appointment as Chief of the UK Mission to the CSC. He pointed out that if the CSC proved to be a success—and no alternative could be contemplated—and if it built up a close association with the UK, answers to many of the problems of UK–Continental relationships would begin to emerge of themselves.

2. M. Monnet reported briefly upon his recent conversations with Makins and Dixon who, incidentally, had been among those who cold-shouldered the Plan in May 1950. They had stated that the UK regarded the CSC as a new sovereign power and was, therefore, sending a Mission accredited to it; the UK attached the greatest importance to the development of a close association with the CSC.

M. Monnet is convinced of the sincerity of the British. He believes that they attach an importance to the CSC going beyond questions of coal and steel, and that they have accepted the fact that it is the beginning of the New Europe. Mr. Draper commented that he had received the same impression during his recent London conversations regarding internal financial stability.

M. Monnet, in reply to queries by Makins and Dixon as to his conception of the UK association with the CSC, had stated that this would take one form if the UK adopted all the regulations and principles of the CSC (non-discrimination, no division of markets, other anti-cartel provisions, etc.) or another form if the UK adopted only some of them. He had further stated that he would recommend that the CSC work with the UK in the same manner as the Schuman Plan adherents had been working with each other so far in developing the organization; rather than being a question of negotiating national interests, the work should take the form of discussing the sort of arrangements that would be best for all concerned.

Mr. Makins had stressed that the UK would be guided by the principle of complete and full exchange of information. Of course, the UK would have certain special problems, such as its need for steel scrap from the Continent.

During these London talks, the British had laid great emphasis on the social aspects (miners) and M. Monnet received the impression that labor questions would play a large role in dealings between the UK and the CSC. It remained to be seen if British labor participation would prove constructive; he was of the opinion that labor is always constructive if its initial suspicion can be removed at the outset.

M. Monnet stated that he was now convinced that not only would the UK not resist this first experiment, but they would help and in so doing would take the road to increasing cooperation with the United States of Europe.

In this connection, Mr. Samuels mentioned that he had received a report that the Prime Minister was very concerned over the apparent feeling of the British public that the Conservatives were taking no broader a view of international affairs than Labor.

3. Mr. Merchant asked whether, in M. Monnet’s opinion, the new attitude of the UK constituted a bi-partisan policy. In reply, M. Monnet recalled that in May 1950 he had met with Cripps and Plowden, as well as with Makins and Dixon. At that time he had made the point that ordinary arrangements between sovereign states would not suffice to avoid the catastrophe that faced Europe if it did not move in the direction of unification through means such as the Schuman Plan. Cripps had asked him whether he intended to go ahead with the Germans if the British stayed out. M. Monnet had replied that, at that stage, he was prepared to do so. In this connection, he had pointed out that the British would not act on a hypothesis but would move when faced with a fact. The answer to Mr. Merchant’s question, therefore, was “Yes”, the bipartisan policy of the British being that of acknowledging the facts.

4. M. Monnet emphasized that a cardinal point that should be reiterated to the general public was that the CSC represented the United States of Europe in the making—in association with the UK and the U.S. He did not mean, of course, that the UK and the U.S. association with the CSC would be of identical character, but, and he stressed this in his London conversations, the cooperation of the CSC with the UK and the U.S. should be such as to reflect the realities of the world situation and it should truly represent the association of the Free World in practical terms. It was very important to make clear to the public that the New Europe was not growing separately from the UK or the U.S.

5. With reference to the current discussions with the Secretariat of the Council of Europe, M. Monnet remarked that this organization was attempting to arrogate to itself a franchise without any authority. There could be no question of merging the CSC into the Council of Europe; aside from the fact that such a development would inevitably create confusion and would vitiate the CSC, there was the further consideration that there was no U.S. delegation to the Council. Furthermore, the CSC General Assembly must meet with no prior commitments. M. Monnet was sure that the CSC Assembly would not agree to turning any matters over to the Council of Europe Secretariat. He took the position that if the Council of Europe refused to put the convention hall at Strasbourg at the disposal of the CSC, the CSC General Assembly would simply meet elsewhere.

6. Mr. Porter asked whether M. Monnet anticipated the establishment of any other resident delegations such as, for example, the Scandinavian. Mr. Monnet thought there was a possibility that there might be some.

7. In concluding, M. Monnet remarked that the composition of the High Authority was extraordinarily good—a fortunate and by no means inevitable circumstance which he regarded as auguring well for the future of this great experiment.

E. E. Oulashin

1. A notation at the end of the source text indicates that the U.S. participants in this conversation were Draper, Merchant, Porter, Tomlinson, and Samuels, as well as the drafter, Eric Oulashin.
2. Draper sent the Department of State a summary of this conversation in telegram Polto 236 from Paris, Aug. 29. (740.5/8–2952)