Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

033.4111/6–1854: Telegram

No. 458
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State

confidential
priority

London, June 18, 1954—8 p.m.

5841. Subject is Churchill visit.

1. Following paragraphs contain embassy observations on general factors affecting Churchill visit to Washington on June 25 and some indication of thoughts which have been uppermost in his mind during recent months. Embtel 5842 June 18¹ deals with particular topics he and Eden are most likely to bring up during White House meeting.

2. Prime Minister’s health. Prime Minister is weaker physically than at Bermuda Conference. He has good and bad days but former are becoming rarer and not infrequently he finds difficulty forcing himself to concentrate for more than a few hours on end.

3. Public reaction to visit. Initial reaction to announcement of visit indicates Churchill and Eden carry to Washington profound hope of British people that progress will be made towards (1) restoration of harmony in US–UK relations, through such measures as improvements of joint consultation on atomic and other questions of common concern. (2) Relaxation of tension between east and west, possibly through new high-level approach to Soviets for settlement of outstanding issues. (3) Agreement on general lines of Far East policy which will halt further Communist aggression, avoid extension of fighting and will be acceptable to Asian commonwealth members.

4. Prime Minister’s views on big 3 meeting. Prime Minister’s speeches before Primrose League April 30 (Embdesp 3661 May 17²) and English-Speaking Union on June 8 show that he still cherishes hope that west can reach overall settlement with USSR. He stated in latter speech as reported in press “nothing that has happened in the past 12 months has made me alter my view that peace through strength must be our guiding star. It is the duty and also the interest of the Communist and free world that they should live in peace together, and strive untiringly to remove or outlive their differences.” Though he has given no recent indication that he believes time for big three heads of state conference is near, in spite of labor pressure to move ahead on it, we should be prepared for his raising this topic.

5. Sentiment for peace. Also Prime Minister still smarts under “warmonger” charges made by Labor during 1951 election campaign and is at great pains to disprove them at every opportunity. Profound desire to avoid general war exists widely in country and many Conservatives beside Churchill consider it politically essential for government to avoid (1) provocative acts vis-à-vis USSR or China; (2) involvement in fighting local actions in way which could lead to general war; and (3) support of other nations’ policies which appear to fall in categories (1) and (2) above. On positive side, dramatic moves for reconciliation with Communist bloc, even without reasonable expectations for success, are popular, and approach of a 1955 general election may increase their attraction. Recognition of effects hydrogen bomb would have on UK heightens desire to avoid acts possibly leading to war and may narrow scope of UK interests abroad which are considered vital. While British not willing to “appease” Communist powers, they may accept more limited definition of that word than US.

6. Commonwealth. As UK itself becomes relatively less powerful in world scene it looks even more to Commonwealth and empire to supplement its strength and prestige. Consequently British increasingly anxious to hold commonwealth and remaining possessions together. There remains undercurrent of resentment, particularly on part of Prime Minister, over UK exclusion from ANZUS Pact. In this sense it is likely that question of UK association with ANZUS may be raised in connection with problem of relationship certain Asian security pacts already in being with future SEA collective security arrangement.

Aldrich

1. Not printed; it stated that the British would be likely to raise the following four topics: (1) atomic developments and strategy, (2) the Far East in general and Southeast Asia in particular, (3) Egypt, and (4) the EDC and its relation to France and Germany. (033.4111/6–1854)
2. Not printed. (641.00/5–754)