Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

740.5/2–752: Telegram

No. 3
The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council, at London¹

secret

Washington, February 9, 1952—6:28 p.m.

Todep 560. Fol are Dept’s comments, which have been cleared with MSA and Gordon, on Brit text (Depto 960 Feb 7²) on NATO–OEEC relationships:

1. Apart from obvious relationship to location argument, we believe Brit attitude toward OEEC–NATO relationship derives fundamentally from two main preoccupations: (1) their desire to shift US–UK relationship from a giver-taker relationship to a partnership relationship. They have always regarded OEEC as embodying the former, and as indicated by their attitude on burden-sharing, are determined that NATO shld embody the latter. (2) They also regard OEEC as a manifestation of US desire for Eur integration and regard NATO as safer forum in which to take coop action, not only because it helps meet problem of their Commonwealth relationships, but also because they are confident that they can go as fast as we can in any move which may involve a sacrifice in sovereignty.

We believe these are real reasons why Brit wish keep functions of NATO and OEEC separate and that Brit text, since it obviously can not make clear these real reasons, is extremely thin, unconvincing, and full of makeweight arguments which will not stand scrutiny.

2. We think it a fundamental mistake to look upon “European integration” and closer NATO relationships as competing concepts or NATO and OEEC as competing orgs. Only when it is clearly recognized that OEEC and NATO are part and parcel of the same idea, i.e. the building of a Western Eur-North Amer partnership, can whole problems of relationship between the two orgs be looked at logically. Fact that both the Europeans and ourselves are now centering our hopes for genuine integration not on a Western Eur federation, but on smaller grouping of EDC countries, and that we have told Brit we do not intend to seek to push them to federate the continent, makes this underlying Brit worry less real than it might have been year or two ago.

3. OEEC is a going concern in econ field, NATO is not. OEEC has a central staff with experience not only with substantive problems, but also with best means of getting action. It also has experience in discovering what types of problems in econ field are susceptible to solution through intergovernmental action and which are not.

4. OEEC has as full members Ger FedRep, Swed, Switz, and Aust. Necessity for participation by FedRep in any econ work affecting Western Eur is so fundamental that it needs no argument. Our analysis of position of neutrals differs from that put forward by Brit. Brit plan essentially makes it easy for neutrals to be neutral and encourages them to draw an early line on extent of participation with NATO powers. Although not wishing to go so far as to drive Swedes and Swiss, particularly Swedes, out of OEEC, we believe it is desirable both politically and economically to encourage them to coop with NATO powers to fullest extent possible. We believe that so long as OEEC is formally distinct from NATO, Swedes in particular will be prepared work on many problems which under the Brit scheme wld be done only within NATO.

5. If OEEC and NATO are physically located in same place, and if there is a clear recognition on part of the principal NATO govts that OEEC is a useful contributor to NATO concept rather than an irritating competitor, we see no difficulty in having the OEEC do basic work on a great many projects which wld otherwise have to be done wholly in NATO, although at some stage products of OEEC’s work may have to be transferred to NATO for further development. For example, unlike Brit we do see a role for the OEEC in future TCC type work.³ We wld assume that from now on TCC type of operation shld be in nature of a continuing appraisal, and that a large part of basic econ analysis cld be done by secretariat of OEEC and discussed in Council of OEEC.

6. The reports of Comite of Five have already demonstrated that in econ field non-mil aspects of NATO are indistinguishable from kind of work with which OEEC either has already had experience or cld do without change in its terms of reference. Unless, as indicated above, there is explicit recognition that the OEEC is not in conflict with the basic NATO concept, the result will tend to be a period of great duplication of effort, leading to an eventual transfer of functions to NATO, and atrophy on part of OEEC, and a consequent narrowing of the geographic area of coop.

7. Cannot agree that future role of OEEC be restricted to field of intra-European trade and payments. Other constructive fields include for example expanded production basic industries, improved productivity, and conservation scarce materials during defense build-up. Continuing work these problems cannot be isolated from economic implications of current defense effort whence stems key economic issues of day. Unless closely linked to NATO, danger OEEC may fail to keep its activities related to these issues.

8. Completely disagree (a) separate national delegations to OEEC and NATO and (b) complete separation NATO economic staff and OEEC secretariat.

9. MSA preparing separate message expanding on positive aspects role of OEEC.

Acheson

1. Drafted by Camp, cleared with Perkins, Cleveland (MSA), and Gordon (DMS), and repeated to Paris.
2. Not printed; it transmitted the text of an informal explanation of British views on the relationship between the OEEC and NATO to the Department of State. (740.5/2–752)
3. For documentation concerning the formation and work of the Temporary Council Committee (TCC), commonly referred to as the “Wisemen,” see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1 ff. For a summary of the report of the TCC to the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, which met in Lisbon, Feb. 20–25, see vol. v, Part 1, p. 203.