Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Europe, 1952–53”

No. 181
Memorandum by Rosalind Sawyer and Ruth H. Phillips of the Office of European Regional Affairs

confidential

[Washington,] November 20, 1953.

Report of the Rome Conference to Consider a European Political Community

Background

The Rome Conference on the European Political Community,¹ which met from September 22 to October 9, represents the first genuine consideration of the Draft Treaty for a European Political Community by responsible Government officers. The Draft Treaty itself, which served as the frame of reference of the Conference, was the product of parliamentarians, approved in March 1953 by the Ad Hoc Assembly,² composed of the members of the Coal–Steel Community Assembly, supplemented by additional representatives of the CSC countries, and representatives from countries in the Council of Europe, not members of the CSC. Ministerial consideration of the Draft Treaty by the six CSC–EDC countries was initially scheduled to take place at Baden-Baden last August.³ The Baden-Baden Conference, however, found the Ministers unprepared to examine the Draft Treaty, but agreement was reached on some general principles on the Political Community and a meeting of the Deputies of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs was scheduled in Rome. The purpose of the Rome Conference was to develop specific proposals for an EPC Treaty, to be reviewed by the Ministers at a Conference to be held in The Hague, beginning November 26.

Report of the Rome Conference and Prospects for The Hague Meeting

Although the Rome Report indicates large and significant areas of agreement among the six countries, the meeting also reveals widely divergent views on important issues requiring considerable further negotiation and reconciliation before the Community can come into existence. Moreover, the Conference was unable to discuss several significant questions, such as the control and authority of the Community in financial matters and foreign policy, for lack of agreement on some more fundamental issues. There has been no indication thus far that work has been going forward since the Rome meeting toward a resolution of the differences among countries, and, in the absence of such consideration by Governments it appears doubtful that The Hague meeting will result in substantial progress beyond that made at Rome. In addition, two major problems which have impeded more rapid movement toward the establishment of an EPC—a Saar agreement and the EDC ratification—still remain unsettled. Thus far, the French have refrained at meetings on the EPC from discussing the place of the Saar in the Community, but have made agreement on the principles of a Saar settlement a precondition to the establishment of the Political Community. In France and Belgium and probably other countries, the decisions on EDC and EPC are closely inter-related, since agreement on the principle of civilian parliamentary control of the European Army has become one of the basic conditions for support of the EDC.

Major Issues

From the report on the Rome Conference, three major issues emerge: the question of the establishment of a popularly elected European Parliament; the question of the supranationality of the executive, or the balance of power between the executive and the national ministers; and the scope of the Community’s authority, that is, whether additional sovereign powers, mainly economic and foreign policy functions, in addition to those already established in the EDC and CSC, are to be ceded to the Community.

If agreement on these issues were ultimately to be reached at the level of the lowest common denominator as indicated by the Rome meeting, the following pattern would seem to emerge: a Political Community of the Six with powers limited to coal and steel and the European Army, plus some general economic objectives and goals, but no new authority in the economic field; the Community to be governed by a lower house directly elected, with representation generally weighted to reflect population; an Upper House, also elected, either by national Parliaments or in some other manner, with either equal representation for all countries or a weighted system or, alternatively, the Council of Ministers serving as the Upper House; a Council of National Ministers; and an Executive, perhaps appointed on a national basis, with supranational elements, the exact nature of which are as yet undetermined, probably collegial in character, in some way incorporating the Executives of the CSC and the EDC, with the addition of a new Executive; and a European Court. The Community would be guided by general economic and foreign policy objectives, looking toward the gradual development of a common market among the Six, but without a new grant of authority beyond the CSC and the EDC, transfer of sovereignty in additional areas to be obtained by virtue of new treaties. The Treaty on the European Political Community would have effect for 50 years. There was no discussion at the Rome meeting on the financial powers or institutions of the Community.

Despite some qualifications by the Dutch, the principle of a popularly elected Lower House appears to have been accepted. The other major issues, however, have not been satisfactorily clarified or solved. It is not clear from the Report on the Rome Conference to what extent the countries conceive of the Executive as genuinely supranational, although the latter term was widely used, what form the Executive would actually take and how it would operate, or the functions of the additional Executive member and the relation and effect of the new Executive on the existing CSC High Authority and the projected EDC Commissariat. The Conference started with the acceptance of the Ministers’ Declaration at Baden-Baden last August that “there shall be created a community of sovereign states which in the interest of all shall exercise supranational functions defined by treaties in force or those which may result from subsequent treaties.” Although the Report affirms at the outset that the Rome Conference based its work on the same idea, the effect of conclusions arrived at in Rome would appear to weaken the Executive and reduce the supranationality granted to the Political Community to less than that granted in the CSC and EDC Treaties.

Whereas we were concerned that the Executive, as provided in the Draft Treaty, might not be sufficiently independent and the Council of Ministers too powerful, the conclusions of the Rome Report appear to weaken the Executive even further, by tending to increase and enhance the role of the National Ministers. In the Draft Treaty, an Executive Council is provided, headed by a President designated by the Upper House and other members named by the President, all responsible to the legislature. The discussion at Rome indicates some movement away from even this degree of independence for the Executive, some Delegations taking the view that not only the President, but some of the other members of the Executive Council be appointed by the Council of Ministers.

The Draft Treaty provides the Council of Ministers with far-reaching and definite checks on both the Executive and Parliament which are actually more extensive than those granted in the CSC and EDC Treaties. Discussions at Rome seem to indicate some desire on the part of several controls for making the national and supranational elements co-equal, although the text is not clear on this point. Agreement was reached on “the maintenance of equilibrium between the supranational element and the national element.” There is some indication that several countries (France, Belgium, and Luxembourg) may be clouding the concept of an Executive of a supranational character by mixing the Executive organ with national elements, reflected in proposals to incorporate the Council of Ministers as part of the Executive organ and to give equal weight to both Executive and National components. As the German and Italian Delegations appropriately noted, the national elements, such as the Council of Ministers, cannot constitute a branch of the Executive, but must be an institutional organ sui generis. The Netherlands reserved its position on this issue.

At a minimum, it would be desirable to seek a clear separation of the Executive and national elements, to guard against solutions which might have the effect of weakening the supranationality of the CSC and the EDC, and to ensure the establishment of a strong Executive, at least as independent as the Executive provided for in the Draft Treaty.

The other major unresolved problem on which additional negotiation will be required concerns the question of the transfer of powers by the Six in addition to those already ceded to the CSC and EDC. On this issue, the French appear to be isolated, holding out against a new grant of economic power to the Community, although agreeing on the need for providing the Community with new economic “tasks”. The French delegation opposed giving the Community authority to enforce any of these new economic functions and was reluctant to concur in a timetable for the progressive implementation of common market goals to be specified in the Political Community Treaty. At the Conference the French dwelled on the difficulties impeding the establishment of a common market, stressed the need for “prudence” and the necessity for safeguards in laying the groundwork for further economic integration. Although several other countries also indicated specific interest in protecting certain segments of their economic structure, all the other Delegations held that the Political Community should be granted real economic powers and should not be limited to the powers already established by the CSC and EDC. Belgium and the Netherlands took the strongest positions among the countries favoring a new grant of economic authority to the Community.

If the French position prevails, it will be a retreat from the Draft Treaty, which empowers the Community to institute measures for a common market one year after the Treaty comes into force. In the Draft Treaty, these measures are to be initiated by the Executive and concurred in unanimously by the Council of Ministers.

Although a European Political Community establishing a popularly elected Assembly, and limited to the grant of powers provided for in the CSC and the EDC, would be an important achievement, it would only consolidate existing gains. A transfer of additional powers in the economic field, on the other hand, would give the new Community more content, providing a broader base than a military-heavy industry alignment, and make the Community dynamic by continuing the impetus and forward movement toward integration of the Community of Six. As indicated by the Rome Report, moreover, the assumption of new powers by the Community in the economic field would encourage and lead to the development of certain new powers, so far unspecified, in the field of foreign affairs.

Five of the Six appear to favor the transfer of powers in the economic field to the new Community. Although French reluctance to take this big step is understandable reflecting as it does the precarious French economic position, there may be some merit in attempting to seek a better solution than suggested by the French Delegation to the Rome meeting. Without additional authority the economic “tasks” suggested by the French are not a real contribution to the integration of the Six. To obviate the necessity for new Treaties to obtain additional economic powers for the Political Community and, at the same time to assure the French against precipitous action toward the common market, consideration might be given to a compromise involving a broad grant of authority for the establishment of a common market among the Six, with an initial transitional period during which time countries could exercise a veto power on the adoption of specific measures and avail themselves of certain safeguards established to protect countries in a sensitive economic situation from the full effects of the operation of the common market.

It should be noted that one important conclusion in the economic sphere was reached by the Rome Conference which should serve to clarify the course of further integration efforts. All countries agreed to adopt measures looking toward the establishment of a “generalized common market” rather than look to successive integration on a functional or sector basis. Along these lines, the Conference was in agreement in principle on the following points:

1. Quantitative restrictions between member states should be progressively reduced and ultimately suppressed;

2. Customs duties among the member states should be progressively reduced and ultimately abolished;

3. The necessary measures should be taken for the progressive establishment of a customs and exchange system with regard to third states. These measures should be favorable to the development of international exchanges.

Attached as an annex is a more detailed summary of the areas of agreement and disagreement reached at the Rome Conference.⁴

1. Regarding the Rome Conference, see Document 178.
2. For information concerning the meetings of the Ad Hoc Assembly in March 1953, see Document 161.
3. For a summary of the Baden-Baden Conference, see Document 176.
4. Not printed.