740.5/1–1353
No. 146
The Assistant Director for Mutual
Security (Tannenwald) to the Under Secretary of State
(Bruce)
secret
Washington, January 13, 1953.
Dear David: You will recall that about a week ago
you and I discussed again the question of a circular airgram on the
subject of European integration.1 I
indicated to you at that time that we had reservations about the failure
of the State Department draft to set forth clearly the need for United
States support and encouragement of progress toward integration.
You suggested that we prepare a redraft of the cable which would
incorporate our views. I have had this redraft prepared and am enclosing
a copy herewith, together with a copy of a memorandum to me from
Harlan Cleveland,
dated January 10, 1953, which deals with the redraft.
In view of the present crisis in European integration and the fact that
the new Administration will take office in a week, I seriously question
the advisability of sending such a cable at the present time. However, I
believe that the problem of European integration is one that should
promptly be dealt with by the new Administration and perhaps the
enclosed draft cable will facilitate the reaching of a decision.
Sincerely yours,
[Page 261]
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Assistant Director for Europe
of the Mutual Security Agency (Cleveland)
to the Assistant Director for Mutual Security (Tannenwald)
secret
Washington, January 10, 1953.
Subject: Redrafting of State Department Circular
Telegram on European Integration.
Attached is the MSA redraft of the
State Department Circular Telegram on European integration. I have a
strong feeling that events have overtaken the cable and that it
would probably not serve a useful purpose to send it out at this
time. However, pursuant to our conversation I have undertaken to
redraft the cable along the lines we discussed.
The State Department draft dealt with a number of important policy
questions, in a manner with which we were in general agreement. Our
principal difficulty with the cable was that it did not recognize
sufficiently the importance of U.S. leadership in connection with
European integration. As a consequence, it presented a somewhat
distorted picture.
In redrafting the State Department cable, we have been at some pains
not to enlarge its scope. The cable, therefore, does not now deal
adequately with what is clearly the most important policy problem
facing the United States with regard to Western Europe—EDC ratification and the crisis in
European integration.2
The EDC, in some form, still appears
to be the best, if not the only framework in which the French would
consider accepting a German defense contribution. If, as it appears,
German rearmament is not feasible without French acquiescence,
ratification of a revised EDC seems
imperative if German contingents are to be added to the NATO forces. Loss of the EDC would also mean the defeat of a
second major U.S. policy toward Western Europe, support of European
integration. The EDC Treaty will in
any event have to be reopened as a result of the recent French
crisis; this is therefore the time to consider changes in the EDC Treaty, and in the conditions under
which the EDC problem is posed in
the minds of the French, in order to preserve the EDC as the means of achieving a German
military contribution and continuing the movement towards European
integration. The subject is an extremely complex one, and we are
probably not in a position to send anything to the field at this
time.
[Page 262]
Toward the end of next week I hope to be able to forward a briefing
paper for Mr. Stassen,
which will review recent developments on the integration front,
analyze some of the current problems from the economic point of
view, and tentatively suggest some of the arrangements that will
have to be considered in recasting U.S. policy to meet the new
situation.
[Attachment]
Draft Circular Telegram by the Mutual Security
Agency
secret
[Washington,] January 9,
1953.
Subject: U.S. Policy on European Integration
- 1.
- This is State/DMS/MSA cable.
- 2.
- In light of recent discussions of European integration and
related matters at Ambassadors’ Meeting in London,3 we
believe it might be useful to outline our views on general
question of Eur integration and
the strengthening of the North Atlantic Community with
particular reference to the Schuman Plan, EDC and related developments.
- 3.
- We may first reaffirm our general position, that support of
European movement towards integration is a key element in U.S.
policy toward Western Europe. USGov continues to feel that
further progress towards political federation, military
integration and economic unification in Europe are necessary as
a means of building strength, establishing security, and
preserving peace in North Atlantic Area. The specific
institutions which have been evolved, ECSC and the EDC, represent a response to the
European desire to provide by united efforts for the prosperity
and security of Western Europe. As indicated in the Tripartite
Declaration of May 27, 1952,4 we also consider that the establishment
and development of these institutions of the European Community
correspond to our own basic interests and will therefore lend
them every possible cooperation and support.
- 4.
- We feel that the creation of European organizations is
primarily a task for the Europeans themselves and that there can
be no substitute for Eur
initiative in the complex and difficult task of building a
united Europe. If an enduring union is to be established in
Europe, it must be European in concept and reflect the
traditions
[Page 263]
and
requirements of Europe. The changes involved are not easy ones
to make, however, and inertia or active resistance is inevitably
encountered. It is this fact that has made U.S. support and
encouragement so important in the past in achieving the
practical realization of such European ideas as the Schuman Plan or the
proposal for a European Army. Conversely, any doubt on part of
Europeans as to firmness of U.S. support necessarily has effect
of weakening movement. For example, U.S. and U.K. assurances
contained in Tripartite Declaration have been essential element
in gaining acceptance of EDC
concept. It is U.S. policy to continue its support and to make
it as effective as possible in the interest of facilitating
further progress.
- 5.
- If some form of political federation and economic unification
are to be achieved in the foreseeable future, it is highly
important that forward motion not be lost. We therefore attach
special importance to the continued movement in the direction of
federation represented by the proposals for the establishment of
a European Political Community. The EPC is the logical successor to the CSC and the EDC, and provides the political auspices under
which new departures might, in time, be undertaken.
- 6.
- It is important to establish, from the first, close and
cordial relationships between the institutions of the
Continental Community and third countries, especially the
political orientation of the new grouping, and as a means of
encouraging progress toward further unification of the Six by
giving important elements in the Six countries the reassurance
they wish that progress in this direction will not result in
isolation. The U.S. relationship with the Continental Community
should be constructed in such a way as to be fully consistent
with the decision on the part of the Six to give the new
institutions supranational authority, and so as to support this
trend. For example, a device such as has been agreed between
Monnet and
Weir, i.e., a joint committee between
the High Authority of the CSC
and British Representatives in Luxembourg for the consideration
of common problems, is consistent with this approach; the
Council of Europe proposal for third-country observers in the
institutions of the Coal and Steel Community is not. It is, of
course, desirable, that the Six Countries continue, in the
future, as they have in the past, to leave the way open for
accession by any state, such as Austria, that is prepared to
undertake the same obligations.
- 7.
- There can, of course, be no complete guarantee that a
federation of the Six Countries, if it were to be achieved,
would be a consistent supporter of those Free World objectives
in which we believe. We believe, however, that recognition of
this risk should not lead us to discourage progress in this
direction, but rather to put
[Page 264]
added emphasis on the necessity for
building sufficiently close relationships between the Six
Countries and the U.S., the U.K., and the other countries of
Western Europe so that the risk is minimized. Integration of the
Six continental countries is complementary to the continued
growth and strengthening of the Atlantic Community as a whole.
The two developments mutually reinforce and strengthen one
another. Therefore, the U.S. should encourage participation by
the Continental Community acting as a single unit, in broader
arrangements such as the OEEC
and NATO, and the concurrent
strengthening of these broader organizations so that they impose
a real obligation on their members to act in a manner which is
consistent with an increase in strength and community of
interest for the entire area. This development is a natural
complement of participation by non-CSC countries in the institutions of the
Six.
- 8.
- In the military field, this implies treating the EDC, once it has been established,
as a single but key element in all NATO plans, as well as in bilateral relations with
the U.S. In the political field, it means strengthening the
habit of consultation among NATO members on foreign policy questions and
broadening the area of discussion. In the economic field, it is
not yet clear what the organizational implications of the EDC will be. Ratification of the
EDC will involve the
extension of the single market in coal and steel in the Six
Countries to the field of defense production. This follows from
the requirements in the EDC
Treaty that bidding on EDC
contracts be competitive and that contracts shall not be denied
to an enterprise on grounds of nationality. Because of these
economic consequences, some aspects of the EDC will require coordination with
the OEEC. Thus, the EDC will have political and
military relations with NATO,
and economic relations with the OEEC.
- 9.
- The U.S. has supported the EDC
because it believes that only if Europe achieves a degree of
unity can it hope to develop further and to deal successfully
with the political and economic problems that are going to
confront it, and because it sees in the EDC the best answer to the problem of Franco-German
rivalry and a German contribution to the defense of the free
nations. If the EDC is not
ratified, the achievement of all of these objectives would be
seriously endangered and a thoroughgoing re-examination of U.S.
policy toward Western Europe would be necessary.
