Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Europe, 1952–53”

No. 129
Draft Circular Telegram by the Officer in Charge of Economic Organization Affairs (Camp)¹

secret

[Washington,] October 24, 1952.

1. In light of recent discussions of this and related problems at Ambassadors’ meeting in London,² Department believes it might be useful to outline our current views on general question of European integration and the strengthening of the North Atlantic Community with particular reference to the Schuman Plan, EDC and related developments. It should of course be understood that these views are premised on the assumption that the EDC will be ratified.

2. Looked at broadly there are two general courses of action open to us with respect to the Six-Country developments. You can either put our full weight behind the maximum degree of unity for the Six Countries or, alternatively, we can encourage Six-Country developments as the beginnings of concerted action by a wider group of countries and, accordingly, encourage the development of arrangements between the Six Countries and other European countries which will lead to some measure of direct participation by other Western European countries in the work of the Coal and Steel Community and similar developments.

3. If there did not appear to be a reasonable possibility that an actual federation of the Six Countries could be achieved in the next, say, five or six years, there would be strong arguments for treating the Coal and Steel Community, and related developments, as a more advanced form of international organization than, say, the OEEC, but to treat them essentially as arrangements among sovereign states and as arrangements to which other sovereign states should be encouraged to adhere to the extent possible since this approach would yield the advantages of a broader area of cooperation. On the other hand, if it can be attained, federation, or as near to federation as can be achieved by the Six Countries, is considered to be the best answer now open to us to the inter-related problems of a resurgent Germany, a divided Germany and French-German rivalry.

4. It is fully recognized that there are a number of current factors militating against the achievement of full union, in particular the growing French fear of German predominance on the Continent. Nevertheless the Department believes that with the coming into force of the Schuman Plan and the establishment of the Ad Hoc Assembly to elaborate a constitution for a Political Authority, there is a reasonable chance that a large measure of integration, and perhaps even federation, of the Six Countries can be achieved. Given this judgment and the fact that we believe full union the better alternative if it can be attained, we believe the essential test which should be applied when considering relationships between the institutions of the Six and other organizations, and between the institutions of the Six and other countries, including the U.S., is whether or not the arrangements are conducive to an early evolution toward a single state whose eventual relationship with other states will be consistent with the relationship between sovereign states. We should seek to avoid arrangements which tend to treat the Six-Country institutions simply as new international organizations, and should avoid formalizing and perpetuating arrangements which should be transitional only, if the objective of federation is to be achieved.

5. There can, of course, be no complete guarantee that a federation of the Six Countries would be a consistent supporter of those Free World objectives in which we believe. Therefore the problem of building sufficiently close relationships between the Six Countries and the US, the UK, and the other countries of Western Europe so that the risk involved is minimized is of fundamental importance. The best course would seem to Dept to be not increased participation by non-Schuman Plan countries in the institutions of the Six (e.g. the current UK–Dutch views) but the converse, i.e., full participation by the Six, acting wherever possible, and as soon as possible, as a single unit, in broader arrangements such as the OEEC and the NATO, and the concurrent strengthening of these broader organizations so that they impose a real obligation on their members to act in a manner which is consistent with an increase in strength and community of interest for the entire area.

6. In the military field this implies treating the EDC, once it has been established, as a single but key element in all NATO plans as well as in bilateral relations with the US. It might also imply an evolution toward a Standing Group composed of the US, UK and a representative of the EDC. In the political field it means, initially, strengthening the habit of consultation on foreign policy questions and broadening the area of discussion. Pending eventual membership by the “Six Countries” in the NATO, the ties between the EDC and the NATO should be strengthened by joint meetings of the Councils of the two organizations. The implications for the economic field are less clear and probably more controversial and lead directly both to questions such as the relationship between the NATO and the OEEC and to the appropriate relationship between regional and global economic institutions.

7. On the assumption that the Six Countries will eventually carry through into other fields the pattern established in the Schuman Plan Treaty for the coal and steel industries, there will be created in the heart of Europe a broad common market which should result in greater productivity within the area and an economy which is more competitive with the United States in world markets. There would thus be achieved, for a large part of Western Europe, the primary economic objectives to which the OEEC has been directing its attention. The economic problems confronting Western Europe can not, however, be fully solved by the creation of a common market either among six countries or among sixteen. Nor can they be solved on a North Atlantic basis. To an increasing extent the role of the underdeveloped countries and Japan will be significant factors in re-establishing a world trade balance. In terms of long run policies the question will arise whether enough economic problems are susceptible to solution either on an OEEC or a NATO basis so that we should look to institutional economic arrangements for the North Atlantic Community, or whether we should not rather consider institutions in which the US, the UK and Commonwealth, and the Six European countries would play leading roles but which would consider Free World economic problems globally rather than regionally.

8. Regardless of the validity of the speculation concerning the future in the previous paragraph, Department believes that for the time being the NATO and the OEEC have important and inter-related roles in the economic field. Although it now seems clear that full integration of the European economy will be feasible only on a Six-Country basis, if at all, the present necessity for continued international cooperation and coordination among the Western European countries in economic matters is obvious. The fact that the Six Countries have been willing to agree to a limited merger of sovereignty, and we hope will do more, should not detract from the importance of continued vigorous action by the OEEC but assist it. It would be foolhardy to weaken the OEEC by openly contemplating its demise at this stage. Six-Country evolution and worldwide developments may later pose the problem of whether the continuation of a “second ring” of organization is required in the economic field (i.e. Six Countries plus other WE countries in association with the US and Canada), but Six-Country evolution will in any event make more necessary than ever strong military and political North Atlantic arrangements.

9. In addition to the full participation of the new community in broader arrangements, in particular the NATO, in which the US and the UK participate, it is also important to establish, from the first, close and cordial relationships between the Six-Country institutions and third countries, especially the US and the UK. This is important both as a means of conditioning the political orientation of the new grouping and to encourage progress toward unification by giving important elements in the Six Countries the reassurance they require that progress toward union will not result in isolation. The thoughts outlined in foregoing paras should, in no sense, be construed as reflecting a shift in US policy or reflecting any feeling on our part that the British relationship to the Six-Power groupings should be weakened. Rather it reflects our view that the British influence, and our own, can be more usefully exerted if, wherever sufficient merger of sovereignty has taken place among the Six so that it becomes feasible to do so, we build our relationship in such a way that it is consistent with the relationship between one sovereign state and another. For example a device such as has been agreed between Monnet and Weir, i.e. a joint committee between the High Authority and the British reps in Luxembourg for the common consideration of mutual problems is consistent with this approach; the Council of Europe proposal for third-country observers in the institutions of the Coal and Steel Community is not. As suggested by recent telegrams from Paris and London, Department believes desirable to undertake in near future discussions with the British in order to make crystal-clear that our attitude does not imply any back-tracking on our frequently expressed desire that they work closely with and lend their encouragement to the development of the CSC, EDC, etc. Nor should our attitude be interpreted as discouraging the UK from exercising initiative in seeking new solutions to the problem of association which are consistent with principles outlined above.

10. A corollary of the foregoing views as to the nature of the relationship between the Six-Country institutions, international organizations and third countries is that US officials should not become too heavily involved in the constitutional process. Our comments, and the pressures which we bring to bear, should all be toward the rapid achievement of a single state rather than directed toward one form of federation rather than another. For example, it may be desirable for us to urge the delegation of particular powers to a central institution on the grounds that without such a delegation of power the essentials of a single state can not be created, but it would not be necessary, or probably desirable, for us to become involved in discussions which are essentially alternative means of arriving at the same end, such as whether or not to adopt a cabinet form of government. We should be constantly on guard against the natural impulse to get too deeply involved in the details and resist the urge to impose our own pattern of development on other countries.

If an enduring union of the Six Countries is to be established, it must be created because they want it, it must be European in concept and reflect their traditions, not ours.

1. Attached to the source text was a covering memorandum by Bonbright to Nitze, dated Oct. 30, requesting comments from the Policy Planning Staff on the proposed circular telegram. The comments by the Policy Planning Staff, drafted by Leon W. Fuller on Nov. 5, are in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Europe, 1952–53”. On the margin of the Fuller memorandum it is noted that this subject was discussed in a staff meeting on Nov. 13 and that all were opposed to sending out this telegram as now drafted; it also indicated that Camp agreed to redraft the circular telegram.

   Another draft by Camp of the circular telegram, dated Nov. 14, was circulated to the Policy Planning Staff on Nov. 15, with additional copies sent to Bruce, Matthews, Bohlen, and Riddleberger. Brief comments from the Policy Planning Staff in a memorandum of Dec. 2, also drafted by Fuller, are in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Europe, 1952–53”, along with the Nov. 14 text. Comments on the Nov. 14 draft by Vernon of the Bureau of Economic Affairs are in file 850.33/11–1952; the reaction of the Acting Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, to the Camp redraft of Nov. 14 is contained in his letter of Dec. 17 to Bruce in which Foster describes the draft circular telegram as an indication of a “considerable amount of progress in our thinking.” (Camp files, lot 55 D 105, “Chronological File—1952”)

   For the reaction of the Mutual Security Agency to the proposed circular telegram, see Document 146.

2. Regarding the London Ambassadors meeting, see Documents 301–303.