Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

740.00/10–252: Telegram

No. 116
The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State¹

secret

Paris, October 2, 1952—5 p.m.

2021. Subject is European Political Community.

1. Monnet’s views on best way to proceed to creation EPC have not changed substantially from those previously reported. He would like to see ad hoc assembly draft a treaty creating EPC on basis of what exists and what is already under way. National parliaments in Europe should not be asked at this time to transfer new sovereignty in any sector beyond coal and steel and defense. He insists the national parliaments are not ready to approve a treaty giving to a yet untried European parliament unlimited power to develop a full European federation as it sees fit. However, the ad hoc assembly is not in its view the best instrument to draw up a complete and final constitution.

2. Monnet points out that CSC and EDC treaties provide for exercise of sovereignty through a CSC executive, an EDC executive, common court, and a common assembly made up of delegates from national parliaments. The next step shld be to improve and complete this institutional structure. The obvious gap is the lack of a directly-elected European parliament. The treaty to be drafted by the ad hoc assembly should, therefore, include provisions for Eur elections, in early 1953, if possible, for a lower house with, e.g., one representative for each 500,000 citizens. The present CSC–EDC Assembly would become the upper house, thus completing the bicameral structure of the new European Parliament. Present membership would probably be changed to give Benelux more delegates in the upper house than they now have in CSC Assembly.

3. Second major task of the ad hoc assembly would be to include in the treaty provision empowering the new European Parliament to name a European executive to take over the executive authority in CSC and EDC. The European executive and the new European parliament would be given full powers to change the organizational aspects of CSC, and EDC in order to adapt the CSC and EDC institutions to the new federal structure (for example, powers and functions of CSC Council of Ministers would be divided up as appropriate among the EPC institutions). Monnet also acknowledges that the new European parliament should probably have some powers to improve the provisions on finance in CSC and EDC treaties and on disposition and expansion of defense forces in EDC treaty, but he clearly does not want to raise question of transferring new sovereignty from the national parliaments beyond defense and coal and steel sectors. The way to permit such modification would be to consider provisions of CSC treaty and EDC treaty as the first EPC legislation. The CSC and EDC treaties could then be modified through the customary legislative process after the EPC treaty was ratified. In this way the ad hoc assembly would not have to spell out necessary changes, but would only establish limits on power of EPC parliament to do so later.

4. Monnet would have the proposed EPC treaty provide that transfers of sovereignty in new sectors are prepared and proposed by the new European parliament, but that all such proposals must be ratified by existing national parliaments before they would become effective. He recognizes, of course, that work would continue on the agriculture pool, health pool, transport pool, and soon, even if the approach he suggests were agreed upon. It is here that Monnet comes into conflict with Dutch views and with proposals being made by European Federalist movement. Dutch desire a definite commitment on the transfer of sovereignty in the economic field, and particularly in agriculture, before they agree to the new political arrangements sought by the French. Federalist proposals go much beyond Monnet in two respects. First, they would transfer sovereignty immediately in fields of foreign affairs and finance, and would transfer broad powers to deal with questionable mobilization and support of defense forces. Second, they would empower the new European parliament to take over sovereignty in other sectors on its own initiative. Dutch views and proposals of Federalists will be reported separately.

5. Views of Schuman are apparently substantially same as Monnet’s, and for once, French Foreign Office seems to be in full accord. Comments by Alphand and Monnet indicate that Spaak, Adenauer and Hallstein are also in substantial agreement, and that effort will be made at coming Bonn, Brussels and Paris meetings to reach agreement that work will progress along lines indicated above.

6. Monnet recognizes that suggested approach is incomplete and imperfect, even though CSC and EDC would both be substantially improved and many lacunae in existing treaties filled. He emphasizes, nevertheless, that transferring sovereignty on a sector basis has forced progress not dreamed possible only a few months ago. He also points out that defense and coal and steel bring under control of European central institutions a very substantial part of government activities in Europe.

7. Monnet sees many advantages in proceeding in this more limited way. A treaty on the lines he suggests could be very simple and could be quickly prepared. An effort to go further could well mean endless drafting and discussion. The approach assumes existence of EDC and should encourage rapid ratification of that treaty. It almost certain legitmate fears [will be?] raised by CSC and EDC treaties in their present form. The idea of setting up popular control over the “technocrats” in Luxembourg and the “generals” in Paris will have great appeal to public and to parliament. He concludes that all these considerations plus the drama of the European peoples uniting themselves for the first time in a directly-elected European parliament provide the decisive and dynamic event that is needed to take advantage of developing favorable trend to a United States of Europe.

Dunn

1. Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.