840.00/10–152
No. 115
The Ambassador in Belgium (Cowen) to the Under
Secretary of State (Bruce)
confidential
Dear David: There are several problems which have been causing me increasing concern during the time I have been here, and some of them are the following. I should be deeply grateful for whatever enlightenment can be given to me.
One is that in creating the new Germany (and similar comment would apply in the case of Japan), a whole new set of economic forces have been turned loose which could, as time goes on, rapidly accelerate the difficulties of the Commonwealth, and particularly of the relationships between the Commonwealth and the Western European countries. New German competition is already beginning to be seriously felt. It is quite possible that if some appropriate adjustments and safeguards are not taken, this might seriously affect the development of some of the European integration institutions, specifically the Schuman Plan. While this has not perhaps come under general observance, it seems to me quite unlikely that the other countries in the Schuman Plan will continue to go ahead with the one-market idea unless German competition can be kept within reasonable bonds. It seems quite likely that similar considerations apply to the development and extension of Japanese competition, particularly in the Far East, but also further afield.
Are we doing enough about planning for the replacement of our own strategic materials which are being so rapidly used at present, not only for our own but for European and other needs? Specifically, as an integrated Europe takes place, as seems now to be fairly rapidly happening, are we safeguarding sufficiently the raw material situation in these countries’ overseas territories? I know, for instance, that there has been considerable uncertainty as to whether it was necessary or indeed even desirable for the MSA to have a Materials Development Program in overseas territories in view of the establishment of DMPA. It occurs to me to inquire whether we shouldn’t be taking advantage of every channel to insure not only an adequate supply of strategic materials for defense purposes, but also to develop with sufficient rapidity and in sufficient volume the supply from other areas of commercial raw materials to prevent the further exhaustion of our own and to insure adequate sources [Page 200] of supply to the extent that our own may be exhausted to a point insufficient to supply our own needs.1
The third is, what are likely to be the effects on our international, commercial and other economic relationships, particularly with Europe, if a European federation of the Schuman Plan or NATO countries should become effective as rapidly as now seems possible? Also, would these economic effects be greatly different if such a federation should include the United Kingdom alone, or the entire British Commonwealth? Any such federation should settle some of our most immediate international problems such as the extension of economic and possibly even military aid since presumably such a federation would be able to stand on its own feet economically and possibly militarily, but it would certainly pose other problems such as very large and important adjustments in our import-export relationships.2
Sincerely,
- For documentation concerning U.S. policy regarding strategic materials, see vol. i, Part 2, pp. 817 ff.↩
- For Bruce’s reply, see Document 125.↩