Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

740.00/9–1052: Telegram

No. 104
The Consul at Strasbourg (Andrews) to the Department of State¹

confidential

Strasbourg, September 10, 1952—noon.

46. From Tomlinson. Subject is European Political Community.

1. During Luxembourg Minister Meeting we understand Adenauer opened discussion on question of European political community by stating that Ministers were faced with choice of whether to proceed on basis of Fr–Ital memo or on basis of Eden proposals as presented in recent Brit communication to 6 CSC govts. De Gasperi commented that he did not believe Brit note should be interpreted as in direct opposition to Fr–Ital memo. However, he did not consider that there was anything new in Brit position since last meeting when Ministers decided to proceed with discussions on basis of Fr–Ital memo. Adenauer and De Gasperi received full support of other Ministers to go ahead on basis of Fr–Ital proposal.

Dutch FonMin then presented amendment providing that a special conf of Ministers should be held to give specific instructs to CSC Assembly and to list questions Ministers wished explored by CSC Assembly. Dutch amendment obviously designed to insure that Assembly would discuss further economic integration at same time as political integration. Other Ministers accepted principle of Dutch proposal for participation govts, but generally expressed view that work of Assembly should proceed without waiting for further instructions from Mins. Adenauer then appointed drafting group to prepare new draft for approval by Mins.

Entire discussion on this subject lasted less than half an hour and Mins approval of final draft this morning took even less time. Only changes suggested by Mins were to emphasize independence of CSC Assembly from Council of Europe. See Strasbourg’s tel 45 [44] to Dept for final text.²

Modification premitting US to observe was stressed in particular by Germans. In brief conversation with me last evening in presence of Adenauer, Hallstein volunteered in very strong terms that influence of US observers must be present at the discussions to come in same way as that of Brit. If this had not been the case in Schuman Plan and in EDC, these initiatives would not, in his govt’s view, have succeeded.

2. Reaction of different dels at Luxembourg to new Brit note (cabled from Emb Paris) were mixed.³ Germans profess to be very worried about whether Brit intend to support integration of six nations, and interpret note as effort of Brit to confuse and to defeat development by bringing it under control of Council of Europe. Dutch reps, who apparently did not take note very seriously, thought it had been due to confusion in Brit FonOff. Dutch did not believe Brit could be so impertinent as to suggest to a sovereign assembly in which UK did not participate what its secretariat should be, nor did Dutch believe Brit really intended to ask govts to instruct independent Parliamentarians on what their attitude should be about such questions. Dutch could only find explanation by stating that part of Brit Govt did not understand difference between CSC Assembly and Consultative Assembly of Council of Europe. Fr and Itals also apparently did not pay much attention to new Brit note.

3. Schuman seems to be very pleased with quick and clear understanding reached by Mins on this question. In conversation with me after first days session, he explained that quick action was not due to hasty consideration but on the contrary represented full agreement reached after careful review and months of informal talks. He said that Brit had also been given opportunity to consider development carefully. He was confident Brit now fully understood and supported initiative. He stressed repeatedly that Brit understanding and support were absolutely essential. Everyone, he said, was now agreed on need for independent development of six-nation community but linked in the closest association with UK and Council of Europe in manner which would not prejudice this essential independence. Schuman continued that timing of action by six nations had been very appropriate. Definite and clear action by Mins would enable Eden to make his speech to Council Europe fully consistent. Schuman said that he was informed Eden would do this and that Eden would have been in a most difficult situation if six nations had not reached definite decision at this time.

4. Schuman may be too optimistic about understanding with Brit. His confidence seems to be based in part at least on his interpretation of message sent to Monnet by Eden. Paris SecGen of Council Europe talked with Monnet in Luxembourg last weekend and apparently accepted High Authority’s view that relations between CSC and Council Europe should be allowed to develop gradually on basis experience acquired in placing Schuman Plan in effect; Paris even suggested that Monnet incorporate this statement in his speech to CSC Assembly as well as some of Monnet’s specific ideas for form which eventual CSC–Council Europe relations might take. Following these conversations, Monnet informed Eden through Marjoribanks of his intention to discuss question in these terms and asked for Brit views on grounds he did not wish to say anything which Eden would feel compelled to contradict in forthcoming speech to Council Europe. Eden replied that he “would deprecate drawing a hard and fast line between the Council of Europe and the restricted communities. The conception underlying the Eden proposals is the contrary, that the two reps of bodies should be linked and should grow together. Her Majesty’s Govt are anxious that this conception should be accepted from the outset, and it is for that reason that they hope the Comite of Mins in the Coal and Steel Comm will endorse it at their forthcoming meeting.

“As regards secretarial arrangements, the attitude of Her Majesty’s Govt is that the Secretariat will be matter for the Schuman Assembly to decide, but it would be consistent with our proposals that the Assembly would in future be serviced by the Secretariat of the Council of Europe.”

Schuman apparently interprets this message to mean that British accept idea that two organs are independent but linked, and that British will accept CSC Assembly as having separate and independent Secretariat. Others, including British del in Luxembourg, are not certain. Brit del was quite embarrassed not only because they are unable to clarify British position but because UK Govt communicated directly with govts on strictly CSC matters without informing High Auth through British delegation, and because communication is in direct conflict with statements made by Sir Cecil Weir to CSC High Auth.

There is considerable talk about these developments in corridors of CSC Assembly in Strasbourg. We have had only limited time to form judgment, but our general impression is that majority of members agree with Mins on importance of drawing distinction between CSC and Council Europe but at same time are anxious not to come into direct conflict with British. Whatever decision Assembly takes on Secretariat question, we hope that Eden will accept it as fully consistent with his proposals for association so that this controversy will not continue.

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Andrews

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1. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.
2. Supra.
3. See footnote 5, Document 101.