762.022/10–1654: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State 1
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1617. Mendes-France–Adenauer talks on Saar are scheduled begin 19th (probably afternoon) and presumably can continue morning 20th since Four-Power talks will not open until afternoon Outcome is obviously critical future not only London accords but entire Franco-German relationship.
I realize German situation has changed and Adenauer will take position political detachment no longer realistic possibility in Germany since demise EDC and that accordingly while accepting administration Saar by Brussels Council of Ministers it must be clear Saar remains German territory. I am concerned Mendes-France will feel he cannot sell this formula to Assembly and in fact such task may well be beyond even his large prestige.
Best chance for Mendes persuade Parliament accept some political concessions on Saar would seem be clear statement from British and ourselves we are willing make promise of support for present settlement [Page 1395] at peace treaty with additional declaration from US we will guarantee settlement from now until time of peace treaty (UK guarantee on this point presumably not required since UK is party Brussels Treaty).
French officials who are handling problem are deeply concerned that Saar may upset the applecart. Heretofore when German situation was more malleable we have felt that given goodwill on both sides settlement could be quickly reached. Now although we must postulate goodwill that may not be sufficient. In past US and UK have traditionally played somewhat secondary role in Saar controversy but time now seems to have come when we should take whatever action possible that would assist both sides in reaching settlement. From French side most helpful step would be in our opinion categoric statement to Mendes-France of our guarantee of settlement and our promise to support it at peace treaty. Such action if taken promptly might assist Mendes in making necessary political concessions to Chancellor on 19th and 20th.
Accordingly I would recommend that Department instruct me to see Mendes-France, who will return from Radical-Socialist Congress Marseille over weekend, on Monday evening or Tuesday morning and inform him US position in sense outlined above, stating that we hope this will help him to adopt flexible position on political problem because of present political situation in Germany.
Such action should of course be closely coordinated with British Inasmuch as British position no longer entirely parallel to US do not believe Jebb would need make Démarche at same time as myself. However it would be essential that British undertake same position as ourselves re support at time of peace treaty.
I believe such a course would be vastly preferable to letting French and Germans run into serious trouble—forcing an appeal to US for help when they already have reached impasse and adopted positions from which they can only retreat with great difficulty. It might then be too late and could delay signature London accords since Mendes-France has indicated he plans sign London agreements only if Saar settlement signed simultaneously.
I would hope Secretary might be fully briefed on Saar before leaving next week in event his personal mediation should become indispensable. In this connection it seems clear Secretary and Eden would be only possible persons who might mediate in event French and Germans unable settle Saar question between themselves.
In view critical importance of Saar problem I would hope we would do everything possible to help French make political concessions (we are informed both sides are willing make necessary concessions on [Page 1396] economic problem) which apparently are needed to meet present situation in Germany.
- Repeated to London and Bonn.↩