751.5 MSP/10–1454: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State 1
1558. Mendes-France asked me to come and see him this morning. He said he was happy about the vote2 and while he did not expect the final vote on ratification to be quite as good he thought that if there were no unexpected difficulties he would not lose more than 30 or 40 votes at the outside. In other words, there would be a minimum of 310 to 320 votes for ratification. He then pointed out that the debate showed very clearly that the French Assembly was preparing to accept German rearmament in a spirit of resignation in order to preserve the Atlantic alliance, and that there was no enthusiasm whatsoever behind the support for the London accords.
Mendes then said that there were two items in the London accords which had been particularly criticised by all shades of opinion in the French Assembly. One was the lack of definite progress towards the arms pool concept, and the second was the provisions for distribution of American military aid. Regarding the first problem, Mendes said he realized that there was nothing that could be done at this time and this was something that would have to be taken up by the Brussels Treaty Council after the new accords had been ratified and had come into being. Regarding the question of American aid, Mendes said he would like to register a most serious plea with the US Govt that we modify the position we took at London and agree to have our military aid distributed by the Brussels Council. Mendes said that if it was not possible for us to go the whole way at this time, he hoped that at the very least we could agree to some sort of compromise solution which would represent a definite modification of the position which we had so firmly taken in London. Mendes pointed out that it was very difficult and in fact impossible for him to explain logically to French Assembly why US was not willing to make an arrangement with the Brussels Organization similar to that which we had been willing to make with EDC Commissariat. I pointed out to him, as I had yesterday to De Moustier, that they were very different organizations and that Brussels Organization was in no sense a supranational body.
Mendes said he could not accept this line of reasoning as it was his desire to give as much supranationality as possible to Brussels Organization [Page 1388] in order to make it a vehicle with which, to work towards European unity. He said he felt that the fact that agreement had been reached that the Brussels Treaty Organization could act by majority decision which would be binding on all the governments concerned gave the organization a real measure of supranationality.
He clearly implied that he would be willing to have any decisions regarding American military assistance that might be distributed through the Brussels Organization taken by majority vote.
It is clear both from the results of the debate which Mendes correctly described, and from my interviews with De Moustier and Mendes, that Mendes’ major effort in the coming talks will be to obtain some modification in US position regarding distribution of US military aid. It is also clear that any modification giving greater authority in this matter to the Brussels Organization will be well received by the French Assembly and will assist Mendes in obtaining ratification.
Hughes and Collins have been kept fully informed on this development. I would like to suggest the possibility that this subject which seems to be of primary interest to France and the US might be profitably discussed, on a bilateral basis with the French prior to the Nine Power meeting.
Mendes then said there was one other real difficulty facing him which was the Saar. He repeated what he had told me previously that a Saar settlement would have to be signed simultaneously with the signature of the NATO agreements at the end of next week. He said he “would be fired” if he signed any definite NATO and Brussels Treaty accords without signing a final agreement on the Saar at the same time. Mendes said that he was meeting with Adenauer on the 19th and he hoped they could reach an agreement in principle prior to the opening of the Four Power Conference which would then be signed at the same time as all the other agreements.
Mendes then said he had been very much concerned by the debate in the German Bundestag indicating that there should be no settlement of the Saar at this time and by certain remarks that Adenauer had made in the Bundestag which indicated that he might be in agreement with the idea of postponing a final settlement. Mendes said that it had always been a French prerequisite for agreement that the Saar Agreement be definitive. He recognized that account must be taken of German problem regarding their eastern territories and that settlement must be made technically dependent on the final peace treaty. However, it must equally be definitely understood that the settlement which would be arrived at would be the settlement in the eventual treaty of peace.
Mendes said that he intended to talk to Adenauer also about broad Franco-German economic relations. He said France wished to find a larger market in Germany for her surplus wheat and the French were [Page 1389] prepared to open their overseas territories to German trade which would be very valuable concession. Mendes said that if Adenauer should turn out to be adamant against making a definitive Saar settlement at this time he would have to rely on US to convince Adenauer of the necessity of reaching an agreement.
Prior to seeing Mendes I had read Bonn’s 1040 to Dept3 which was very disturbing to me. I fully agree with Mendes that French Parliament will not accept any solution which is not in fact a final one and that if such a solution cannot be reached the London accords will not be ratified. The French will accept any wording which may be suggested to indicate that the final settlement of the Saar depends upon peace treaty arrangements provided it is very clear that the settlement reached will be the actual settlement placed in the peace treaty.
- Repeated to London and Bonn. Attached to the source text was a memorandum by MacArthur, dated Oct. 14, in which he summarized Dulles’ view that since an objective of the Brussels Pact was supposedly greater European unity, then perhaps the Department of State “might be able to link this objective in some way with a statement regarding our policy with respect to our military aid program.”↩
- On Oct. 12 the government of Mendès-France won a vote of confidence by a margin of 350–113, although Dillon immediately warned against overconfidence on the part of the United States (telegram 1562 from Paris, Oct. 13; 751.00/10–1354). A breakdown of this vote and an analysis of why it happened is provided in telegram 1565 from Paris, Oct. 13, not printed (751.00/10–1354).↩
- Dated Oct. 12, p. 1386.↩