Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

INR–NIE Files

Special Intelligence Estimate

top secret

Washington, May 22, 1951.

SE–5

Vulnerabilities of Communist China¹

the problem

To examine the prospects of effective opposition to the Chinese Communist regime under varying circumstances of covert or overt US support, and to estimate the international reaction to these courses of action.

assumption

Indefinite continuation of indecisive warfare in Korea.

estimate

1. It is estimated that there are approximately 600,000 anti-Communist guerrillas in China. About 300,000 of these are estimated to be under loose Nationalist control. The remainder consists of traditional bandit and war-lord groups who have always fought against the ruling authorities and whose activities are now directed against the Communists as the ruling authority and of some non-Nationalist anti-Communist groups. The guerrillas are virtually uncoordinated, are poorly supplied, and operate in small bands. If well supplied and coordinated, those guerrillas who are strongly anti-Communist could form the core of a potentially effective resistance movement.

2. Covert US logistical support would substantially increase the capabilities of non-Nationalist and Nationalist resistance forces on the mainland, but not to the extent of posing a serious threat to the Chinese Communist regime or of precipitating full-scale civil war. Despite the size and strength of Communist security forces and the difficulties of supplying and organizing the widely-scattered and politically divergent resistance groups, covert US support would probably: (a) increase the obstacles to further consolidation of Communist control over all of China, particularly in south-central China; (b) divert more of the regime’s resources to the maintenance of internal security; (c) harass vital north-south lines of communication; and (d) somewhat weaken Communist military capabilities.

3. The opposition between the Nationalist and non-Nationalist guerrilla forces presents difficulties to the achievement of these objectives. Some non-Nationalist opposition groups might not cooperate in a resistance effort which was under Nationalist auspices, but an alternative leader capable of arousing all anti-Communist elements has not yet emerged. It would, therefore, be hard to build up an effective guerrilla resistance movement on the mainland without the collaboration of the Nationalists in Taiwan. Support for the anti-Communist, non-Nationalist resistance units would be difficult because these groups do not possess a secure base of operations. Opposition between Nationalist and non-Nationalist forces is not likely to become acute unless guerrilla activity grew to proportions of a full-scale civil war.^*

4. Presently contemplated US aid, provided restrictions on Nationalist operations against the mainland were removed, would increase Nationalist capability for commando operations on the mainland, but would not enable the Nationalists to conduct sustained or large-scale military operations on the mainland. Such raids would probably result in the Communists’ diverting additional forces, possibly as many as 200,000, to the coastal areas opposite Taiwan and would encourage anti-Communist movements throughout China. A diversion of this sort would lessen Chinese Communist capabilities for operations elsewhere.

5. Excluding the element of Soviet participation, we believe US logistic but not operational support to the Nationalists on Taiwan, if expanded so as to provide matériel needed for the ground, air and naval forces, would probably, after the minimum period of time required to train the Nationalists, enable them to establish a sizeable bridgehead in South China without further US participation. Whether or not a bridgehead could be consolidated and expanded into a successful invasion would depend to a great degree on the reliability of the Nationalist armies and on the Nationalists’ ability to organize, train, and equip sizeable forces on the mainland. A consolidated bridgehead or a successful invasion would relieve Chinese Communist pressure against Southeast Asia, would weaken Communist internal controls, and probably would force the Chinese Communists to reduce their effort in Korea.

6. Excluding the element of Soviet participation, we believe that a Chinese Nationalist invasion of the mainland with full US logistical and operational support, excluding only the commitment of US ground troops, but including intensive and sustained air attacks by US forces against selected vital targets and a maximum naval blockade and bombardment of the China coast, would have the following effects on the Chinese Communists: (a) their war-making capabilities would be drastically and immediately reduced; (b) their lines of communication and the importation of needed supplies and war materials would be severly disrupted; (c) the industrial segment of their economy would become progressively paralyzed; and (d) their administrative control of China would be severely strained. We believe further that the coordinated Nationalist-US operations might imperil the stability of the Chinese Communist regime.

7. Although considerable discontent exists in Communist China, most opposition is passive. Any increase in the activities of anti-Communist forces might gain the sympathy of many of the discontented, but such forces would have to offer the promise of success to enlist active support of large groups. It would appear that, while there are still strong anti-Nationalist feelings among elements of the population, the initial acceptance and popularity of the Communist regime have generally waned and, in some areas, have turned to grudging tolerance and dislike as a result of the police-state methods of the Chinese Communists and their failure to improve the living standards of most elements of the population. These police state methods have, on the other hand, eliminated hundreds of thousands of persons suspected of actual or potential anti-Communist activities.

8. In the event of a Nationalist landing on the mainland with US logistical support to the Nationalists on Taiwan, but without further US participation, there would be a “wait and see” attitude among the general populace. They would wait, on the one hand, to measure the potentialities and conduct of the Nationalist forces and, on the other, to judge the nature and extent of Chinese Communists reprisal measures. In short, the more successful the invasion operation, the wider would be the popular support, although the residuum of anti-Kuomintang sentiment may retard the growth of such support.

9. An invasion with full US operational support, particularly the bombing of mainland targets, would tend to stimulate anti-US sentiment among mainland Chinese. The intensity of this reaction might be diminished by US propaganda preceding and accompanying the invasion, especially if supported by military success.

10. The UN would be extremely unlikely to support a Nationalist invasion of the mainland, bombing of Chinese territory, or a naval blockade unless there were new provocative actions by the USSR or by its Satellites, including the Chinese Communists. Should the US undertake such measures without UN approval, a crisis in the UN probably would result. The gravity of this crisis and its outcome cannot be estimated within the scope of this paper.

11. The governments of the Philippines and South Korea would not object to an invasion of the mainland by the Chinese Nationalists with US logistical and/or operational support. Japan would be concerned unless given US guarantees which it considered adequate. The governments of India, Indonesia, and Burma could be expected to condemn any overt action against the Chinese Communist regime. In the present confusion of anti-Communist and anti-imperialist sentiment in Asia, it is unlikely that the other states of the area would take a firm stand at the outset. Successful invasion of the mainland would undoubtedly strengthen anti-Communist forces in Asia.

12. The Western Powers, notably Britain and France, wish the US to avoid involvement in any form in China. They probably would contend that US covert activities would not appreciably affect Chinese Communist capabilities, but, nevertheless, would reduce the chances of confining hostilities to the Korean theater. The British. French, and probably other NATO governments would strongly oppose US logistical support of a Chinese Nationalist invasion on the grounds that it would diminish US military aid to Western Europe and would increase the risk of precipitating general war. If the US should provide full logistic and operational support of such an invasion, we believe that a crisis in the relations of the US with Western Europe would result; the gravity of the crisis and its outcome cannot be estimated within the scope of this paper.

13. In the event of US military involvement in China, the USSR would seek to exploit internationally to the fullest extent the issue of aggression and the danger of global war. We believe that it puts great store by its political and psychological potential and would strive to divide us internally, estrange us from our allies, promote fear and neutralism, and discredit our leadership and desire for peace. The extent and nature of the USSR’s military reactions in the Far East as discussed in the following paragraphs would, at each stage, undoubtedly be coordinated with its program of international political and psychological exploitation.

14. If the US should give covert aid to Chinese guerrillas, or if the US should give logistical support on Taiwan sufficient to enable the Chinese Nationalists to invade the mainland, we believe the USSR would give increased aid to the Chinese Communists designed to counter the effects of such US aid. Since US forces would not be involved in an invasion of the mainland supported logistically from Taiwan, the USSR might conclude that its own air and submarine forces could be used to counter the invasion without serious risk of a conflict with the US.

15. Full US logistical and operational support of a Chinese Nationalist invasion of the mainland would almost certainly be regarded by the USSR as a serious threat to its security interests in the Far East. Although we are unable, on the basis of intelligence, to determine what measures the USSR would take to meet such a threat, we believe that the USSR would take steps which would increase the risk of general war. So long as the Kremlin estimated that the existence of the Chinese Communist regime was not in jeopardy, we believe that the USSR, while giving all necessary support against the invasion, probably would not openly commit its own forces against US forces. If, however, the Kremlin estimated that the existence of the regime was in jeopardy, we believe that the USSR, whatever the consequent risks of general war, would do whatever was required to uphold the Chinese Communist regime, including, as a last resort, the open commitment of Soviet forces against US forces.^†

16. The USSR may well consider it unnecessary to formalize or acknowledge its support of the Chinese Communist regime. However, in view of Soviet security sensibilities and the definiteness of Moscow’s published commitments to Peiping, formal Soviet support of Communist China under terms of the Sino-Soviet pact must be considered a distinct possibility. In any event, if the Soviet Union did provide major overt support to the Chinese Communists, it probably would cite the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty in an effort to justify its actions before world opinion.

17. In view of the expressed US desire to avoid a general war, and of the opposition of the Western European powers to the expansion of any Far Eastern conflict into general war, the Kremlin might estimate that a US–USSR conflict starting in China could be localized in the Far East. On the other hand, the possibility cannot be disregarded that the USSR might be willing, or even might desire, to have a Far Eastern conflict expanded into a general war between the US and the USSR, leaving to the US the responsibility for initiating such a war and thereby exposing the US to the risk of losing its most important allies. Indeed, at every stage from the extension of covert aid to the initiation of local or general hostilities, the USSR would probably seek to force the US to take the initiative, and thereby to incur the onus of “aggression.”

18. We are unable, on the basis of present intelligence, to determine whether the Kremlin would be in fact willing to have a Far Eastern conflict expanded into a general war between the US and the USSR. In making its decision, the Kremlin would undoubtedly take into consideration the global power situation (including atomic capabilities). We believe it unlikely that the Kremlin would be willing to have a Far Eastern conflict expanded into a general war with the US unless it estimated that the USSR possessed a clear margin of superiority, or unless it estimated that delay would tip the scales of power irretrievably against the USSR.

Appendix A

Vulnerabilities of Chinese Communist Regime to Military Action

1. General. Several factors condition the vulnerability of the Chinese Communist regime to military action. Some of these are basic to China regardless of the regime in power. The internal transportation system is inadequate and there is consequently a tendency toward autonomous economic, social, political, and military regions. The low level of industrialization has forced China to depend on outside sources for all but the small and simple types of military equipment. The enormous population can provide an almost inexhaustible supply of untrained military manpower, but the general economic and administrative development of the country is so backward that neither the Nationalists nor the Communists have been able effectively to exploit China’s full manpower resources for military purposes. The almost complete lack of steel facilities and indigenous petroleum resources and the small output of the steel industry force China to rely on foreign sources for the support of its military establishment.

2. Other factors conditioning Chinese Communist vulnerability to military action are peculiar to the Communist regime’s present situation. The most important of these is the war in Korea, which has diverted a major part of Communist China’s military, transportation, and economic resources to meet the requirements of this large-scale operation. This in turn has prevented the Communists from carrying out their program of economic reconstruction and development. It has also undoubtedly delayed the complete consolidation of control over China proper, particularly in the areas of South China which were last to be “liberated” and which are most vulnerable to guerrilla attack and amphibious invasion. Finally, there have been indications of a growing dissatisfaction with the Communist regime. This dissatisfaction, although presently not serious enough to constitute a real danger to the regime’s control, represents a potential source of support to an effectively organized opposition movement.

3. Guerrilla Attacks. The “newly liberated” areas of Southeast, South, and Southwest China are especially suitable for anti-Communist guerrilla operations. The population has been traditionally hostile to central authority from outside these areas. The Communist regime has not yet been able to implement its rural-control mechanisms and to consolidate its position in these areas. Inter-regional transportation bottlenecks in South China and its mountainous terrain are additional factors which make this section particularly vulnerable to guerrilla operations.

4. Air Attack. Communist China’s electric power plants, petroleum refining and storage facilities, and iron and steel and munitions industries are few in number and are principally concentrated in North China and Manchuria. They are all within medium bomber range of Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan and Luzon. Over 90 percent of these targets are within range of carrier-based aircraft. Thus, these installations are particularly vulnerable to air attack. Because China must import such critical items as petroleum, tanks, motor vehicles, heavy weapons, and aircraft, the weak and tenuous lines of communication are key targets for air attack or sabotage. The only available rail line capable of moving heavy equipment from Manchuria to China runs from Chinhsien to Tientsin along the coast and is vulnerable to naval bombardment as well as air attack.

5. Naval Blockade. China’s economy is essentially rural and could function, albeit at a low level of subsistence, without foreign trade. For POL, military equipment and supplies, and certain semi-processed raw materials and machine tools necessary for the support of key industries, the Communist regime is largely dependent on foreign sources. China is also dependent on exports for obtaining needed foreign exchange. Moreover, a large portion of domestic commerce is carried in coastal vessels. China’s present vulnerability to a naval blockade is consequently high. A blockade would require Communist China to rely on the USSR for virtually all its import requirements and would restrict all shipments from the USSR to the already-burdened rail and road systems in the Soviet Far East and China.

7. Invasion. The large-scale movement of trained Chinese Communist troops from China proper to Manchuria and Korea has weakened the ability of the Peiping regime to defend its coastal areas from invasion. The South China coast is particularly vulnerable because of its proximity to Taiwan and because Communist control is weaker in this area than in any other part of China. Recognizing the potential danger of an invasion, the Chinese Communists have attempted to compensate for the withdrawal of troops by urgent precautions to strengthen the coastal defense installations in the south.

Appendix B

Strength of Non-Communist Elements on the Mainland

1. Between 600,000 and 650,000 Chinese on the mainland are believed to be active in organized or semi-organized groups opposing the Communist regime. About half of this number are estimated to be under loose Nationalist control. The remainder consists of traditional bandit and war-lord groups who have always fought against the ruling authorities and whose activities are now directed against the Communists as the ruling authority and of some non-Nationalist anti-Communist groups.

2. By far the greater proportion of these dissidents are south of the Yangtze; most of them in the southeastern provinces of China (see Map).² There are perhaps 100,000 men in the various Nationalist-oriented guerrilla bands in the coastal Provinces south of Shanghai. Guerrilla forces in the mountainous interior are largely independent, but may be considered as a Nationalist potential. On the northwest perimeter of China proper, among the minority peoples mainly of the Moslem faith, there appears to be some guerrilla activity. Although far from contact with the Nationalist Government and anti-Chinese in feeling, these guerrillas might become part of the Nationalist potential if given guarantees as to their future autonomy and adequate support.

3. The resistance movement on the mainland now consists of virtually uncoordinated, dispersed, and very poorly supplied bands. The largest known groups consist of about 3,000 men. Even those who are claimed to be under Nationalist control are frequently without effective communications; moreover, rivalry exists among Nationalist governmental groups and officials on Taiwan for the allegiance of guerrilla forces. Despite the Communist campaign against the guerrillas during late summer of 1950 and the ensuing winter, activity by resistance forces, particularly in Kwantung and Kwangsi, is continuing and may actually have expanded. A substantial part of these guerrilla units is probably motivated by strong anti-Communist feeling and could form the core of a potentially effective resistance movement.

4. At the present time, there is no organized anti-Communist, non-Nationalist political resistance movement on the mainland or in Hong Kong. There are a number of small, uncoordinated groups of such dissidents, but they have no leader of sufficient stature to head an effective movement. The bandit and war-lord forces which are harassing the Communist regime could not be expected to give firm support to an organized anti-Communist movement except on terms advantageous to them.

5. The effectiveness of the guerrillas could be greatly increased by better supply and more competent organization, even though no new recruits were gained. If supply and organization were improved, however, new recruits would in fact be added. Numbers would probably not grow much beyond 1,000,000 unless a substantial area of the mainland were secured by anti-Communist forces. At that time defections from the Communist ranks could be expected.

6. Under present conditions, there is little or no prospect for bringing about significant defections from either the Chinese Communist Party or Army. The Communist regime has thus far been able to control any dissident movement. Nevertheless, defections could be expected after the commencement of large-scale guerrilla or military operations on the mainland. The number of defectors would depend largely on the prospects of the insurrectionary movement’s success. If an area on the mainland had been made secure, defections could probably be stimulated by the use of the traditional “silver bullet” approach.

1. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred generally in this estimate on 18 May. Dissents from specific portions of it are noted as follows:

   “The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, at page 3.” [See paragraph 3]

   “The chiefs of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff, at page 7.” [See paragraph 15]

2. The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, believes that opposition between Nationalist and non-Nationalist leaders is, in some instances, already acute, and therefore the text tends unduly to minimize the very real difficulties presented by the lack of unity of anti-Communist guerrilla forces. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. It is the view of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, GSUSA; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, US Air Force; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, that paragraph 15 should read as follows:

   “15. Full US logistical and operational support of a Chinese Nationalist invasion of the mainland would almost certainly be regarded by the USSR as a serious threat to its security interests in the Far East. Although we are unable, on the basis of intelligence, to determine what measures the USSR would take to meet such a threat, we believe that the USSR would take steps which would increase the risk of general war. So long as the Kremlin estimated that the existence of the Chinese Communist regime was not in jeopardy, we believe that the USSR, while giving support against the invasion, probably would not openly commit its own forces against US forces. If, however, the Kremlin estimated that the existence of the regime was in jeopardy, there is a serious possibility that the Kremlin would openly commit Soviet forces against US forces actively engaged in operational support of the invasion. We believe, however, that the Kremlin probably would not deliberately initiate a general war for the sole reason that its security interests in the Far East were thus threatened.” [Footnote in the source text.]

2. Not reproduced.