S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563
Memorandum of Conversation, by Charles Burton Marshall of the Policy Planning Staff
Present at the conversation were [names deleted] …, and C. B. Marshall, hereafter referred to in the first person.
[Page 1668]First a note as to background:
[Name deleted] was regarded in the political section of the Consulate General as the person who had the surest channel to persons near the center of authority in Peiping. …
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Preceding the conversation I consulted with [name deleted] on tactics. It was agreed I should volunteer remarks only about the idea of establishing a secret contact to use in event it should ever become propitious to approach the problem of restoring peace; that I should not seek to pump [name deleted] for information and that I should not attempt to bring up the topic of the U.S. attitude and policy; that if he should make inquiries about them, I should give him the same line I had given Eric Chow …, but with great reserve.
I opened the conversation by stating to [name deleted] the following:
I was in the line of policy at the Department of State.
I was in Hong Kong to study certain problems in relation to our Far Eastern policy.
I understood that [name deleted] had told him of my presence and that he had communicated this to friends in Peiping who had the ear of those in authority.
This initiative on his part was interesting. It had given me an idea. It seemed advisable for people on both sides of the quarrel to give attention to how to go about settling it in event the times should become propitious.
It was hard to see how the initial steps could be taken in the public and somewhat rigid framework of the UN. It was difficult to set up an official and overt channel between the governments.
It seemed therefore that people having access to the two governments should establish a line of communication so that the chances for peace would not be lost merely for lack of a way to open conversations. It occurred to me off-hand that probably such talks, if they ever should come to pass, would have to pass through three stages. First it would be necessary to talk about having talks about talking. If all went well, it would then be possible to go on talking over arrangements for talks. At about that stage some informal system of credentials would have to be set up so that each party would know it was not being deceived as to the status of the other. Finally, after some exchange of less informal credentials, the process could advance to definite talks about a basis on which to arrange an end to the conflict.
After such a basis had been agreed to—and only after that—it would be possible to make public disclosures and proceed to formalize the agreement through the UN or some other channel.
[Name deleted] said this all seemed to make sense.
I said it might be opportune for us to get the idea into people’s [Page 1669] heads in Peiping. I said I was sure I was right in saying that my suggestion was compatible with the highest official views in Washington. I suggested that the channel to Peiping used to get through the message might be used in reverse in event Peiping ever came to a more sensible view about the war in Korea and saw its way clear to ending it.
[Name deleted] then asked whether he might make a statement. I assented. He continued as follows:
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[Name deleted] asked me whether I could give assurance that the United States would not change its policy and attitude in the midst of efforts on the part of [name deleted] and himself and others to arrange an approach to peace. He said he wished to be sure that our moderate position would continue and that they would not be left in the lurch incident to a sudden toughening of policy or a sudden move toward full war.
I told him the following:
I certainly could not give him such assurance.
I could not promise an unchanged attitude because I was aware that the United States’ attitude toward the Korean struggle had already undergone changes. For example, up until a few weeks before, that [there] had been wide divergence of opinion on the question whether we should continue the struggle. Many had argued that we should get out and write the whole thing off as something we had started without knowing how to finish it. Within the past few weeks, however, the national will had become resolved. No significant persons suggested that we should withdraw from Korea. We were in there to fight the thing to a finish. Of that no doubt could be entertained. It was up to the Chinese to decide what sort of a finish it would be. It could be a settled conclusion of hostilities by mutual arrangement, or it could be a conclusion reached after untold bloodshed over a very wide front.
[Name deleted] inquired about the degree of urgency in getting messages through and trying to lay the lines for conversations looking toward peace.
I spoke as follows:
This was a question for the Chinese to answer, not for Americans.
We felt we were doing pretty well in Korea now. We were sure we could stay on indefinitely. We would prefer not to have to, but on the other hand the Korean venture was proving advantageous to us in getting our army ready for its larger mission—that of forming a deterrent to the Russians or, if war proved inevitable, of defeating the Russians.
One prospect that made the question urgent for the Chinese was the prospect of war between the United States and Russia. It would be a [Page 1670] tough and bloody war. United States victory was pretty certain, but it would come only after a terrible ordeal. We would be hard pressed and would certainly show no consideration to any nation found in our enemy’s camp at the onset of hostilities. If I were a Chinese I would be getting very anxious about the possibility of protracting the Korean struggle until the full war erupted. I would know that in that event it would be the end of China’s hopes for perhaps a century.
A second prospect that should make the Chinese feel anxious was that the United States would come into the fullness of its strength in about 18 months. That was a certainty—whereas war was problematic. The United States was like any other nation in that its attitude in the fullness of strength was likely to be different from its attitude in a more or less necessitous situation. I could not promise what our attitude toward China might become. I knew what it was at present. General Bradley had just stated it very well in his testimony in Washington.1 We wanted a reasonable and peaceful settlement and were ready for it any time the Peiping people came to their senses. We might throw all that overboard at a later stage of full strength.
More important than official statements was the attitude shown by the American people. We had been fighting the Chinese now for some months, yet no significant showing of hostility toward China had taken place. Our press, radio, and other channels of opinion had reflected no opprobrium for the Chinese. Chinese walked our streets and did business in our country without fear of insult or injury. This was a new phenomenon to us—to fight a passionless, rancourless war. It indicated a residual friendship that the Chinese should be loath to squander. If the Chinese nation should be able to reestablish rational control of its policy and come to terms with us, it would be making an accommodation with a friend, not coming to terms with an enemy.
Yet this very circumstance of passionless struggle contained a danger that the killing of Chinese might become a sort of a habit with Americans.
My remarks about friendship for the Chinese people should not be construed as indicating approval of their rulers. We made a clear distinction. We regarded the men of Peiping as guilty of the blindest and most reckless folly.
[Name deleted] said that it would be difficult, perhaps out of the question, for the Chinese to come to a termination and settlement with us in Korea if the United States and its allies should crow about the matter as if it were a victory; that the Chinese could not swallow [Page 1671] pride. He asked me what assurances could be given in this regard. I said:
The Korean struggle was marginal to us. The big adversary was not China, but the Kremlin. We would not be likely to waste a lot of time crowing about a secondary development.
The same factors that had caused us to restrain our passions in the fighting would likely cause us to restrain them if the fighting were halted.
The U.S. had made clear that it sought not victory but a restoration of the Korean situation conforming as far as possible in the circumstances to what it was before the aggression.
But so far as lightening for the Chinese the burden of their consciousness of not being able to finish what they started—that was beyond our capability.
The conversation ended with a grave exchange of good wishes.
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- This conversation was held in the upper lounge at the Hotel Peninsula, Kowloon, from 2:00 to 3:00 p. m. It was written up on May 21 and May 27 from sketchy notes taken during the conversation. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- General Bradley had begun his testimony at the MacArthur hearings on May 15.↩