Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563

Memorandum of Conversation, by Charles Burton Marshall of the Policy Planning Staff

top secret

[Hong Kong,] May 9, 1951.^*

Present were Eric Chow, Ralph Clough, Sabin Chase, and C. B. Marshall, hereafter referred to in the first person.

Chow turned out to be a fat, extroverted Chinese, about 36 years old. It would be almost, but not quite, fitting to call him urbane. The show of warmth was too much, the laugh at sallies of humor too hearty, and too obvious the attempt to disassociate himself spiritually from the Peiping regime.

Chow began by covering the development of the Chinese Communists’ tutelage to Moscow. He recounted the Sian-fu kidnapping and the sequel of cooperation between the KMT and the Communists. He recounted the break-up of cooperation in 1940 signaled by the attack on the Fourth Field Army. He said that so long as positional warfare had continued, cooperation had remained possible but as soon as the two political elements had been placed in competition with each other in developing a popular base in a static situation cooperation had ceased to be possible. He recalled that at the time preceding the break-up of cooperation he had been at Yenan. He said the Communist leaders then had seemed oblivious of Russia as a special consideration in Chinese policy. He said that nothing in their speeches or conversation or in the indoctrination of their cadres had indicated special regard for Moscow; no Russian infiltration was evident. He noted that at that time Chou En-lai had been the exponent of the united front.

Chow said that after V-J Day, in September of 1945, Mao Tse-tung had made a speech asserting the purely Chinese basis of Communist policy and that this speech contained a veiled warning to Russia not to regard China in a special position of subordination.

Chow said that the orientation toward Moscow had resulted largely in reaction to United States backing of the Kuomintang. He said that the Chinese Communists had felt that alone they could not prevail against domestic enemies supported by the United States and came to regard the United States as the implacable foe of any Chinese development of communism.

This interpretation, he added, had been strengthened decisively by the publication of the China White Paper in 1949. Chow described this as solidifying the decision to tie to Moscow’s apron strings. He said that many copies of it had been obtained at Communist headquarters and had been analyzed page by page and sentence by sentence; it was taken as confirmation that the United States was disposed to intervene in Chinese affairs, to throw its weight behind the side it deemed conservative, and to regard with active disfavor any Chinese course in the opposite direction.

A comment was interpolated to the effect that the publication was regarded by others as a blow to the Chiang regime. Chow observed that the China White Paper had established a high mark for abortiveness as a diplomatic gambit. This appraisal I did not contest.

Chow said the policy of “leaning to one side” had been brought forth tentatively soon after the issuance of the White Paper, and in sequence then occurred the establishment of the Communist government at Peiping, the recognition by Russia, and strong re-affirmation of the pro-Russian orientation. He said that at that time the Politburo at Peiping was divided on the policy of leaning to one side.

I asked whether these high authorities were still divided on this. He said that they probably were, but this was supported by no overt evidence, for whatever differences might occur within the Politburo they were not outwardly reflected. He pointed out that the semiofficial Foreign Relations Association at Peiping had recently issued some statement alluding to the desire of the Chinese people for friendship with all other peoples. He said that this indicated that the policy of leaning to one side was not to be regarded as a universally accepted and permanent formula.

Chase observed that the word “people” has special meaning in the Communist lexicon—the populace regarded from the viewpoint in proletarian politics. He observed that friendship for all peoples meant not friendship for all governments or all nations but friendship for all politically organized proletariats. I added that the word “people” had special meaning in all totalitarian lexicons. I compared its meaning in the Communist lexicon with its meaning in the Nazi, Fascist, and Falangist vocabulary.

Chow said that anyway the policy of leaning to one side was not really a policy but should rather be described as a strategy. He said it lacked the permanence of a policy but did not bear on the ends of the regime but related rather only to temporary means and would pass in time. He said that some Stalinist zealots had espoused the idea of doing away with instruction in English and Western European languages in the Chinese educational system since important Chinese relations in the future would be only with Russia but that this suggestion had been overruled on the ground that China would again some day deal with the rest of the world.

Chow said that the true place of the policy—or strategy—of leaning to one side might soon be made clear in a book being written by Mao. He said that Mao had retired from the scene of active politics some months ago in order to write a book bringing up to date the theoretical basis of the party. He said Mao believed he had become too deeply enmeshed in practical politics and had need of refreshing his theoretic sources. Meanwhile, he said, the leadership had devolved on Chou En-lai for running the government and on Liu Shao-chi for party affairs. He said that many people made the mistake of distinguishing ideologically between these two, failing to take into account that the differences between them stemmed from the circumstance that one was operating in a governmental framework and the other in the party framework.

Chow resumed his account of the growth of Russian control in China. He said that Mao had been highly flattered during his trip to Moscow the winter before last. He had been paid respect beyond the measure allotted to other satellite leaders and was told repeatedly that China was a partner of the Soviet Union—a, partner almost equal to the Soviet Union itself. Chow said that in this atmosphere of flattery and talk of dignified collaboration, the Sino-Soviet treaty¹ had been brought forth.

Chow said that when the Korean affair came up, the Soviet leaders turned to China saying: “This is something in your sphere. As our main partner—as the next greatest Communist power, you should take care of this. This will mean sacrifices for you for a while, but the role of world communist leadership is not an easy but an heroic one. Anyway, we Russians will be making even greater sacrifices in the common cause when the inevitable final struggle with the capitalist world occurs.”

Chow then continued:

As of last fall the Chinese were really afraid of attack, really believed the United States planned to extend the struggle to the Chinese mainland. In their view the logical way for the United States to do this would be to get a lodgment in Korea, move northward against the hydroelectric power sources of vital importance to the industry of Manchuria. Chu Teh had made a speech last September to the effect that the Chinese must watch to see what the U.S. intentions were. Chu Teh had said these intentions would be shown by whether U.S. forces crossed the 38th parallel, for if they crossed, it would mean that their intentions were beyond the restoration of the status quo and aimed at jeopardizing China. Chu had said that the Chinese could not tolerate the United States’ forces getting into a position to threaten the power sources for Manchurian industry.

The Chinese concurrently were sure of a U.S. landing at Shanghai and had taken preparations for it.

Chow remarked that this might sound silly to us, but it was not silly to anyone who understood the Chinese Communist mentality. He said it was important to remember that their only window was on Moscow.

Chase asked whether the Chinese Communist leaders had their eyes open now that the United States had manifestly not acted aggressively against China. Chow said the critical question was not only as to having one’s eyes open but also as to what windows were available for one to look through.

Chase asked specifically whether the men of Peiping now saw that they were misled in judging the intentions of the United States as aggressive.

Chow said in answer:

The men of Peiping were solid in their view that the United States was their enemy and that a U.S. war with Russia was a high probability.

They were persuaded by the logic of history that the Western powers would be defeated by the Communist powers in such a war and that the victorious emergence of the Communists were assured, with or without war. This was the logic of history.

I said the following:

The logic of history was a subtle and theoretic thing; I preferred the study of history to the study of the logic of history. The course of recent history was strewn with the bones of regimes that had underestimated the will and power of the United States. If war came it would happen again.

We did not want war. This was not because we had doubts about its outcome. On that we were assured. We would win. We had the strength. We knew our capabilities. It would be a hard ordeal. We would suffer greatly. But we would win. Anyone who consulted the data of our strength would know this. Only those who took refuge in the logic of history to avoid the plain lesson of the present facts could doubt it.

We wished to avoid that war not because of expectation of defeat but because of our knowledge of the pain it would cause not only to ourselves but to all the world. Such a war would be an ordeal for us but would be painful beyond all experience to the nations we would defeat. We certainly hoped to be spared the necessity of participating in such a human tragedy.

A further factor in our desire for peace was our anticipation of the effect of a war upon the American spirit and American institutions. The United States would certainly come out of a Third World War into a Roman phase in its historical development.

Up to now we had attempted to deal with other nations on a basis of comity, fairness and compromise. If we were forced to go through the ordeal of a Third World War in the defense of our own national security we would put all of those impulses behind us. We would have no disposition to show mercy or consideration to any nation which had helped our adversary.

It would be woeful for China if its rulers in their blindness caused China to be in our adversary’s camp if and when a war should come. There would be no possibility of China’s starting out in the camp of our adversary and then shifting over when the tide of battle had definitely shifted our way. During World War II we did permit Italy to make this sort of a shift, but I was sure that Marshal Bagdolio would go down as the last man to have saved his neck by being a turncoat. If China were caught in the camp of our adversary at the outbreak of a world war it would have to suffer the consequences to the bitter end. We could not afford to show it mercy or consideration. It would probably mean that the Chinese would be set back a century or more in their progress. We would regret this. We would regret that the blindness of China’s rulers had forced such a situation and such a choice upon us.

Men of reason and good will everywhere must now be thinking just as such men had thought in the summer of 1914 and in the long months of anxiety in 1938 and 1939. The thought uppermost in their mind was the urgency for finding some way to avoid a tragedy.

Such a thought was strong in the minds of the men who determine policy in the United States. Unfortunately the choice was not theirs. The determining power was in the hands of the men who ruled in Russia and who rule in China. It was particularly within the power of the latter to choose a line of policy which would relieve the dangers of war or to persist in a line of policy that would make war virtually inevitable. The best chance of avoiding war was to create circumstances which would give pause to men in the Kremlin. The best way to produce those circumstances would be to create an independent course of action in China as a substitute for the present Chinese line of subservience to the world designs of Moscow.

During this part of the discussion Chow lost his ebullience. His face became set and grave. He divided his time between watching me and watching his plate. I was certain that my words had had a great effect on him. I checked this impression with my companions and they were of the same view.

After a brief pause Chow renewed the discussion by observing that I seemed to have found all the faults to be on China’s side and asked whether I did not think the United States had also made some mistakes. I said that of course the United States had made mistakes and that an errorless course of action was no more to be expected of a nation than it was to be expected of an individual. I said that the circumstance that all governments made errors could not be made the basis for excusing tragic folly in the conduct of any particular. I asked Chow specifically what he had in mind.

He said that it occurred to him that a great deal of the difficulty and the impasse would have been avoided if the United States had early recognized the Peiping Government as the dominant and sovereign power in China.

I spoke as follows:

Personally I was inclined to agree with this point of view. I did not regard recognition as a stamp of approval or as carrying any moral quality or implying any value whatsoever. Recognition was just a conduit for doing business.

In my view if the United States had problems with China those problems should be dealt with through some channel. This meant that there should be some regular channel of handling affairs between the two countries and that in turn meant diplomatic recognition.

Chow appeared pleased and remarked that he was glad to find me in agreement with him.

I resumed as follows:

So far I had spoken about the theoretic aspects of recognition. I wanted to add something about the practical aspects because these bore upon the present problem of relationships between the United States and China.

We had recognized a number of the satellite countries in Eastern Europe—all to no good purpose. Recognition of the regimes in Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Poland, etc., had not achieved the purpose for which recognition was extended.

The reason for this was no deficiency in recognition as a channel, per se. It was in the simple circumstance that the governments concerned had lost their moral autonomy and were no longer capable of doing business in their own right.

Any government which wanted to be recognized as a government was under the compulsion to make sure that it remained in essence a government. One of the essential characteristics of a government was its ability to enter into and carry out contracts in good faith.

Every Chinese should ask himself the question whether the government at Peiping fulfilled that test. We in the United States had looked with the utmost anxiety upon the penetration of China by alien authorities responsive not to Chinese needs or Chinese aspirations but to the will and purposes of the Kremlin.

China was in the gravest danger—perhaps this had already occurred—of becoming a colony to a new imperialism which went under the name of anti-imperialism.

Chow responded heartily to this and said I had hit the nail on the head, or words to that effect. Chow observed further:

Americans did not appreciate the emotions which guided the men of Peiping. We should take more into account the prides and inward feelings and emotional content of their minds.

They were dominated by a great resentment against the United States for its persistent support of the KMT against the Communists and there would be a long period of bitterness and conflict before this emotion could work itself out.

I then spoke as follows:

It would be one of history’s most tragic paradoxes if a nation, namely China, should be led into a terrible tragedy simply because of some emotional feeling on the part of the men who ruled it.

We in the United States also had emotions but we had better sense than to allow our emotions to rule our policy.

My own emotional impulse was that the United States should carry the war to the Chinese mainland, destroy Chinese commerce and industry and teach a terrible lesson to the men of Peiping for their affronts to my country and for their destruction of American lives in Korea, all to the purpose only of serving our enemies in the Kremlin. This emotion was shared by our military establishment, by our diplomatic establishment, by the public leaders of the United States, by our press and by President Truman himself.

We put this emotion aside, however, and tried to be guided by reason in the interest of humanity.

The consequences were always tragic when the rulers of nations attempted to use public policy as a means of satisfying their own emotional drives. It was certainly devoutly to be wished that the men of Peiping would take a more reasonable and calculating view of their situation and do it soon.

It would be a mistake to assume that the determination of the United States to guide by reason and to withhold itself from indulgence of its emotional impulses was limitless. There was certainly a point—I did not know where or when it would be reached—at which the American people and their government would say, “To hell with it. Let’s give the Chinese what they’re asking for”.

Chase made the following observations:

The Chinese Communists did not appreciate the tremendous pressure under which the government of the United States was being placed.

There was a growing demand in the United States for direct action against the Chinese mainland and that this demand was not abated but was actually intensified by occurrences in the sequel to the removal of General MacArthur.

The Chinese were to make a mistake if they interpreted the MacArthur removal as eliminating the possibility of direct action against the Chinese mainland.

Chow said that the Chinese Communists had their own special interpretation for the MacArthur issue. He particularized as follows on this interpretation:

At present the press was most interested in the conflict of the point of view between General MacArthur and Secretary Marshall. This was being presented as a conflict between two wings of American capitalism. The first wing was dominant in the Eastern states and centered in New York. It reflected the view of the American capitalists who were interested in investments and business opportunities in trade with respect to Europe. Marshall was seen as the champion of this group. This group wanted to turn primary attention away from Asia and towards Europe for the time being. The other wing was dominant in the Middle West and in the Far West. It represented a more traditional Republican point of view. Its overseas concern was mainly in the Pacific area rather than in the Atlantic. Its view was articulated by the mid-western members of Congress and was reflected notably in the Chicago Tribune. Its champion was General MacArthur, who was from Wisconsin, who had made his career in the Pacific and who was close to the international circles of the Republican Party. This group would make American capitalist stakes in the Pacific the primary concern of the American foreign policy. It favored the re-conquest of Asia as item number one on the American agenda.

Another element in the interpretation was that MacArthur had been relieved because of a military failure. As the Chinese Communists had interpreted the events to the public in China, MacArthur had been sent north in Korea to cross the Yalu, penetrate Manchuria and make war on China. He had misinterpreted the strength and timing of the Chinese resistance, had made a bungle of the campaign and had been removed for that reason. The United States was concealing its chagrin by making rationalizations for the removal of MacArthur.

Chow said that from the American point of view, it was obvious that the North Koreans had caused the aggression, but this was being with-held from the Chinese; they were consistently being given the interpretation that the South Koreans had been the aggressors and had acted at the instigation of the United States and with close support of American forces.

Chase inquired as to how they explained away the circumstances that there were obviously no American forces in Korea at the time that the fighting occurred. He pointed out that General MacArthur had brought this out in his testimony and that it was obviously the case in everyone’s recollection.

Chow said that the Communist press in China had interpreted MacArthur’s testimony in this respect as an alibi by which MacArthur was trying to explain away his failures as a commander and to remove from his reputation the onus of failure.

Chow continued as follows:

The notion of South Korean aggression was obviously without foundation in fact to men who had free access to all the information. He had had an editorial problem in the publication of his paper in Hong Kong. If he had followed the Peiping Communist interpretation of events he would have made his paper the laughing stock of everyone in Hong Kong. Accordingly he had tried to be vague as to the identity of the aggressor as of last June 25. He had always treated the subject by referring to the long period of local sorties back and forth across the border and by observing that apparently the sortie that had touched off all the trouble happened to have been one made by the North Korean forces.

This had caused a great deal of criticism of his editorship by Communist authorities and he had been reproved by the Editorial Supervisory Board of his paper.

As a result he expected to be ousted as editor within the next month or so.

He was in a difficult position because he had no way of getting an explanation through to the authorities in Peiping as to the necessity which caused him to put forth this interpretation. All Communist affairs were handled by strict adherence to the chain of command and he was forced to deal exclusively through the channels of the Chinese news agencies and with the editorial board immediately above him.

Clough, Chase and I interpreted this last point as prompted by Chow’s recognition that we were trying to give him a message to get over to Peiping. He may have been signalling to us that he no longer had a channel by which to get such a message through or he may have been providing a cover for his intention to get the message over. It was difficult to say which was the case.

In the closing phases of the conversation Chow commented on contemporary conditions within China. He spoke as follows:

It was difficult to tell whether the war in Korea had been forced upon the Peiping government as a means of stepping up its internal program or as a consequence of stepping up its internal program.

Whatever the cause and effect of relationship might be, there was no doubt of a direct and essential connection between the war and the course of internal policy.

Concomitantly with the war the land reform program had been put through ruthlessly. It would probably have been impossible to do this except in the atmosphere of war.

Virtually everybody was better off than before the Communists had come in. Minor bureaucrats had more power, were getting better pay and enjoyed the situation of working in an effective government. Workmen were generally much better off than previously and had benefited greatly by the Communist policy of concentrating the food supplies in the cities at the expense of the countryside. Small farmers were about as well off as formerly. The tenant farmers were much better off, and only the landowners had suffered.

At the conclusion of the conversation Chow made special inquiry as to how long we would be in Hong Kong and where we were staying. I told him we would be around for about one week. Chase emphasized that the time was extendable in the light of what might turn up to challenge our continued attention here.

Chow rode back to the center of Hong Kong with Chase and me. His whole demeanor was of the utmost friendliness. He repeatedly expressed his gratitude for having been given such a disclosure of the attitude of the United States. He left us with an expression as to his appreciation of the privilege of holding a free conversation with free men who still enjoyed the privilege of free thought.

1. This conversation lasted about three hours. It was held at a dinner party at Ralph Clough’s house from about 8:00 to 11:00 p. m. No notes were taken. This summary, written out on May 11, is derived from catchwords set down, with Chase’s aid, within an hour after the last utterance. As it emerges in this writing, the conversation sounds more orderly and narrative than it actually was. [Footnote in the source text.]
1. The text of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 14, 1950, and two accompanying agreements, may be found in Documents on International Affairs, 1949–1950, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 541–547.