Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

793.00/4–2351: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

secret

London, April 23, 1951—4 p. m.

5563. Deptel 4734, April 17¹ and Embtel 5527, April 20.² In connection with the Department’s feeling that the British shld now be prepared make certain concessions to US viewpoint on FE problems, EmbOff has been undertaking an evaluation of likelihood of modification of Brit policy toward China.

1. It is believed that nothing which has so far happened will change basic policy of present govt of pressing for establishment normal dipl relations with CPG altho from practical viewpoint there is little hope of expectation CPG will agree to exchange of Ambs. Similarly events to date have done nothing to change Brit policy of supporting CPG’s application for UN membership: this is in accordance with Brit concept of UN as international forum for peaceful exchange and if possible amelioration of views and that admission to UN in no way implies approval of govt.

2. On other hand, there has been noted increasing tendency take firm line in retaliation for (a) CPG aggressive action in Korea, and (b) ill-treatment Brit natls and requisitioning of Brit property in China. For example, Dept will have noted (a) the embargo on shipments of oil to China last summer, the requisitioning of the Yung Hao and the recent action designed to restrict shipments of rubber to China, and (b) the withholding of visas to the head of CPG del to the meeting sponsored by the Brit-China Friendship Assn in London and to the proposed CPG del to Malaya.

[3.] China Dept FonOff has submitted to FonMin comprehensive survey of difficulties encountered by Brit interests in China including attacks on Brit shipping near Hong Kong, arbitrary with-holding of exit permits, exorbitant demands made on Brit firms, arrest of Brit dipls, expulsion Brit ConGen Tihwa, etc; etc. Survey ends with expression of views that it firm policy of CPG eventually to expel from China all alien interests not contributing indirectly to strengthening of present regime (or at least not undermining it) but makes no recommendations. Primary purpose this exercise was place facts before new FonMin³ and justify strong representations about to be made by Brit dipl rep Peiping on behalf Brit, Austral, Canadian and US natls and interests. (Although understood no specific ref to Hong Kong made in survey, FonOff under no illusions re ultimate fate that colony; apparent aim of Brit Govt is postpone as long as possible any overt CPG move in that direction).

4. In explanation relative lack of publicity given such incidents in Brit press, and relative mildness of retaliatory action taken by govt up to present, Emb off given understand Brit Govt wishes avoid taking any action which will (a) embarass Brit interests and Brit natls in China which are in a sense hostages, (b) contribute to further deterioration of Sino-Brit relations and force CPG into even closer relationship with USSR and thus remove possibility development Titoist tendencies, and (c) amount to public admission govt’s Chinese policy has not paid dividends.

5. There is, of course, considerable speculation as to possible change of policy in event of change of govt in UK. If Conservatives assume power there will certainly be reexamination Brit China policy, and if general elections do not take place before autumn (which in view Bevan’s⁴ and Wilson’s⁵ resignation now seems unlikely) Conservatives may force reexamination before then. It thought likely no basic change of policy wld result from this reexamination although there wld certainly be change of emphasis. On basic present position it cld not be expected that a Conservative government wld recall UK rep Peiping. On other hand it might very well be Brit wld no longer support CPG for membership UN and wld be willing strengthen economic sanctions. In explanation it shld be pointed out Conservatives divided on China issue. As early as autumn 1949 Churchill⁶ came out strongly in Commons for recognition CPG, while Eden⁷ and Salisbury⁸ opposed. Conservatives with economic affiliations in FE pull one way while those with ideological anti-Communist views pull another. Always present in minds Brit policy-makers is unfavorable reaction on India of any drastic measures directed toward China,

6. It perhaps wld be pointless to speculate what further deterioration Brit-CPG relation wld have to occur before present govt cld be expected radically to revise Chi policy. It might require further overt evidence of CPG aggression, perhaps directed toward Indochina. In other words, unless Brit hand is forced, a radical change in UK policy toward CPG cannot be anticipated, although a progressively tougher policy will be followed in (a) in the face of anticipated evidences of increasing CPG unfriendliness toward UK, or (b) rejection by CPG of GOC or other UN peace moves.

7. As it looks from here, Brit efforts maintain some sort of working relationship with CPG have served useful purpose; Brit reps China have been most cooperative in extending protection to American interests there and even though their patience in attempting establish dipl relations with CPG in the end proves fruitless, they will have demonstrated to all reasonable people that open CPG break with Western Nations was due to no fault of UK.

Rptd info Paris unnumbered.

Gifford

1. Ante, p. 352.
2. The reference telegram stated that although the British were willing to make certain limited concessions, they were unlikely to make any major changes in their Far Eastern policies (711.551/4–2051).
3. Herbert S. Morrison had become Foreign Minister in March, following the resignation of Ernest Bevin.
4. Aneurin Bevan had recently resigned as Minister of Labour.
5. Harold Wilson had recently resigned as President of the Board of Trade.
6. Winston Churchill, Leader of the Opposition.
7. Anthony Eden, Deputy Leader of the Opposition.
8. Robert Arthur James Cecil, Marquess of Salisbury, Leader of the Opposition in the House of Lords.