Subject: United States Action to Counter Chinese
Communist Aggression
The enclosed study of the military effectiveness of the possible use of
Chinese forces on Formosa against the mainland of China, submitted by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to the reference action, is
transmitted herewith at the request of the Secretary of Defense for the
information of the National Security Council. It is also being referred
to the Senior NSC Staff for use in
connection with the current project on “United States National
Objectives and Policy in Asia”.4
[Enclosure]
Study Submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
top secret
[
Washington,
March 14, 1951.]
5
Courses of Action Relative to Communist China
and Korea—Anti-Communist Chinese
[Here follow the first two sections of the study consisting of
estimates of the military strengths and capabilities of both
Communist and Nationalist China as of January 1, 1951. Section three
quotes the two paragraphs relating to Formosa from President
Truman’s statement of June 27, 1950.]
[Page 1599]
4. Nationalist China is still the legally recognized member of the
United Nations from the area of China.
5. Although at present all U.S. military advisory personnel to
Nationalist China have been withdrawn, the agreement between
Nationalist China and the United States concerning the old Joint
Advisory Group, together with its terms of reference, are still in
force.6 On
7[8] March 1951, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff recommended that a Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) be authorized for Formosa
immediately.7
6. Although Communist China is largely self-sufficient in food and
hard fuel, she is dependent upon sea imports in excess of 97 per
cent of petroleum requirements and a large percentage of many other
materials vital to the economy. China is a country of great
distances, limited interior lines of communications and with few
land outlets to the outside world. As China’s coal and food are
produced in certain areas only, distribution is dependent on inland
waterways, coastwise shipping and the limited railroad net.
Therefore, if these means of transport are disrupted, the entire
distribution system will collapse and large areas will be denied
many of the essentials of life.
7. U.S. Naval Amphibious Lift Available at the
Present Time: General MacArthur has U.S. naval amphibious
lift for 0.4 combat loaded army divisions. An additional 0.3
division lift is now available in the Pacific. A total lift for 1.0
divisions could be provided within about two months. However,
considerable additional lift could be utilized, especially for short
hauls such as from Japan to Korea, or from Formosa to China, by the
use of excess World War II vessels now in Japan, by utilizing all
types of cargo, coastal and other vessels, and by increasing ship
lift in accordance with oriental standards. It is estimated that
amphibious lift for 100,000 Nationalist troops could be assembled in
two months.
8. It is believed that Soviet decision to engage in open war with the
United States (United Nations) will be predicated on the Soviet
concept of the proper time to do so, which may, of course, be either
hastened or delayed by U.S. removal of current restrictions on
Nationalist China but which probably will not be precipitated by it
per se.
9. The peoples of Asia will be greatly influenced by their judgment
as to the probable outcome of any action against the Chinese
Communist regime and will be reluctant to commit themselves to take
sides, and more particularly, to align themselves with a probable
loser. Successful overt action against the Chinese Communist regime
would
[Page 1600]
invoke favorable
reactions in most of the non-Communist Asiatic nations, though
little material aid could be expected from them. There are at
present non-Communist governments in Indochina, Malaya, Siam, Burma,
Formosa, Pakistan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines.
These governments and the anti-Communist element among their peoples
would be encouraged in their own efforts against communism by strong
action against Communist China. The anti-Communist elements and
guerrilla forces on the mainland of China would also be encouraged
and motivated to positive action. India, however, though
non-Communist, could be expected to condemn any overt action against
the Chinese Communist regime. Nehru recognized the Chinese Communist
Government, would oppose any extension of hostilities, and would
particularly condemn U.S. aid and assistance to the Chinese
Nationalists because he opposes any participation by the “white man”
in Asian affairs.
10. There is evidence to indicate that a substantial part of the
Chinese people are thoroughly disillusioned with the Chinese
Communist regime, and it is estimated that about 700,000 are engaged
in active resistance operations, ranging from local banditry to
organized guerrilla warfare.
11. Although the Communists were formerly welcomed by many Chinese as
the lesser of two evils, another switch in allegiance by those same
Chinese would not be unlikely. For example, the actual benefits to
the farmer resulting from the agrarian reform have been considerably
smaller than the Communist propaganda line would indicate. While he
has been gaining land to farm without high rentals, the tax in the
form of confiscation of a large part of his production has left the
farmer with approximately the same net result as heretofore.
12. Nationalist troops have undergone extensive and prolonged
training, but, due to inept leadership and poor living conditions,
there is some question of their morale. Knowledge that they were
receiving full-fledged aid from the United States would provide a
tremendous lift to morale. It is highly probable that, provided with
effective leadership, modern equipment, and logistic support, they
could be brought to a point of efficiency equal to that of the
average of the Chinese Communist Army. The use of Chinese
Nationalist Forces in any war with Communist China would be most
desirable from a military viewpoint. They constitute the only
immediately available ground forces for use on the mainland of
China, and their acceptance and use would inspire hope among
millions of non-Communist Chinese on the mainland of China and
non-Communist sympathizers throughout Asia. An increase in the tempo
of guerrilla activity and sabotage within
[Page 1601]
Communist China would be promoted while, at
the same time, the threat of Nationalist landings on the China coast
would prevent further CCF* withdrawal from South China for transfer to
Manchuria and Korea. Furthermore, this trend combined with possible
large-scale guerrilla activity in Kwangsi and Yunnan would
materially reduce pressure on Hong Kong and Macao, and reduce
support of the Viet Minh.
13. Chinese Nationalists have an excellent system of intelligence in
the central coast areas of China, the accuracy of which has been
frequently verified. However, their means of obtaining intelligence
elsewhere is extremely limited. Therefore, it is considered that if
augmented by U.S. air and naval intelligence, it would not be likely
for the Communists to trap any Nationalist landing force on the
mainland due to surprise action.
14. In the light of past experience and present conditions in the
Chinese Nationalist military command, it is considered that the
establishment of a Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group is mandatory
in the event of further U.S. logistical support to ensure that:
supplies are not misappropriated, troops are properly fed and paid,
equipment is properly maintained and utilized. Such a group should
have representation down to the battalion level, and in time may
require about 2,000 officers and men for full implementation. In
addition, the magnitude of our aid should be used as a lever by the
head of the group to ensure that operational advice is accepted.
15. Areas of operation on the Chinese mainland suitable for
Nationalist attack contain few vital objectives. Fukien Province,
directly opposite Formosa, is wild, mountainous, semi-tropical, and
sparsely populated in comparison with the rest of China. The bulk of
the people live on the coastline, where fishing is a major industry.
The interior is infested with bandits, who will fight on any side
which pays them. This area is suitable for the establishment of a
guerrilla operating base. From such a base, underground control and
supply lines to the north, west, and east could be maintained to
other guerrilla groups.
16. To the south, the Crown Colony of Hong Kong, with British
sensitivity, its trade and traffic, makes any overt operation by the
Nationalists in the Canton area undesirable initially.
17. To the north stands Shanghai, at the mouth of the Yangtse River.
From the city, south for about 100 miles, the coastline contains
good beaches, and is protected by numerous offshore islands. Just
south of Shanghai is one of the largest airbases in China.
Furthermore, the area inland, between the Yangtse and Yellow Rivers,
is the
[Page 1602]
rice bowl of
China. Thus, this area is suitable for a large-scale lodgment or for
commando type raids.
18. Amphibious operations by the Nationalists against the mainland
south of Canton and north of Shanghai are not considered feasible
due to logistical problems, and the danger of annihilation.
19. In view of the foregoing, the probable military effectiveness of
the Chinese Nationalist forces in operations against the mainland is
considered under five different cases below. In this connection, the
element of Soviet participation has been excluded. Should overt
participation occur at any time, our entire course of action in the
Far East would be immediately altered to one of strategic defense,
due to actual or threatened general war. In this case, the use of
Chinese Nationalist Forces on the mainland of China would depend on
the degree of direct Soviet participation within China, and our own
ability to assist with either matériel or supporting forces. Soviet
covert participation, probably by air and naval units only, would
correspondingly reduce Nationalist overt effectiveness, but would
not seriously impair Nationalist covert capabilities.
a. Case I. The protection of Formosa by 7th
Fleet and restrictions on mainland operations by the Nationalists
are both removed; the present Military Aid Program (MAP) is
continued, but no additional logistical support is given the
Nationalists. In this case, nearly the entire Nationalist strength
will be required for defense of Formosa, and nothing more than a few
small harassing raids by air and sea could be attempted. Raids by
ground troops would be subject to the principal danger of defection,
and in any event, Formosa would probably fall within a year.
b. Case II. The protection of Formosa by the
7th Fleet is continued, but restrictions on mainland operations by
the Nationalists are removed; the present MAP is continued, but no
additional logistical support is given the Nationalists. In this
case, the Nationalists could spare approximately 150,000 troops from
the defense of Formosa, but transport and resupply problems would
probably limit mainland operations to the establishment of one or
two small guerrilla bases in Fukien Province, and scattered
large-scale raids of not over 10,000 men each. These raids could
remain ashore one to three weeks, depending on the time required for
the Communist Chinese to muster sufficient ground forces to defeat
the beachhead. The principal military effect would be to force the
Communists to station additional troops, possibly as many as
200,000, in the vulnerable coastal areas.
c. Case III. The same as Case II above, but
in addition supplies and incentive bonuses for guerrillas are
furnished to the Nationalists by
[Page 1603]
the United States. In this case, an
additional Nationalist capability would be created. They could
probably accelerate the tempo, increase the combat effectiveness and
widen the area of guerrilla activity with logistical support. With
outside leadership, organization and bonuses, they could probably
improve cohesion and control, and enlarge the guerrilla force
somewhat. The principal military effect would be active guerrilla
warfare throughout the provinces of Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangsi and
eastern Kwantung. Probable subsidiary effects would be: a disruption
of the coastwise shipping (junk); harassment of mainland fishing
fleets; destruction of Communist military depots in the area
designed to support attack on Formosa; and disruption of the
economies of Fuchow, Amoy, and Swatow, the principal economic
centers of the area.
d. Case IV. The same as Case III above, but
additional logistical support in the form of rations, supplemental
pay, individual equipment, to include expanded supplies and
incentive bonuses for guerrillas, are furnished by the United
States. In addition, a full-scale Joint Military Advisory Group down
to battalion level would be mandatory, as noted in paragraph 14
above. In Case III, in addition to capabilities noted above, the
Nationalists could maintain several large-scale guerrilla bases in
Fukien Province. In coordination with amphibious operations, they
could probably retake and hold certain Kwangsi air strips by use of
guerrillas presently in the area, and thereby open an air route to
Yunnan Province. Thus, widespread guerrilla activity could be
fostered in an area which has always been difficult for the central
government to control, which is important as being on the
Indochinese border, and which contains one of the largest airports
in China, at Kunming. They could probably, by a combination of
guerrilla and overt operations, keep the rail and coastwise shipping
in a state of disruption. Since the principal rail lines throughout
China could be cut from time to time, and since the distribution of
food and other necessities in many areas depends largely on rail
traffic, this action would require the utilization of additional
thousands of CCF troops for security
duty throughout China. They could probably make landings of
10,000–15,000 troops and remain ashore for from one to eight weeks,
or perhaps indefinitely in small mobile groups, depending upon the
Communist Chinese ability to muster forces to dislodge them. This
would be affected in large part by the aid which they receive
ashore. However, it cannot be expected that any large-scale
defections of Communist troops or even civilians will take place
until it is believed that the Nationalists have a good chance of
remaining ashore and expanding their bridgehead. Unless the USSR
should withdraw support of Communist China, this would probably not
take place for a long period of
[Page 1604]
time, except as noted under Case V, below.
The principal effect of this course would be to sow the seeds of
rebellion which might in the long-term succeed in overthrowing the
Communist Chinese Government, but in the short-term would preoccupy
perhaps a third of the CCF
first-line troops, in addition to an estimated one-third of the
total of CCF second-line troops
currently considered engaged against guerrillas on the mainland of
China.
e. Case V. The same as Case IV, except that
active support to landing operations is given by U.S. air and naval
units. In this case, not only would the scope of guerrilla
operations be greatly expanded, but the overt aid given by U.S.
armed forces would indicate that the Nationalist beachheads would be
supported, retained, and enlarged. With reasonable security against
reprisal, large numbers of defections from Communist troops and the
citizenry could be expected. The extent to which a massive landing
(involving initially 150,000 troops without endangering Formosa)
would succeed, and how well it could eventually maintain itself from
mainland sources, is a matter of speculation. However, the chances
for eventual complete collapse of the Communist Chinese Government
are definitely present. In any event, the effectiveness of the
CCF would be reduced (and the
threat to peripheral areas correspondingly minimized) in direct
proportion to the effort and zeal invested in this undertaking.
20. Active operations under the conditions of Cases I, II, and III
can be initiated almost at once. However, three to six months would
be required before major operations could be carried out under the
conditions of Cases IV and V.
21. The military effectiveness of the use of Chinese forces on
Formosa against the mainland of China will be in direct proportion
to the aid and guidance given by the United States. In short, the
Chinese Nationalists are not capable of continued overt activities
at this time without direct U.S. military support. Even with U.S.
air and naval support (Case V above), the ultimate success of
military operations on the mainland is questionable. It follows that
Chinese Nationalist forces should be equipped by MDAP along somewhat austere standards,
but trained for eventual employment on the mainland. In the
meanwhile, U.S. identification with guerrilla warfare, either in
conjunction with Nationalist or independent efforts, should be a
prelude to larger overt operations using Chinese Nationalist forces
if such should appear practicable in the future.
22. The courses of action proposed in paragraph 9 of NSC 101/1 will have very little
immediate effect on our position in the Far East. However, if taken
in conjunction with the other courses of action now under
consideration for the Far East the combined results in
[Page 1605]
time may well: deny all
of China south of the Yellow River to Communism; eliminate Communist
logistic support in Indochina; disrupt the economy in the remainder
of China; banish the threat of armed aggression in other parts of
Asia; reduce the effectiveness of Communist Chinese military forces,
and do much to counter the myth of Communist invincibility
throughout the world.
23. In the consideration of Cases II, III, and IV and V above, the
Chinese Nationalist forces retained on Formosa are considered
adequate for the defense of that island. It is noted that in each of
these cases protection of Formosa by the 7th Fleet was assumed. If
such protection is removed (Case I) it is believed that the Chinese
Communists could conquer Formosa within a year.
