793B.00/8–1451: Telegram
The Chargé in India (Holmes)1 to the Secretary of State
613. Ref Contel 114, rptd New Delhi 110, Aug 13 from Calcutta. Emb appreciates opportunity which exists in possible transmittal letter on US letterhead signed by Amer official to Tib Defense Min … for purpose persuading Tib officials to disavow Sino-Tib agreement and to advise DL to leave Tibet.
Emb believes, however, risks involved in transmittal proposed letter are far greater than advantages which may result for US and Tibet.
If such document fell into Commie Chi hands, it might be used as evidence US endeavor imperialistically to interfere in internal affairs of Tibet and to disrupt ostensibly friendly relations between China and Tibet. It might even be possible, if Tibs were hard pressed in further negots with Commie Chi, that Tibs might use such document to reinforce their position.
Emb questions, in any event, whether additional communication from US, even on US letterhead and signed by Amer official, would increase Tib knowledge and belief in US position. As Dept and ConGen aware, all previous msgs re US position were transmitted to DL through two and in some cases three channels of communications. These channels included Shakabpa, Taktse and Harrer. Important Tib officials surrounding DL were probably informed substance these msgs in transmission to DL by DL fol receipt. Harrer has informed Emb DL sent him two ltrs in which DL acknowledged receipt all US communications and indicated that he himself would have preferred to [Page 1787] leave Tibet but decided return Lhasa in accordance with “wishes and opinion of the majority of Tibet”.
On balance, therefore, Emb believes DL and Tib officials are well informed re US position and that proposed letter to Tib Defense Min would not sufficiently add to such knowledge to justify risks involved. Furthermore, Dept msg quoted in Deptel 295, Aug 4 as amended in Embtel 507, Aug 6,2 which [name deleted] will carry to Lhasa when he leaves Calcutta …, should provide further evidence to DL and Tib officials of continuing US interest.
At later stage, when some definite indication of developments at Lhasa is recd, Emb envisages that a further message of encouragement might be sent. In such message Emb believes it might be helpful to suggest that DL send personal rep in whom he and Tib officials had confidence to India for informal discussion with Amer officials. Such rep would be able return Tib and make report which would confirm substance US position and wld be more likely serve as basis for such further actions as DL prepared to take. In addition, Taktse might write DL at that time observing that Taktse’s own ltrs may not be reaching him and recommending rep be sent India for informal discussion with Amer officials re possible future courses of action.
Suggestions advanced in foregoing para are based on belief Tibs in Lhasa will continue to “stall” in their negots with Commie Chi and have merit of avoiding dispatch official US documents to Tibet where they may reach unfriendly hands.
Sent Dept 613, rptd info Calcutta 83.