CA Files: Lot 59 D 228
The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)1
personal and official
Dear Dean: I am very much disturbed to learn that there has been a change in the plans of our relationship to a Chinese Third Force movement. I have put a great deal of effort into laying the groundwork with the Philippine government for them to accept such a movement in principle and to give some practical, concrete form to this acceptance. Given the feeling of the Filipinos toward the Chinese, this was no easy task. Had we proceeded to assure the Philippine government of our willingness to accept responsibility for the activities of Third Force leaders here—a responsibility we could meet by exerting influence on these leaders, and had we clarified in Chiang Kai-shek’s mind the fact that the Third Force is not anti-Nationalist, but anti-Communist and so supplementary to his efforts, it is incontestable that we should have gone a long way toward the creation of an effective anti-Communist instrument.
The fact remains that there are large areas—political and geographical—where the Nationalists under their present leadership have no influence. Nor can any increase in Taiwan’s military potential give the Nationalists influence in these areas. The Chinese Communists, through terrorism at home and subversive activities abroad, are organizing all Chinese in support of their regime and they are increasingly successful [Page 1772] in this because they meet no organized opposition. It appears to me that it is our responsibility to develop and organize this opposition in areas where Taiwan has no influence, by whatever means may be necessary, as a counterpart to our support of the Nationalists. The project which we seem to have abandoned, would, if taken firmly in hand, have gone far toward creating an anti-Communist movement among Chinese where no such movement now exists.
The recent increase in Chinese Communist activities in Southeast Asia in general and the Philippines in particular is a matter of grave concern to me. The local governments in this area have little or no capabilities to prevent the build up of large, effective Communist undergrounds among their Chinese populations. These Chinese, given the pattern of their political relationships with the governments under which they live, neither will nor can resist this Communist effort by themselves. They will only do so on receipt of help, advice and direction from us. While the Communist effort in this field is a large one, it lies well within our capabilities to make a comparable, successful counter effort. Indeed, it is incumbent on us to do so, unless we are willing to see the Chinese of Southeast Asia mobilized as a Communist fifth column.
I would conclude by saying again that there is nothing in the Third Force idea that detracts in the least from Taiwan’s potentiality. It would doubtless detract from the prestige and self esteem of Chiang and his principal followers, but these are scarcely to be reckoned as factors contributing anything toward the American position, or even the total anti-Communist position, in Asia. I hope that as our Asiatic policy develops in the near future, it will accommodate as an integral part the Third Force idea and that we will have some share here in the implementation of that idea.
Sincerely,
- According to undated handwritten notes on the source text, Rusk directed the letter to the Office of Chinese Affairs, and Perkins discussed it with Cowen on one of the latter’s visits to Washington.↩