Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468

The Acting Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Kennedy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)

top secret

[Washington,] July 11, 1951.

Subject: Your Meeting with Mr. Rusk and Ambassador Henderson on Tibet.

Discussion

The general purpose of this meeting is to exchange views in order that we may be sure that we are in agreement as to policy and lines of action prior to the Ambassador’s departure for New Delhi.

The situation at the moment is as follows:

1. The Dalai Lama has been informed that the US is sympathetic to the maintenance of Tibetan autonomy and is prepared to do everything feasible to assist Tibet in this regard; that if the Dalai Lama publicly disavows the Peiping agreement the US will also issue a sympathetic statement, tenor and timing to be dependent upon the Tibetan announcement; that the US is prepared to make a substantial effort to obtain asylum for the Dalai Lama in Thailand (steps have already been taken), would actively second efforts by the Dalai Lama with respect to Ceylon, and, if circumstances required, would give sympathetic consideration to his coming to the US; that financial support to the Dalai Lama and entourage would be forthcoming; that the US is prepared to provide limited assistance in terms of light arms, depending upon political and military developments in Tibet proper and on evidence of a cooperative attitude by the GOI; and that if the Dalai Lama appeals to the UN the US would support consideration, although the attitude of other UN members would be an important factor.

2. The Dalai Lama has not stated his position with respect to the Peiping agreement and has remained at Yatung awaiting the arrival of the Chinese and Tibetan delegates. Latest information is that he is confused and is uncertain as to what he should do.

3. The Dalai Lama’s elder brother, Taktser, arrived in New York Sunday (July 8) morning. The public reason for his trip is health, but it is presumed that he carries a letter from the Dalai Lama and will consult with the Department.

4. The UK has stated that there should be full consultation with the GOI to encourage that government to accept a disavowal of the Peiping agreement and to cooperate in further steps, and has made clear that the UK would find it difficult to follow the US lead if GOI opposed it. Consultation has already taken place with both the UK and the GOI.

5. The GOI has not commented as yet on our statement that we would support the Dalai Lama in a disavowal and would assist in obtaining asylum for him.

6. New Delhi believes that for the moment we should await developments at Yatung. Calcutta expresses concern that we may stimulate a negative reaction if we press too much.

Recommendation

General agreement should be sought either:

a. That the action so far taken constitutes the maximum and we should await further developments such as information as to the Dalai Lama’s decision; or

b. That more positive action along the following lines should be initiated immediately:

1. Suggest that the Dalai Lama instruct an emissary to sound out the GOI re asylum in India and/or transit to another country. (New Delhi’s 129 of July 10.)

2. Inform Dalai Lama that US would assist in arranging and would finance private air transport for Dalai Lama and retinue. (New Delhi’s 131 of July 10.)¹

3. Inform Dalai Lama that if the above approach is made, the US will discuss arrangements with the GOI, including those involving air transport. (New Delhi’s 131 of July 10.)

4. Approach GOI to obtain the necessary cooperative attitude, after we know the initial approach has been made by Tibet, and concert next steps with the UK and the GOI. (London’s 184 of July 10.)²

1. In the reference telegram, not printed, the Embassy suggested that it should be authorized (1) to inform Shakabpa that the United States would, if necessary, finance private air transport for the Dalai Lama and his retinue from India to another country, and (2) to discuss with the Indian Government preliminary arrangements for such air travel, but only in the event it should become clear the Dalai Lama was unable to remain in India (793B.00/7–1051).
2. The reference telegram, not printed, reported that the British attitude was that, if the Tibetans denounced the Sino-Tibetan agreement, the United Kingdom and India could not refrain from making a statement; the British High Commissioner in New Delhi had been instructed to approach the Indians to urge that some action be planned in the event that the Tibetans denounced the agreement (693.93B/7–1051).