793B.00/7–251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Perkins)1

top secret

Subject: Tibet

Participants: Mr. B. A. B. Burrows, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. R. H. Belcher, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, FE
Mr. Donald D. Kennedy, SOA
Mr. Howard Meyers, UNP
Mr. Troy L. Perkins, CA

Messrs. Burrows and Belcher of the British Embassy called on Mr. Merchant today at their request to discuss Tibet. In response to Mr. Burrows’ general query, Mr. Merchant briefly sketched the background of our thinking and gave an account of our recent relations with the Tibetans along the lines which had been given to the UK High Commissioner in New Delhi by our Chargé.

The discussion brought out that the British were concerned with bringing the Indian Government more into the picture, particularly as regards any moves the U.S. Government might make or contemplate making. Mr. Burrows made the point that the Indian Government might be useful in the very aims which we wished to achieve, and that, contrarily, if the Indians were left without any knowledge of such matters as a statement to be issued by the U.S. or our support of a UN [Page 1728] appeal, their attitude might actually be adverse; thus the Indians might help if their cooperation was enlisted and they might definitely hinder our efforts if it was not. Mr. Burrows, evidently acting under instructions, made it fairly clear that the British Government’s attitude and action toward the Tibetan question, including the possible repudiation by the Dalai Lama of the Peiping agreement, would likely closely follow the lead of India (whether or not India had first been brought into the discussions).

The British representatives also pointed out the importance of timing, particularly as related to the Korean armistice negotiations before us. Mr. Merchant assured them that we had this very much in mind, and it was pointed out that we had freedom of action both as to the timing and the scope of any comments we might make if the Dalai Lama decided to disavow the agreement. It was noted that the question of the support this Government would give the Tibetan case in the UN would depend on the type of appeal made by the Tibetans and in the light of the fact that the interests of many other member nations besides our own were involved.

  1. From June 27, 1951, until March 1952, Mr. Perkins acted unofficially as the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs. The director of the office, Oliver Edmund Clubb, and John Paton Davies of the Policy Planning Staff were suspended on June 27, 1951, pending hearings by the State Department Loyalty Security Board. The Department announced on July 30 that Davies had been cleared and returned to active duty; his domestic tour of duty was to expire the following month and he was then scheduled for assignment to Bonn. On March 5, 1952, Secretary Acheson told a press conference that the Board had determined that Clubb was a security risk; he had appealed his case to the Secretary who had overruled the Board’s finding and reinstated him, and he had subsequently resigned. For the text of the Department’s announcements concerning the two cases, see the Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1951, p. 150, and August 13, 1951, pp. 278–279; for text of Secretary Acheson’s comments, see ibid., March 17, 1952, pp. 437–439.