Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 148: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret   priority

C–60060. For info CINCUNC Adv Msg HNC 642.

“Further to HNC 638.1

“Special feature of day. At close of morning session, Communists delivered ans to CINCUNC’s letter ref ICRC, forwarded by HNC 634.2 They also presented letter from Gen Dean to his wife and requested delivery (HNC 635).3 They suggested that item 4 sub-delegation be medium for transmitting mail from POWs at camps of both sides and pointed out as preamble that UN POWs would undoubtedly be writing home on big UN holiday. UNC sub-committees agreed to the mail-forwarding proposal.

“Sub-delegation reconvened 1500 hrs. UNC opened as follows: UNC will suggest where many of the more than 50,000 unaccounted for might be found. Communists captured many thousands of ROKA soldiers. Where are they now? Some who succeeded in getting back to UNC lines have told of having been forced to fight against their own army until they managed to escape. Thousands of others are still serving in Communist army. Communists say they are volunteers. UNC is by no means sure that this is so, in the light of what those returned soldiers have reported. In any case, these captured soldiers are, and always have been, in the status of POWs. They should never have been used for work directly connected with mil operations, and Communists should have shielded them from the effects of mil action. Obviously, these two rights, the right of all POWs not to participate in work contributing directly to the conduct of the war, and the right to he protected against mil operations precluded the use of POW to fight [Page 1442] against their own army. The Communists have flagrantly impressed POWs, and have further violated their right as individuals by striking their names from the POW lists. By this action Commies would deny POWs the right to be repatriated dur an armistice. Having used POW illegally dur war, they would continue to use them illegally dur an armistice. Quite apart from the effects of this practice upon the individuals immediately concerned is its effect upon the basis of exchange of the POW. It constitutes a transparent and fraudulent attempt to get something for nothing. Having deliberately presented incomplete lists from which many thousands of names are missing the Communists come to the armistice conference and demand an all-for-all exchange of POW. When they include in the lists all the POW they actually hold, then their proposal of an all-for-all exchange, while unsound from a mil pt of view in a mil armistice would at least be honest.

UNC therefore suggests that as a part of the accounting the Communists add to the POW lists all former ROKA soldiers now serving in North Korean Army. That might account for a substantial part of the missing 50,000. UNC is still waiting for accounting on these upwards of 50,000 missing POWs.

“Gen Lee replied as follows: History shows no cases where the same nbr of POWs were taken by each side and the same nbr of POWs were released by each side. Such a thing never happened in the past and will never happen in the future, UNC insistence on wanting to know where POWs were released is no more than an insistence to avoid solving the question. UNC says Communists should have about twenty times as many POWs as they actually have. The fact is that a large nbr of POWs who were released may be in UNC Army or may be living at home. Many after they returned home joined the guerrillas and fought for the people in UNC rear. By interviewing the roving generals on Formosa the fact can be understood better. By releasing many POWs Communists could destroy the anti-popular reactionary army. Experience indicates that it is successful. UNC considers the release of the POWs to be the increase of mil forces of the other side, but Communists are not afraid of such thing and recognize a big political effect in it. To release all the POWs directly at the front dur the hostilities is possible only for an army which fights for the people. UNC say that Communists rob the POWs of their rights by making them join the army. That is not what Communists are doing but precisely what the other side is doing. It uses POWs as spies, but many are captured. They can be seen in custody. After the experience of the past and in accordance with their consistent policy, the Communists consider the release of POWs a must and they will do it in the future. This is not a consistent policy but a large nbr of POWs have been released.

[Page 1443]

“On Nov 24, 1950 in the name of the Supreme Command and as well as the name of the Chief of the Political Bureau of the People’s Army, Communists gave orders to continue to release the POWs. On July 30, 1950 in the name of the Supreme Commander, the order was issued to release the POWs. This is said to be helpful in clarifying Communist policy on POWs. Maybe it is hard to understand that the release of POWs is a must at the front. Only an army which was brought up among the people and which fights for the people can carry out the policy. Now what about a clear explanation of the 44,000 persons question.

UNC replied. We are still trying to find out what happened to the thousands and thousands of POWs that have apparently vanished from the face of the earth. UNC will not stop until it has a satisfactory explanation of upwards of 50,000 POWs. As to the nbr of POWs released at the front who might be in UNC Army or at home, some are in the army; a grand total of 177. None are at home. Communists say it is policy to educate POWs and release them en masse at the front. They must educate them in a hell of hurry if they turn them loose without getting their names. 177 have come back to UNC lines and unannounced thousands have vanished. The bal of the session was spent in clarifying UNC POW data with particular ref to a Communist figure of 44,259, the origin of which has not yet been clarified but which does include the approximately 38,000 former ROK nationals who have been reclassified. Recessed 1723 to resume 1100 tomorrow. Signed Joy.”

  1. See telegram C–60059, supra.
  2. See telegram C–60057, December 24, p. 1435.
  3. Not printed.