Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 140: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
C–59976. For info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 624.
“Sub-delegates on item 3 met at 1100.
“United Nations led off with proposed revisions of 3 remaining disputed principles as follows:
[Page 1427]“(4) In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holdings by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to increase the numerical quantities of military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition in Korea after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective. Any rotation of personnel shall be subject to on-the-spot supervision by the supervisory organ of noncombatant nations and shall be carried out at the ports of entry in the rear agreed upon by both sides.
“The rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields for civil air operations at specified points shall be agreed; such rehabilitation shall not include extension of runways. No other airfields shall be rehabilitated or constructed.
“(5) Each side shall designate an equal number of members to form a military armistice commission to be responsible for supervising the execution of the armistice agreement and for settling through negotiation any violations of the armistice agreement. The functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the following three provisions:
- “a. Within the demilitarized zone, the military armistice commission utilizing joint teams directly dispatched by it shall be responsible.
- “b. Outside the demilitarized zone, at the ports of entry (including airports) in the rear as agreed upon by both sides, and at the places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred, a supervisory organ of representatives of non-combatant nations shall be responsible. A request from the senior member of either side represented on the military armistice commission for an investigation will be referred to the supervisory organ which must see that the inspection is conducted.
- “c. Any member of the supervisory organ is authorized to communicate directly with any member of the military armistice commission.
“(6) Each side agrees to invite non-combatant nations in the Korean war, to send representatives to form a supervisory organ. The supervisory organ shall, when requested by the senior member of either side represented on the military armistice commission, dispatch inspection teams of non-combatant nations to carry out the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement at ports of entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides and at the places where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred outside the demilitarized zone. The supervisory organ shall report on the results of supervision and inspection to the military armistice commission. Both sides shall accord the inspection teams of non-combatant nations full convenience of the main lines of communication and transportation in performing the above stated functions. In addition, such periodic aerial reconnaissance, observation, and photographic [Page 1428] flights as are required will be performed by the non-combatant teams.”
“Hsieh asked what were the UNC concessions in revised principles. UNC said its proposal was clear. Hsieh repeated threadbare complaints about interference in internal affairs, saying he would absolutely not accept limitation on airfields. Hsieh also attacked aerial observation. Hsieh said if UNC did not drop the above two points, discussions could make no progress. UNC invited Hsieh to make an alternate proposal designed to break deadlock. Hsieh again repeated objections to interferences in internal affairs. Hsieh said if UNC would cancel last passages in principles 4 and 6, all other questions could be settled. UNC again asked for counter-proposal. Hsieh attacked restrictions on airfields, and said again so long as UNC insisted on such restrictions no progress could be made. UNC said progress depended on Hsieh facing facts as they exist today. After recess, Hsieh said question was whether UNC would give up concluding passages in principles 4 and 6. Hsieh said he saw no reason for inclusion of sub-paragraph c in UNC revised principle 5, or for last sentence of sub-paragraph b in same principle. UNC said these designed to avoid deadlocks in military armistice commission. Hsieh asked if UNC would remove the two points at issue (airfields and aerial observation). UNC said it was for stable armistice; that Hsieh delayed progress by opposing a stable armistice. UNC said Hsieh should accept fact that the UNC would keep on insisting on a safeguard against development of an air threat on other side during armistice. Recessed 1600. Continue tomorrow 1100, with intention to hold firm for UNC proposal of today. Signed Joy.”