Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 138: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Advance Headquarters, United Nations Command, Korea

top secret
operational immediate

Tokyo, 23 December 1951—10:49 a. m.

C–59946. Ref your HNC 611.¹ This msg in 3 parts.

Part 1. We have carefully analyzed your proposed positions which might be taken during negotiations on agenda item 4 and submit the following general comments.

a. Negotiating for the return of ROKA personnel impressed in NKPA Forces. While the ROK Govt has indicated a desire to secure release from Communist Army of all Koreans of ROK origin who were forcibly recruited into NKPA, and while the loss of this group to the North Korean Govt may substantially decrease the troop strength available to them, certain overriding disadvantages make it appear inadvisable to include this group in any position to be used for negotiations. These are:

(1) Extremely unlikely Communists would ever admit they forcibly impressed South Koreans. It is even possible that they could prove many enlisted voluntarily.

(2) Provides effective propaganda springboard for the Communists to claim South Koreans were volunteers and to play up wholesale defection of South Koreans from the ROK Army.

(3) No way of knowing who or how many of this group Communists could produce. A strong possibility exists that they would include any South Koreans, military or civilian, to counterbalance preponderance in numbers of POWs held by UNC.

(4) Provides basis for claim ROK was trying to get back pro-Communist South Koreans for mass execution.

(5) Questionable whether JCS intended that this group should be included in any exchange.

b. Effects of one-for-one exchange as it relates to indefinite retention of POWs in captivity. In previous discussions of one-for-one exchange, you have indicated your reluctance to open with this as an initial position because of the propaganda value to the Communists of stressing the captivity theme. However, one-for-one appears to be a feasible approach provided it is not maintained to the point where the UNC will be accused of holding up negotiations for the purpose of retaining the excess POWs in UNC hands. Its advantages are:

(1) Retains maximum bargaining power for further negotiations, and as a corollary makes each successive position appear to be a concession.

(2) If the Communists renounce one-for-one and play on the captivity theme, it provides us with an immediate opportunity to introduce question of civilian internees who are also in captivity. While there may be advantages in including in item 5 the question of eventual disposition of retained POWs after a one-for-one exchange has been completed, and while such action might expedite bringing item 4 to a conclusion, it appears that such an important item would again open the whole question in item 5 and might block the final conclusion of a successful armistice. Further, there is strong evidence to indicate that the return of volunteers to Communists’ control is properly a military rather than a political matter. The disposition of non-volunteers remaining after an exchange has been completed is a political matter.

c. Principle of parole. It is noted in your positions 4 thru 7 no reference is made to the parole principle applicable to POWs included in any exchange. While admittedly its enforcement would be difficult or impossible, it does appear to have propaganda and negotiating value which make worthwhile its retention in our proposals, particularly since it is immediately related to the principle of level of forces in item 3.

Part 2.

1. Forwarded for your consideration is a proposed series of successive positions which appear to have desirable characteristics which follow generally the announced JCS policies, and in the main follow your basic ideas. It is realized that no particular sequence can be selected arbitrarily now and that continual readjustment may be required to tailor the positions to fit the pattern of negotiations.

a. Position 1: Introduction of exchange on a one-for-one basis to include POWs initially and names civilian internees subsequently; this position to be maint only so long as it appears to have negotiating value and does not put the UNC in the unfavorable light of appearing purposely to delay negotiations so as to retain a mass of POWs in its custody for further bargaining. Will not require JCS approval.

b. Position 2: All-for-all basis for exchange provided that:

(1) First enemy POWs are exchanged on a one-for-one basis for UNC and ROK POWs.

(2) Additional enemy POWs are exchanged on a one-for-one basis for named civilian internees in Communist custody.

(3) The side which still holds POWs shall thereafter release from POW status all the remaining POWs held by it and shall repatriate all those who express a desire to be repatriated. Those so repatriated will be paroled to the opposing force, such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual will not again bear arms against the side releasing him. Delegates of the ICRC shall be permitted to interview all POWs remaining after the person-for-person exchange has been completed in order to insure that the choice is freely made.

(4) Voluntary exchange in para 1 b (1) above is considered feasible because of large numbers of NKPA POWs in UNC custody who can be expected to volunteer, and provide a safe margin for the exchange of the total number of UNC POWs and civilian internees. Will not require JCS approval.

c. Position 3: All-for-all exchange to include only POWs (no civilian internees) with no forced return. Initially exchange to be conducted on a one-for-one basis until one side has exchanged all of the POWs held by it and shall repatriate all those who express a desire to be repatriated. Those so repatriated will be paroled to the opposite force, such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual will not again bear arms against the side releasing him. Delegates of the ICRC shall be permitted to interview all POWs remaining after the person-for-person exchange has been completed in order to insure that the choice is freely made. This requires JCS approval.

d. Position 4: All-for-all exchange to include POWs and civilian internees with forced exchange. Initially exchange to be conducted on a one-for-one basis until one side has returned all the prisoners and civilian internees it holds. The POWs remaining after this exchange has been completed will be delivered by the detaining power to the opposing force with no choice of return offered POWs prior to their return. This requires JCS approval.

e. Position 5: All-for-all exchange to include only POWs with forced return. Initially exchange to be conducted on a one-for-one basis of POWs only until one side has returned all the POWs it holds. The POWs remaining after the exchange has been completed will be delivered by the detaining power to the opposing force with no choice of return offered POWs prior to return. This requires JCS approval.

1. See telegram C–59944, supra.