795.00/12–2151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

top secret

Subject: Korea: South African Comments on Proposed Statement of Sixteen Powers

Participants: Mr. Basil Jarvie, Chargé d’Affaires, South African Embassy
Mr. Hickerson—UNA
Mr. Johnson—FE
Mr. Popper—UNA
Mr. Shullaw—BNA

The South African Chargé d’Affaires, Mr. Basil Jarvie, called on me today to give the views of his Government on the proposed statement by the sixteen powers having forces in Korea. Mr. Jarvie said that South Africa was prepared to give its moral support to the proposed statement. He added that since Korea was so far removed from the area of South African interests his Government had been prepared from the beginning to follow the lead of the United Kingdom and the United States.

Mr. Jarvie said the South African Government, without directly suggesting any changes in the language of the statement, had made several comments about the text. In the second paragraph of the statement the reference to the UN objectives of a unified, free and independent Korea appeared unrealistic and possibly provocative. He referred in this connection to the fact that if an armistice is achieved the line of division will be roughly comparable to the situation obtaining before hostilities. In the circumstances, to suggest the possibility of the expenditure of additional thousands of lives in the achievement of the UN objectives seemed undesirable.

I told Mr. Jarvie that it had certainly not been our intention in the statement to do other than restate the objectives which the UN had sought since 1946 and to affirm our intention to continue to pursue these objectives through peaceful means. Because of the repeated references made to this subject the omission of it in this statement would be sure to cause comment. I said we would have another look at the statement to make sure there was no ambiguity on this point.

Mr. Jarvie made the personal suggestion that the specific reference to a unified, free and independent Korea might be replaced by a more general reference. Mr. Johnson pointed out that the omission would be noted immediately by the South Koreans who would interpret it to mean that we had abandoned our principles and were abandoning them.

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Mr. Jarvie then referred to the section of the statement relating to the rehabilitation of Korea and stated his Government had not, up to the present, made any contribution for this purpose. I told him the statement was general and did not constitute a commitment, but, of course, we hoped South Africa would decide to make a contribution.

Mr. Jarvie next mentioned the last paragraph of the statement, and said that his Government had always been of the opinion everything possible should be done to avoid an extension of hostilities, and they continued to be of this mind. In the event the armistice were broken, South Africa, he said, would have to review the question of maintaining a squadron in Korea, In any case, having regard to South Africa’s commitments in the Middle East, it could not maintain a squadron indefinitely in Korea.

I told Mr. Jarvie that in our opinion any major breach of the armistice would be on such a scale as to make it impossible to avoid an extension of hostilities to China itself, and I wanted to make our views on this point entirely clear. Mr. Jarvie asked whether association in issuance of the statement would carry any obligation to return the South African squadron to Korea if it had been withdrawn in the period between the armistice and resumption of hostilities. I said that there was no commitment involved either to maintain existing forces in Korea or to add to them in the event of a breach of hostilities, but that the statement, if it meant anything, did carry a certain moral obligation to do what was required to resist a new aggression. Mr. Johnson added that obviously we did not mean to suggest that the countries concerned would act without regard to conditions elsewhere at the time of the attack.

I told Mr. Jarvie that in the event hostilities were resumed I hoped that the South African Government would, instead of considering withdrawing its squadron, decide to furnish several additional squadrons. Mr. Jarvie then said that the message from his Government did not state that it would definitely withdraw the South African squadron but only that in the event of a breach of the armistice it would have to consider the question of maintaining the squadron in Korea. He said that if an armistice is concluded there will have to be discussions, in any case, among the countries having forces in Korea about their maintenance, I told Mr. Jarvie that, while some forces might be withdrawn, we expected it would be necessary to maintain UN forces in Korea for several years.

Mr. Jarvie said that his Government believed it would be some time before elections could be held in Korea and that the reference in the statement to elections had no immediate connotation.1 I expressed agreement with this view.

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Mr. Jarvie said the only other point he wished to make was that South Africa had not recognized South Korea. Association with the proposed statement would not, in the view of his Government, alter this situation. I expressed agreement.

I told Mr. Jarvie that since my last conversation with him we had learned Mr. Eden likes the statement and will seek a Government decision on it. In reply to Mr. Jarvie’s question, I said he had suggested no changes in the language. I also told him that after talking with our Chiefs of Staff we were convinced the statement had taken on added importance. Without the deterrent to a resumption of hostilities supplied by the statement, our Chiefs of Staff would have to insist on prohibition of the repair or construction of airfields in North Korea and on adequate inspection. There was considerable doubt that in these circumstances an armistice could be agreed upon since on both of these points the Communists would be unlikely to meet our demands.

  1. The draft statement made no mention of elections. See telegram 2807, December 5, to London and footnote 1, pp. 1249 and 1373.