Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 104: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret   flash

Korea, 18 December 1951—4:02 p. m.

HNC–588. This message in 6 parts.

Part 1. Following a canvass of the opinions of the delegation and staff at Munsan yesterday and today, I submit herewith an analysis which includes:

1. The general situation.

2. Existing major points of disagreement.

3. The final position on each of these major points, which in my view the present and future interests of the U.S. require that we maintain, with the supporting reasons in each case. (Where a position is in conflict with JCS instructions, the facts are so stated.)

4. Conclusions.

5. Recommendations.

Part 2. The general situation.

1. a. There are several principle elements in the situation as of this date, all of which are indeterminate except one. The single exception is the time remaining of the thirty day period as it affects agenda item two. This period has 9 days to run.

b. The indeterminate principle elements are the effect of an extension of this period: The intentions of the Communists with respect to concluding an armistice; and the finality of the several positions which the Communists have taken on the respective existing major points of disagreement. Each of these is discussed in turn.

2. a. Extension of the thirty day period will have a positive and harmful effect on the mental attitude of our forces in Korea, unless the period of extension is very short and conclusion of the armistice negotiations is clearly imminent. Furthermore, unless the condition obtains, it will have a like effect on public opinion in the United States.

b. While I state this purely as an opinion and while I am not in a position to gauge its force, I would think it conceivable that such public opinion might result in the U.S. Government adopting courses of action in Korea [in] conflict with its best interests, might incline it to accept a local temporary advantage, rather than an over-all far-reaching gain.

c. It could, it seems to me, be a case of taking the cash and letting the credit go, the “cash” being a temporary lull, a brief interruption in casualty reports; the “credit” being safeguards which would provide for maximum recovery of surviving POW’s and maximum insurance against further casualties through minimum essential security measures for our forces in Korea today and in Japan tomorrow.

3. The intention of the Communists with respect to concluding an armistice is perhaps the most conjectural of all the variables in the present situation. Opinion has changed 180 degrees several times in the past few weeks, and today there is almost as much on one side as on the other. Whatever be the Communist intentions, it seems probable that we are ‘most likely to develop them through a determination of the points on which we will not yield; through prompt announcement of those points in such unequivocal language as to make our purpose crystal clear; and through reiteration of these positions every day for the remainder of the thirty day period of grace.

4. The finality of the several Communist positions on existing major points of disagreement can likewise be determined in the same manner.

5. a. Item number 3 of the agenda now under active discussion is not making acceptable progress because of Communist intransigence.

b. Throughout this analysis, in fact throughout our entire negotiations, the policy directive you have assigned me has been kept clearly in mind, namely, the attainment as soon as possible of an armistice on terms acceptable to the United States.

c. Throughout this analysis, in fact throughout our entire negotiations, your directive, that, if negotiations are broken off the onus must rest on the Communists, has likewise been kept clearly in mind.

d. However, these two points above deserve comment.

(1) With respect to the first, it is axiomatic that the Communists have a like policy objective. Hence, with due respect to the second point, there must come a time at which our final positions must be stated, and if not accepted a time at which we must be prepared to continue their reiteration indefinitely until either our patience, or that of the Communists is exhausted.

(2) With respect to both the first and the second, there is, I believe, a point at which the law of diminishing returns takes over. While again perhaps presumptuous in attempting to forecast the course of United States public opinion, I yet feel that a time must come when, if our final positions continue to be rejected, yet the Communists themselves do not break off negotiations, that the United Nations Command must do so. I do not, of course, suggest that the time has yet arrived. I do suggest that if the present course of these negotiations long continues, it will arrive and the decisions to meet it should be made in advance.

(3) Every time that the United Nations Command delegation abandons a position which it has strongly held, its future position and bargaining strength are proportionately reduced. Communist practices world-wide should by now be so thoroughly understood that no reasonable person can any longer be in doubt that the more they gain the more they take. The more that is yielded to them the more obdurate they become. Only through recognition and application of this well established fact can we hope to bring these negotiations to either a successful conclusion, or to a clear issue warranting their termination by the deliberate decision of the United Nations Command.

Part 3. Major points of existing disagreement.

Agenda Item Number 3

1. Armistice not to be effective until supervising organ is ready to function.

2. Neutral organ to be subject to direction and control of military armistice commission.

3. Ground (as distinguished from aerial) observation at ports of entry including ground, sea and air with freedom of movement for observer personnel.

4. Prohibition of rehabilitation and construction of airfields, and aerial observation thereof.

5. Rotation, replenishment and replacement.

Agenda Item Number 4

6. Basis for release and exchange of POW.

Part 4. Final positions on major points of disagreement which in my view the present and future interests of the U.S. require that we maintain.

Agenda Item Number 3

1. Insistence on prohibition of the construction or rehabilitation of airfields.

The most important part of this armistice is the restriction on the rehabilitation of airfields. Without such a restriction, the armistice contains no adequately effective provision for the security of our forces, or even for the stability of the armistice itself. The rehabilitation of airfields during the period of the armistice is inconsistent with the fundamental idea of an armistice. The balance of forces and conditions existing at the time of the armistice is put into effect could be radically altered thereby. The rehabilitation of enemy airfields is today the greatest potential threat to the security of our forces in Korea. Tomorrow it could be a similar menace to our forces in Japan.

2. Insistence on neutral aerial observation and photo reconnaissance. This provision is essential for determination of adherence to terms of armistice, particularly paragraph 1 above. Without aerial observation of the 97 airfields in North Korea, prohibition of rehabilitation of airfields would have little practicability, and none on new construction.

3. Insistence on the rotation and replenishment principle, unlimited except by the principle that there shall be no increase in the levels existing at the time the armistice becomes effective. To agree to limit rotation and replenishment to a level beneath that necessary to maintain the strength of our forces in Korea would constitute withdrawal by attrition. It would be an unmistakable indication of weakness of the Communists.

4. Insistence on including provisions in the armistice agreement which provide for mandatory action by the Military Armistice Commission and the neutral observer personnel in the execution of tasks assigned in the armistice agreement. Without provisions making mandatory the execution of tasks assigned the Military Armistice Commission and the neutral organ, the Communists can block any action by these organizations through refusing to agree. With such provisions included in the armistice agreement, it is not considered necessary to place the neutral organ under the direction and control of the Military Armistice Commission. (This position varies in wording but not in effect from present instruction of JCS 89173 paragraph 2D).¹

5. Insistence on location of neutral observer teams at major ports of entry including ground, sea, and air as mutually agreed to by both sides, with freedom of movement over major lines of communication as required. It is essential that observation be conducted at a selected number of major ports of all types and freedom of movement be accorded teams to conduct these observations in order to determine whether the enemy is increasing his military capabilities by importation.

6. Basis for release and exchange of POWs. (Deduced from Communist statements in meetings to date).

a. We believe final position which offers best chance for maximum recovery of our military POWs is all-for-all exchange confined to military personnel only.

b. Although UNC has not as yet given any indication of its position on the basis for release and exchange of POWs, Communists have assumed that UNC will propose exchange on one-for-one basis. On this assumption they are attacking this position and building up a strong propaganda case against the one-for-one exchange. Article 118 Geneva Convention tends to support their all-for-all argument. In view of this, the UNC by formally proposing one-for-one exchange will be exposing itself to adverse propaganda. Such a risk would probably reap no productive results, because settlement on a one-for-one basis is likely not to be accepted by the Communists and because it seems likely the U.S. public would create an overwhelming demand on the government of a concession long before the UNC could outsit the Communists on this issue.

c. With respect to inclusion of civilians and forced repatriations.

(1) The only arrangement which gives any reasonable assurance of no forced repatriation is to omit any civilians and insist on a one-for-one exchange, without nationality considerations, until all POW held by Communists are recovered; thereafter release remainder of POW we hold but repatriate only volunteers. This conflicts with para II (6) JCS 89746² and requires your prior authority.

(2) Any tenable position which includes selected civilians will almost certainly entail forced return of some personnel and thereby violate para II (7) JCS 89746.

(3) Therefore JCS decision is required as to which has priority—the return of selected civilians or adherence to principle of no forced return of POW.

d. The repatriation of civilians is a political question; to raise it is to violate the consistent stand of the UNC that the armistice is strictly a military matter.

e. We further believe that if we insist on principle of voluntary repatriation we may establish a dangerous precedent that may react to our disadvantage in later wars with Communist powers. Should they ever hold preponderance of POW, and then adhere to their adamant stand against any form of neutral visits to their POW camps, we will have no recourse, if they said none of our POWs wanted to be repatriated.

f. On assumption civilians have priority, there appears to be only one practicable way to proceed:

(1) Offer not to oppose all-for-all exchange of POW provided a specified number of selected civilians are included by Communists. This may well lead to demand by Communists for return by UNC of all civilian internees and refugees in South Korea including South Korean civilian internees once reported to Geneva but since reclassified; that is, they may demand extension of all-for-all exchange principle to include refugees and internees.

(2) POWs shall be exchanged on a person-for-person basis until all POW of one side have been exchanged. The side which still holds POWs shall thereafter release from POW status all the remaining POWs held by it and repatriate all those who express a desire to be repatriated. Those so repatriated will be paroled to the opposing force, such parole to carry with it the condition that the individual will not again bear arms against the side releasing him. Delegates of the ICRC shall be permitted to interview all prisoners of war remaining after the person-for-person exchange has been completed in order to insure that the choice is freely made.

g. The value of the second alternative as a club to secure acceptance of the first depends largely upon the adverse propaganda effect upon the Communists of having a large number of former Communists soldiers refuse to return to their homeland and of having the UNC provide them asylum. Unfortunately, the second alternative, which extends the institution of asylum to POWs is so appealing to humanitarian sentiment, that once it is announced and publicized, the demand by our people to stand or fall on this proposal may preclude ultimate abandonment of this position.

h. In view of the many interests involved, negotiations to accomplish return of civilians would be delicate. It is thought that the UNC should never formally propose alternative 6 f (1) above. The sub-delegation would explore it with as little publicity as possible under the guise of discussing the Communist all-for-all proposal. We would state that the UNC holds many more prisoners, but that Communists want an all-for-all exchange. If the Communists will include in the exchange a specified number of civilians from lists to be provided, UNC will not oppose Communist proposal of all-for-all. Exchange of POW by UNC, and POW and listed civilians by the Communists, would be on a one-for-one basis, until prisoners and listed civilians held by the enemy are exhausted. Delivery of the remaining POW held by UNC would be contingent upon satisfactory compliance with the terms of the agreement by the Communists. The club would be exposed but not wielded.

Part 5. Conclusions.

Agenda Item 3

1. The question of whether the enemy will or will not agree to an armistice containing a prohibition on increasing military capabilities (air facilities) during the period of armistice is perhaps the gravest question posed by the armistice negotiations, and in the unanimous opinion of the delegation is the key question on which the faith of the armistice hinges. If the enemy will not accept, or will long delay an armistice which contains a prohibition against airfields, the question arises why the enemy is so seriously concerned with airfields. The answer to that question may indicate the intentions of the enemy. The only way that crucial question can be decisively answered is—to press the enemy to a point of ultimate decision and choice—an armistice, or airfields. If his choice is the latter, then his intention to take over all of Korea (accepted in National Intelligence Estimate No 55)³ include the determination to project his air power through-out the peninsula.

2. It is concluded that paragraph II (2), (6) and (7) of JCS 89746 prevent freedom of action of the UNC in presenting tenable initial or intermediate positions. The choice between permitting UNC POWs to volunteer for repatriation and attempting to secure the return of UN and ROK civilians, needs to be made because it is the opinion here that both cannot be achieved in the same UNC proposal.

Part 6. Recommendations.

1. That final positions outlined in part IV above be approved soonest without qualification and that the UNC delegation be authorized to announce them as such to the Communists and to the world at times of my choosing.

2. That current JCS instructions in conflict with above be rescinded. Signed Ridgway.

1. See the editorial note, p. 1296.
2. Dated December 15, p. 1340.
3. Dated December 7, p. 1263.