795.00/12–1851
Position Paper, Prepared in the Department of State, for the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly
SD/A/C.1/368/Rev. 1
United Nations Action in Korea (Alternative II—If an Armistice Is Achieved)1
the problem
To determine the position of the United States as to the steps to be taken by the Sixth Session of the General Assembly after an Armistice in Korea.
recommendations
1. The United States should continue to play a leading role in General Assembly consideration of the Korean question and should [Page 1360] direct the efforts of the Assembly towards the achievement of a satisfactory political settlement of the Korean problem.
2. The United States should support a resolution which would reaffirm that it remains the purpose of the United Nations to seek to bring about by peaceful means a unified, independent and democratic government in Korea. To that end, the resolution should establish a new United Nations commission. The terms of reference of the Commission should be:
- A.
- The Commission should consider and enter into discussions with governments and authorities as appropriate regarding a basis for bringing about a unified, independent and democratic Korea by peaceful means;
- B.
- The Commission would deal exclusively with a Korean political settlement and would have no authority to consider any other problem;
- C.
- The Commission would report to the General Assembly, as appropriate. If it should succeed in getting agreement of the interested parties to a plan for the unification of Korea consistent with United Nations principles, it would submit this agreement for the approval of the General Assembly.
3. In discussions regarding the composition of the Commission, prior to passage of the resolution, the United States should proceed on the basis that the Commission should be a small body capable of carrying out the negotiating function which is its primary task. The United States delegation should make it clear that in view of the role of the United States in the Korean conflict it should be a member of the Commission. In addition, it would be desirable to have 3 small countries from among those which have participated in the fighting in Korea, e.g., Thailand, Australia, and Turkey, and the Soviet Union, if it will serve. If the Soviet Union is not willing to serve, this seat on the Commission might nevertheless be kept open. If informal discussions indicate that the United Kingdom and France strongly desire a place on the Commission the Delegation is authorized to agree to including them.
4. The resolution should express the appreciation of the Assembly to UNCURK for its services. UNCURK should go out of existence when the new commission informs it that it is ready to begin its functions under the General Assembly Resolution. When the Assembly receives the report of the new Commission on the results of its effort to bring about a peaceful settlement, the Assembly will review, in the light of the report, the need for long term political United Nations representation in Korea.
5. The proposed resolution should also refer to past resolutions by the Security Council and General Assembly on the United Nations [Page 1361] action in Korea, note the approval of the armistice by the Security Council, express the Assembly’s own satisfaction over the conclusion of the armistice and the successful accomplishment by United Nations forces of their mission in Korea. Friendly delegations may feel, however, that such provisions will antagonize the Communists and jeopardize the possibility of a political settlement, and the delegation is authorized to omit or reverse these provisions if consultations indicate strong opposition. In that event, we should reach an understanding with other delegations that a stronger General Assembly resolution leaving the record clear as to the character and purpose of the United Nations action in Korea would be introduced at a later date, if efforts to achieve a political settlement break down.
discussion
A. Political Settlement for Korea.
The Objective is Unification. An armistice in Korea will bring about a cessation of the fighting and make provisions against its resumption. It will constitute only the first step towards the achievement of a permanent peace in Korea and a political solution of the Korean problem by peaceful means.
The United Nations is committed to seeking the establishment in Korea of a unified, independent and democratic government. Such unification has also been the policy of the United States, and represents the desires of the Korean people. Every effort should be made, therefore, after an armistice, to bring about such unification under United Nations auspices, in accordance with United Nations principles, and under conditions which would provide maximum assurance against Communist aggression and subversion. At the same time it is the United States position that it is preferable to have Korea divided on an indefinite basis under an armistice agreement than to have a unification under conditions which would not give maximum assurance against Communist domination.
The Communists have also taken the position that the armistice is only the first step and a political settlement must follow. They have also championed the unification of Korea. It is extremely unlikely, however, that the Communists would agree to a truly independent and democratic Korea, to free elections under United Nations auspices, and a process of unification under the guidance of a United Nations commission. More likely they will seek a political settlement on terms which would permit them to gain control of all Korea. Failing that, as they have already indicated, they may seek an agreement for the mutual withdrawal of non-Korean troops. At the same time, the United States could not support any political settlement which gives [Page 1362] up the goal of unification and accepts the division of the country as permanent. It would be better to have the armistice continue in effect as an armistice only. The United Nations troops would stay as long as was necessary in order to ensure the defense of the Republic of Korea against renewed aggression. The United Nations would keep alive the principle of unification and continue its efforts through appropriate machinery to achieve it.
Whatever the prospects of success, the General Assembly should, after an armistice, reaffirm unification as the only acceptable solution for Korea and extend every effort to achieve a unified Korea on a United Nations basis. It is important also that the United States take the initiative in this regard and not allow the Communists the propaganda advantage of posing as the principal proponents of a unified Korea.
Forum for Seeking a Political Settlement. The United Kingdom has indicated its view that following an armistice, a political solution of the Korean problem should be sought at a Five-Power Conference (United States, United Kingdom, USSR, France, Communist China) or Seven-Power Conference (the same powers plus, presumably, India and Egypt), with some kind of “associate” participation by the Republic of Korea and the North Koreans. (After agreement is reached on a Korean settlement, the United Kingdom has in mind that the same conference might also deal with other Far Eastern problems). We have informed the United Kingdom that we do not accept this approach which contemplates a solution of the Korean problem by the Great Powers without any participation by the United Nations or by other countries vitally interested in the Pacific (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines) and only a secondary participation for the Koreans, the real parties in interest. We also indicated that we could not agree to any arrangement which might give the impression that we were treating Peiping as the Government of China. (With regard to a discussion of other Far Eastern questions, we informed the United Kingdom that neither the Five—nor the Seven-Power conference would be representative of the United Nations membership on such questions as Chinese representation and Formosa, but that after a Korean settlement, we would be prepared to discuss other Far Eastern questions in an appropriate forum which would include all the parties with interests in the questions to be discussed).
As the United Kingdom was informed, it is our position that the Korean problem should be solved by the parties in interest. Strictly, this would mean that the question should be discussed by representatives of the Republic of Korea and of the North Koreans; the United Nations should participate also in view of its continuing interest in [Page 1363] the Korean problem and the role it must play both in achieving a settlement and in supervising its implementation. It is foreseeable, however, that the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists will claim a voice in the solution of the Korean problem. Since, as a realistic matter, no agreement for a Korean settlement could be achieved without their consent or acquiescence, particularly with Chinese Communist troops remaining in Korea even after an armistice, the United States is prepared to agree to their participation in discussions of a Korean settlement in an appropriate forum.
A New United Nations Commission. Under the proposed resolution the General Assembly would establish a new United Nations Commission on Korea, with headquarters in New York but free to travel as necessary. This Commission would be authorized to consider and enter into discussions with governments and authorities, as appropriate, for the purpose of achieving agreement on bringing about a unified, independent and democratic Korea by peaceful means. Its terms of reference would be limited to the Korean political settlement, and it would have no authority to consider any other problems. It would report to the General Assembly the results of its efforts, and, if it should succeed in obtaining agreement of the interested parties on a plan for the unification of Korea consistent with United Nations principles, it would submit this agreement to the Assembly for its approval.
The composition of the commission should reflect the facts that its primary task will be negotiation and that it will deal only with the Korean situation. In view of the important role of the United States in the Korean conflict its inclusion on the commission is mandatory. The other members of the commission could appropriately include three other members of the United Nations from among those who have participated in the fighting in Korea. Thailand and Australia, as Far Eastern countries, appear logical choices, and Turkey might be a suitable third member, representative of broader United Nations interest in the Korean problem. If any or all of these three states will not accept membership on the commission, the delegation may substitute other appropriate states from among those with forces fighting in Korea. In addition, the USSR should be invited to assume a place on the commission; in view of its own interest in the area and the importance of obtaining Communist concurrence (including Communist China) in any Korean settlement, if it refuses to accept membership, a seat for it might be kept open. Soviet membership would facilitate the work of the Commission in organizing and carrying on any discussions with both the North Korean and Chinese Communist authorities.
[Page 1364]Efforts should be made at the outset to persuade other delegations, particularly the French and British, to agree to the above arrangements concerning the membership of the commission. We should point out the desirability of avoiding the appearance that the great powers are imposing a solution on the Korean people. If the United Kingdom and France should be included on the commission, it would be difficult to avoid the question of Chinese representation and the consideration of other Far Eastern questions in the commission. The United States remains firmly opposed both to representation of the Chinese Communist regime in any United Nations body and to the discussion of other Far Eastern questions until after a Korean settlement. However, both France and the United Kingdom may insist upon membership for themselves on the commission; if informal discussions indicate their strong desire for such membership, the delegation is authorized to agree to their inclusion.
As indicated above, the Chinese Communists will undoubtedly insist upon a role in a political settlement for Korea. While we are prepared to agree to their participation in the discussions, any arrangement for actual membership on the commission would be obviously impossible. As one of its first tasks, the new United Nations Commission must work out detailed arrangements whereby other interested governments and authorities may participate in the discussions on a Korean settlement. In particular, means for consultation with representatives of the Republic of Korea, of the North Korean authorities, and of the Chinese Communists must be devised. An opportunity should also be provided for any other directly interested United Nations Members (such as the Philippines) to make their views available to the commission.
Relation to UNCURK. Since the new commission will provide overall machinery for seeking to achieve the United Nations objective of a free, unified and independent Korea, UNCURK should go out of existence as soon as the new commission is ready to undertake its functions under the General Assembly resolution. This resolution should accordingly provide for termination of UNCURK upon its notification that the new commission is ready to begin its work, and should also express the Assembly’s appreciation to UNCURK for its services during the past year.
When the Assembly receives the new commission’s report on the results of its efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement, the Assembly will review, in the light of that report, the need for long-term political United Nations representation in Korea. This point can appropriately be made in speeches by the United States and other [Page 1365] friendly delegations during discussion of the Korean item in the Assembly.
B. Approval of the Armistice.
It is expected that if an armistice is reached, a resolution will be introduced in the Security Council noting the armistice with approval. Some of our allies would like to see a resolution which does that and no more. The United States would wish the resolution, as a minimum, to refer to and reaffirm past resolutions of the United Nations in regard to the action and objectives in Korea, in order to avoid the impression that we were giving up the United Nations version of what has happened in Korea and were willing to rewrite or forget that history. The United States would also like a provision which would explicitly refer the problem of the political settlement of Korea to the General Assembly.
The action in the General Assembly would, of course, have to take account of any resolution which might be adopted in the Security Council. The proposed resolution should refer to the Security Council resolution and also indicate the Assembly’s approval of the armistice. Particularly since some countries have already indicated a desire for a simple uncontroversial resolution in the Security Council in the hope of getting Soviet support for that resolution, the United States would like the subsequent action of the General Assembly to set the record straight on the whole Korean episode. We would not wish to leave the world confused and uncertain as to the real character and purpose of the action in Korea. It must remain clear that there was Communist aggression in Korea, that the United Nations action was designed solely to meet this aggression and that the United Nations has succeeded in this mission, and has not altered or abandoned its original objectives in Korea as a result of the conflict.
It may be anticipated that there will be objection to such provisions. It will be argued that such a resolution would antagonize the Communists and jeopardize the possibility of achieving a political settlement in Korea. If consultations reveal strong views to this effect, it may be necessary to omit or soften these provisions. In doing so, however, it should be made clear that we consider this only a postponement and that if efforts to achieve a political settlement break down, we will wish a stronger resolution along these lines.
In this regard, the delegation should warn other delegations against the dangers of assuming that the achievement of an armistice means a radical change in Soviet objectives. Such an attitude could have serious consequences going beyond the question of United Nations action in regard to Korea. The United States is always ready to welcome true Soviet cooperation in support of the United Nations Charter; [Page 1366] we have no concern or desire to maintain cold war tension. We would have to have much more and stronger evidence of Soviet change of heart, however, before we were persuaded that the USSR had suddenly decided to give up all ideas of aggression and Communist imperialism and has started on the path of peaceful cooperation. The Soviet attitude to the armistice in Korea must not be allowed to engender false and dangerous impression that all will be sweetness and light on the international scene. Such an impression would lull us into a false security, and jeopardize all our efforts to build up the strength of the free world and to maintain free world unity against aggression in and out of the United Nations. Within the United Nations it might tend to paralyze action on almost any subject which some delegations might feel would antagonize the Russians.