S/S Files: NSC 118 Series
Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)1 to the Secretary of State
Subject: National Security Council Agenda for Meeting on Wednesday, December 19.
Item 2—NSC 118/1 “United States Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea”.2
NSC 118/1 has been prepared in response to the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under date of November 3, 1951 (NSC 118)3 which, in essence, stated that the achievement of a military decision in Korea would require significant additional U.S. forces and means and asked that U.S. objectives in Korea be re-examined in the light of this situation.
The decision taken in NSC 118/1 is to reject as an objective the unification of Korea by force and to continue to seek in Korea the objectives set forth in NSC 48/5,4 namely, as an ultimate objective, to seek by political means the unification of Korea, and, as a current objective, to seek an acceptable settlement which would include, as [Page 1350] a minimum, 1) a satisfactory armistice, 2) establishment of the authority of the ROK over all of Korea south of a determined defensible line, generally north of 38°, 3) development of ROK military power to deter or repel renewed aggression, and 4) withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea.
The paper then sets forth certain courses of action to be taken in various contingencies which may arise, including achievement of an armistice, clear failure of armistice negotiations, and protraction of armistice negotiations.
These courses of action follow in general those previously agreed upon by the State and Defense Departments.
They include the principle of “greater sanction”, to be applied in case an armistice is achieved.
They include, in case armistice negotiations fail, a provision removing restrictions against advances or attacks in Korea. This is not intended to give new authority to General Ridgway since in actuality there are not now restrictions on advances or attacks placed upon him by the NSC. However, Defense desires it to be unmistakeably clear that restrictions which have, in fact, resulted from previous governmental level decisions, do not apply in case of a breakdown of armistice talks. This provision wipes the slate clean, removing all restrictions except those on attacks within 12 miles of the USSR borders. At the same time it is understood that any large-scale advances northward would be undertaken by General Ridgway only after consultation and approval from Washington. In this connection we are committed to consult the 16 participating nations prior to any major advance deep into North Korea.
The courses of action further include a provision that, in the case of failure of armistice negotiations, U.S. air forces may be employed (unilaterally and on short notice, if the situation so requires) “to attack Chinese Communist air bases whenever the scale of enemy air activity threatens seriously to jeopardize the security of the United States forces in the Korean area, such employment, however, to be specifically authorized by the President”. As the Staff Study (Annex to NSC 118/1)5 points out, the enemy air buildup has reached a stage where serious consequences to UN forces might result from an expansion of air attacks by the communists. Consequently, this paper recognizes that the Commander in Chief of UN forces, in case the scale of enemy air activity is such as to jeopardize the security of his troops, must be able to initiate attacks against Chinese Communist air bases before they are able to launch what might be a sudden massive air attack which could have disastrous effects on the UN forces. This [Page 1351] increase in scale might develop over a period of time. In this case, and at such time as he determines, specific authority is to be sought from the President to employ U.S. air forces against Chinese bases. In case of a sudden massive attack by the communists, General Ridgway acts under standing instructions which permit him to take retaliatory action against Chinese airbases.
The one issue on which the State and Defense Departments have taken divergent positions is the question of a naval blockade. The Defense proposal is that we should:
“Press the major maritime powers participating in the Korean campaign to impose, immediately upon the failure of armistice negotiations, a naval blockade on Communist China. Failing acceptance of this course, seek agreement from as many nations as possible to impose and to participate in the joint enforcement of a complete embargo on all shipments to Communist China, including a prohibition on the ships of these countries calling at Chinese Communist ports.”
The Department has suggested the following language:
“Seek agreement from as many nations as possible to impose and to participate in the joint enforcement of a complete embargo on all their trade with Communist China, including a prohibition on the ships of these countries calling at Chinese Communist ports, at the same time indicating to these ‘nations that failure to achieve increasingly effective multilateral economic pressure upon Communist China’s aggressive military potential through these means may require employment of UN naval forces for search and seizure at sea, closure of ports or imposition of a naval blockade of the China mainland coastline.”
You will note that the discrepancy between these two positions is more a matter of tactics than of substance. It is generally agreed within both State and Defense Departments that our western European allies, particularly the UK, would not accept, in the circumstances of a failure of armistice negotiations, the imposition of a naval blockade against Communist China.
We are fully aware of the general British attitude toward a naval blockade. They have doubts about the vulnerability of China to economic pressure, they desire to avoid hostile acts against Communist China, particularly because of Hong Kong, and they fear the dangers of military involvement with the USSR through a naval blockade.
The question is whether we can obtain our objective better through pressing first for a blockade and then falling back to an embargo, or whether we can more successfully achieve the same or better results by endeavoring to bring our allies along in a program of constantly increasing economic pressure which may eventuate in a naval blockade. We believe the latter is the course most likely to achieve the results [Page 1352] we desire and that pressing for an immediate naval blockade would only result in rejection and therefore delays in obtaining agreement to the embargo which we believe is possible.
The British have already come a considerable distance in their application of economic controls against China. A recent report on shipping entering Chinese Communist ports shows a decrease in noncommunist shipping from 608,000 tons in July to 456,000 tons in September. The ONI report in question (ONI Serial 74–C–51, 23 November 1951)6 states that “a relatively small amount of this shipping carried strategic cargo to Communst China”.
The efficacy of a naval blockade would depend to a large extent upon its enforcement against Soviet ports. Since it is generally accepted that such a blockade would not be enforced against Dairen or Port Arthur, its advantages would thereby be considerably lessened.
It is believed that, with the exception of the positions on a naval blockade, NSC 118/1 will find general acceptance in the Council. The Annex to NSC 118/1 contains a discussion of the various alternatives open to the United States in Korea, the arguments for and against these choices, a description of the various courses of action recommended and analyses of a minimum acceptable settlement and a political settlement.
It is recommended that you support the Department’s proposed paragraph on the naval blockade (paragraph (6), page 6, marked*) and concur in the adoption of this Statement of Policy by the National Security Council and its submission to the President for approval. It is further recommended that you make clear your understanding that under paragraph 2 b (3) any proposals by General Ridgway for an extensive advance into North Korea from the present positions of the UN forces would be subject to a governmental level decision.