Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 94: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
C–59466. HNC–570. For info CINCUNC Adv HNC 570.
“Further to HNC 568.1
“1. Following is statement made in meeting of sub-delegates on Item nbr 3 this date which is considered of particular significance. You have made a number of statements attempting to show that principles advocated by the UNC are unfair, unreasonable and unwarranted. You condemn our insistence on prohibiting the rehabilitation [Page 1346] and reconstruction of airfields as being interference in your internal affairs. You object to our intention to rotate and replenish our forces in Korea. You complain that our retention of islands threatens your rear. You object to aerial surveillance as being more interference in your internal affairs. On the other hand, we defend these principles as insuring against an increase of military capabilities during the armistice and thereby a threat to the stability of the armistice. Now let’s look at the situation as it is today. You are not threatening our rear in any way. You are not preventing us from rehabilitating airfields, you are not conducting aerial surveillance of our communication centers. You are not preventing unlimited rotation and replenishment of our forces. You do not interfere in the internal affairs of our side in any way. Under the conditions of combat, as they exist today, you do none of these things and we have no fear that you might. You do none of these things because you cannot—you lack the military capability to do them. But how do you find the situation today on your side? We do hold islands which you say threaten your rear. We do keep your airfields unuseable. We do conduct aerial surveillance throughout your rear. We do limit the extent to which you can replenish your forces. We do interfere in your so-called internal affairs by disrupting your internal communications systems and by destroying communications centers in your rear. We do these things today because we have the military capability to do them. Until the armistice is signed we will keep on doing them. Now to preserve the existing situation as to military capabilities, to replace the effect of the UNC’s military operations, we propose only that during armistice you shall not gain a military capability which you do not now possess. We go even further. We agree to apply the same restrictions to ourselves, even though you lack the military capability today to implement these restrictions by force of arms. But you complain this is unfair—you who are unable to impose any of these military restrictions upon our side by your own strength. You complain that it is unfair for us to insist on continuing restrictions through armistice terms which we are fully able to impose, and are imposing on you by military means during hostilities. In short, you seek to gain, through negotations, what you could not win through fighting. You seek to avoid, through negotiations, what you could not avoid through fighting. In accepting the restrictions advocated by the UNC you merely accept a continuation of limits on your military capabilities which exist today as a result of UNC military operations. Your capabilities should continue to be limited by the terms of the armistice. You lose nothing. You gain much, for these same limits are applied to the UNC, even though you cannot today affect them by military means. It is clear, therefore, that our proposed principles are more than fair [Page 1347] to you—they are wholly to your advantage as compared to the situation existing today.
“2. On three occasions, subsequent to the above statement, UNC repeated the following:
“We are always ready to consider seriously any proposal which provides for effective supervision of and adherence to the terms of the armistice and for prohibition of increases in military capabilities during armistice. Signed Joy”.
- Supra.↩