Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 95: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)1

top secret
operational immediate

JCS–89746. From JCS.

Reur CX 59188 and CX 59176.2 This message in 3 parts.

Part I.

It is agreed that your final position may have to be that all POWs be released irrespective of outcome on release or exchange of civilians. However, we feel you should not assume this position now. Before agreeing to an exchange of POWs only, you should, at a time you consider appropriate, introduce question of exchange of civilians. Otherwise we lose whatever bargaining position we have because of large number of POWs we have in comparison to Communist holdings. We have moral obligation to make every effort to obtain release of civilians. In addition our government is under pressure from United States groups and other UN nations to include their civilians and ours in exchange arrangements along with POWs. For above reasons we are unable at this time to approve your proposal not to raise issue of exchange of any civilians until you have secured a final agreement of POWs.

Part II.

Therefore, procedure you outlined in CX 59188 and CX 59176 is approved as to major aspects as follows (lesser details are left to your discretion):

(1) Before reaching any substantive agreement on Item 4 you should continue to insist on provision by Communists of lists of prisoners and their locations.

[Page 1341]

(2) You should seek one-for-one basis of exchange of POWs, continuing, as long as you deem advisable, a demand that ICRC be permitted to visit all POW camps. Actual exchange should be by groups at POWs including in each group both UN and ROK POWs.

(3) If agreement cannot be reached on (2) above, basis of negotiations may be shifted to all-for-all exchange.

(4) Before moving to this position, you should, at an appropriate time, introduce question of exchange of civilians. In any discussion of civilian exchange you should be guided by following:

(A)
Every effort should be made to exchange UN civilians and ROK Governmental personnel (list of UN civilians furnished you in JCS 89189.3 State is consulting with Ambassador Muccio to develop a comparable ROK list).
(B)
Similar effort, though of lesser priority, should be made to exchange all remaining internees and refugees.
(C)
You should consult with Ambassador Muccio on all phases of exchange of ROK civilians.

(5) If it becomes clear to you that agreement cannot be reached on anything short of all-for-all exchange, you may then proceed to negotiate on all-for-all basis. In this case the provisions of Subpara (4) above will continue to apply.

(6) If, in your judgment, it is impossible to force an agreement which will include exchange of those civilians indicated in Subpara (4) (A) above, you will request authority from Washington before taking final position to secure release of POWs only.

(7) Any position requiring forced return of personnel held by UNC must have prior approval by Washington.

Part III.

Instructions are being formulated for recommendations to be made under agenda item 5 if arrangements for release of civilians cannot be accomplished as part of armistice terms. These will be furnished you shortly.

  1. In a memorandum dated December 15, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) described the background stages of this telegram as follows:

    “On the morning of December 15, Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Johnson discussed with the JCS a reply to General Ridgway’s CX 51888 [59188] and CX 59176 on the basis of a draft prepared in State. Agreement was achieved on the message which was subsequently discussed with the Secretary. The Secretary, together with General Collins, obtained the President’s approval and the message was transmitted to General Ridgway as JCS 89746, December 15.” (Black Book, Tab 94–A)

  2. Both dated December 12, pp. 1315 and 1311, respectively.
  3. See the editorial note, p. 1296.