795B.5/1–1951
The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, January 19,
1951.
Dear Mr. Secretary: In the attached memorandum
of 17 January 1951 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have submitted their views
regarding the request of the Korean Government that the Korean Youth
Corps be armed, and regarding the general question of increasing Korean
forces to resist Communist aggression. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have
concluded that there is not, at present, any desirable, feasible and
timely method of appreciably increasing the Korean forces to resist
Communist aggression.
Accordingly, I am forwarding this memorandum to you, for your
information, with the request that, whenever appropriate, the Department
[Page 106]
of State inform
representatives of the Korean Government that, from the military point
of view, the most effective utilization of members of the Korean Youth
Corps and other qualified males at present is to replace losses in
existing ROK units.
Faithfully yours,
[Enclosure]
The Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)
top secret
Washington, January 17,
1951.
Subject: Proposed Arming of the Korean Youth
Corps.
- 1.
- In accordance with your memorandum of 14 December 1950,1 the Joint Chiefs
of Staff have considered the request of the Korean Government
that the Korean Youth Corps be armed, and the general question
of increasing Korean forces to resist Communist aggression.2
- 2.
- Initial study indicated that, although no machine guns,
mortars, anti-tank weapons or artillery can be made available
for additional Korean forces, there are sufficient small arms
and ammunition available in Zone of Interior stocks to increase
Korean forces by from 200,000 to 300,000 men, armed with rifles,
automatic rifles, carbines and sub-machine guns. Further, it
seemed probable that on the order of 75,000 to 100,000 of these
men might profitably be utilized to:
-
a.
- Augment the rifle strength of Republic of Korea
(ROK) divisions and
U.N. forces;
-
b.
- Form special units for guarding lines of communication
and for operations against Communist guerrillas;
and
-
c.
- Conduct guerrilla operations in Communist-held
territory.
- 3.
- However, it is General MacArthur’s opinion that such
utilization of additional Koreans would be of questionable
value. His comments with respect to the subparagraphs above are
substantially as follows:
-
a.
- In the combat areas, withdrawal of U.N. forces,
including the current retrograde movement from the Seoul
vicinity, has been due in most instances to the
inability of ROK units
to maintain the integrity of their assigned sectors.
This failure has been repeated in situations involving
either North Korean or Chinese forces and, whenever
determined enemy pressure is encountered, appears to
have equal application to ROK divisions closely integrated in U.S.
corps zones as well as those operating directly under
ROK Army control. In
consequence, it now appears that any possibility of
checking the enemy may be dependent upon the
establishment of a defensive position of such
proportions that U.S. divisions can be deployed in depth
in mutually supporting locations.
-
b.
- Continued effort has been made since 25 June 1950 to
effect the most practicable utilization of Korean
personnel. In addition to materially augmenting the
ROK Army, members of
the Youth Corps and other qualified males have been
supplied with significant quantities of small arms for
the purpose of strengthening police units and
anti-guerrilla security elements. Despite the relatively
large number of non-army personnel now under arms, enemy
guerrilla units continue to operate effectively in many
widely scattered regions of South Korea.
-
c.
- Furthermore, members of the Youth Corps and other
qualified males have been supplied with arms for the
creation of special organizations to operate in
Communist held territory. Such guerrilla forces,
however, have accomplished little in Communist rear
areas, primarily due to lack of strong-willed
leadership.
-
d.
- On the basis of past accomplishments of ROK armed forces, the
probable restricted size of the battlefield in which
U.N. forces may soon be operating and the high priority
of requirements for the National Police Reserve of
Japan, the most effective utilization of available
Korean manpower in the near future would be to replace
losses in existing ROK
units. Any long-range requirement for, or desirability
of, arming additional ROK personnel appears to be dependent
primarily upon determination of the future U.S. military
position with respect to both the Korean campaign and
the generally critical situation in the Far East.
- 4.
- In view of the above the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that
there is not at present any desirable, feasible and timely
method of appreciably increasing Korean forces to resist
Communist aggression.
- 5.
- Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you
inform representatives of the Korean Government and the
Secretary of State that, from the military point of view,
experience indicates that the most effective utilization of
members of the Korean Youth Corps and other qualified Korean
males is to replace losses in existing ROK units.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
