Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

S/S Files: Lot 59D95, Box 99

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State (Barnes)¹

top secret

Rome, November 28, 1951.

Participants:

United States	United Kingdom
Secretary Acheson	Foreign Minister Eden
Secretary Lovett	Lord de Lisle and Dudley4
General Bradley	Marshal Sir John Slessor5
Secretary Pace	Sir Pierson Dixon6
Assistant Secretary Perkins	Sir William Elliot7
Mr. Frank Nash2	Mr. Shuckburgh8
Admiral Arthur Davis3
Mr. Robert G. Barnes
Mr. L. D. Battle

The Secretary opened the discussion by stating that he wished to review with Mr. Eden and his colleagues an issue concerning Korea which had been broached to Sir Oliver Franks the other day in Washington by Mr. Matthews. We wished to give consideration in connection with the armistice negotiations to making a statement that any breach of the armistice would be a serious matter and would create a situation that would make it impossible to localize the conflict. Even with an armistice, it would be necessary to keep troops in Korea for some time, but we wished to minimize as much as possible the dangers of what might happen. We conceived of the statement as one which would create a situation similar to that prevailing in the case of Berlin, where the deterrent to aggression was not the troops on the ground but the consequences that would flow from any violation of the peace.

Mr. Acheson said this question tied into the problem of securing an agreement on inspection in the current armistice talks. We had come to the conclusion that it would be wise to reduce the amount of inspection which we would request in the current negotiations. This would increase the military risk to the UN Command in Korea. The proposed statement on the consequences which would flow from a violation of the armistice would help to minimize this military risk.

General Bradley said it might be helpful to point out that there were roughly five different types of inspection which we might demand: (1) full inspection behind the lines, (2) inspection of certain key points such as ports and rail heads, (3) inspection conducted only by air, (4) inspection of a limited area of perhaps 25 miles behind the armistice line, or (5) inspection of only the demilitarized zone. After an armistice was agreed, we had to face the problem that the enemy could build up its forces materially once freed from UN air interdiction and thereby create a very serious threat to the UN forces. At the present stage of the negotiations we faced the choice of demanding a strong inspection or of accepting a weaker inspection supported by a strong statement with reference to a violation of the armistice.

Mr. Lovett pointed out that our air activity in Korea had completely disrupted all rail communications in North Korea and served to prevent the North Korean forces from building better air fields closer to the front lines. With an armistice these two results would not be possible and the enemy would be able to build up materially its military strength. Sir John Slessor asked if there was any provision in the present armistice terms which denied each party the right to repair airfields and rail lines and was informed that there was not.

Mr. Eden said he was confused about the time sequence involved in the present negotiations and inquired as to whether it was true, as rumored, that an armistice had been achieved that afternoon. He was informed that this was not true. The agreement reached so far was only with respect to the present military line. The terms of the armistice, the principle of inspection and the exchange of prisoners were still to be discussed, and all items had to be agreed before there would be an armistice. In response to a question, General Bradley explained that the military line had been agreed for a period of 30 days, but that if an armistice was not secured within that time, the agreement on the line would lapse. Mr. Eden said he understood that and thought that the 30 day point was perfectly fair, as he had explained in the House of Commons.

Mr. Acheson said that we now had to admit that it would be impossible to secure an agreement with full inspection. We would try to get as much as possible, but if we were to reach agreement at all it would be necessary to accept something less than an adequate inspection system. This problem could be helped by a statement about the consequences of a violation. Mr. Lovett added that perhaps the concept of a full inspection was illusory after all, since the principal communist bases were located north of the Yalu. We had pretty good information on the present rate of the communist build-up, and it was apparent that an inspection up to the Yalu would still not eliminate all possibilities of danger. Therefore there was great value in considering the statement regardless of the degree of inspection secured.

Mr. Eden asked what General Ridgway’s view was on this matter, and General Bradley said that Ridgway now realized he could not secure all that he would like to have. His major point, however, was a desire that he be given a firm instruction on the inspection point now. Ridgway hoped to avoid any possibility that his instructions might be modified in the middle of the negotiations with the attendant suggestion of weakness on our part. The real question was whether we could not assure General Ridgway of some other form of security, such as perhaps a blockade or other measures which might be taken against the communists.

Mr. Eden said that was a very big question and one he could hardly answer on the spot. Mr. Acheson said we did not expect him to answer it then but that we thought he would want to discuss it in full with our people before making his decision.

Lord de Lisle said this was presumably a situation which might go on for some time. Mr. Acheson agreed that there was no time limit on the military threat but that we felt the danger diminished with the passage of time. Mr. Lovett added that many military men now think there may never be an armistice but just a fading away of hostilities. General Bradley agreed with this, and added that in his opinion the North Koreans would never violate any armistice agreement which might be reached but would on the contrary be quite glad to get one.

Mr. Eden asked if we had in mind a public statement, and Mr. Lovett said that it would have to be. Mr. Acheson pointed out that, while we had never made a formal declaration on this point, he had said about the same thing in answering questions during the Congressional investigation into the dismissal of General MacArthur. As to the nature of the statement, Mr. Acheson said that what we had in mind was a US–UK statement, or possibly a US declaration supported by the UK. We did not contemplate making this statement through the UN.

Mr. Eden said he was sort of wondering about the inspection problem and how it had been handled in other cases. Mr. Pace cited instances in Austria and elsewhere where we had arranged for joint inspections. Mr. Eden said the inspection point was important and we should not give up on this idea. Mr. Acheson said we would not; we would in fact ask for it all first, but we had to realize that if we were to secure an armistice we would be forced to accept something less than the best.

Mr. Eden then inquired just what it was we wanted from him and how soon. He said we obviously had to give Ridgway guidance and he assumed it was pretty urgent. Mr. Acheson said that if the current reports were true, agenda item 2 had been concluded and Ridgway was now moving into item 3. After two or three days of general discussion, he would need to have his final negotiating position on the inspection point.

Mr. Eden said it was quite clear that Ridgway could not be left without any sanction. The question was how much he should be given. Mr. Eden said he was anxious to be clear on the whole proposition now and not have any misunderstanding later as to just what we had agreed. He said he was planning to return to London on Thursday,⁹ would try to talk to the Prime Minister¹⁰ on Friday and get off a wire that same day.

Mr. Lovett said that Mr. Eden should realize that if there was a violation of the truce, our country would be swept with great indignation and the people would want the administration to throw the book at the communists. He did not think America would be alone in its rage. General Bradley added that he hoped we would not be alone in the sanctions we might have to apply. Mr. Eden said he hoped so too, but he was thinking of his own public opinion and wanted to be quite clear as to what its was we wanted to do.

Mr. Eden said he thought we had to reach decisions on the following points and he thought it was desirable to settle all the points now:

1. The instructions to be sent to General Ridgway in connection with negotiations on the inspection.

2. The decision to make the public statement. In this connection he said he would like to have the US work out just what it was we wanted to say. Mr. Acheson said that he did not have any language but that what we had in mind was a public statement outlining the serious nature of an attack. It would be made without time limit, but it would be understood that it was not an unlimited future commitment regardless of other circumstances.

3. The form of further action which we might take. With reference to this point, he asked whether we would want to do more than bomb the communist airfields. Mr. Lovett stated that some form of blockade would be necessary. General Bradley pointed out that the number of ships going into China had almost doubled in the past year and that this traffic was a very real problem.

Sir John Slessor said he questioned those figures, particularly as they concerned Hongkong. Mr. Eden said he did not have any figures like that, but they would check them and let us know. He added that from a purely personal standpoint he felt that the bombing beyond the Yalu would be less difficult for his government than the blockade.

General Bradley asked how far beyond the Yalu they had in mind, and Sir John Slessor said it would be a question of bombing in the most effective way. He thought it was a point which could be worked out among the military representatives. He felt that the really important point was the bombing immediately across the frontier. He said we had a very difficult task in not doing this now, but once it was done, it might prove unnecessary to bomb farther in. Once you eliminated the forward fields, you might not need to go after those that were 300 miles or so beyond the Yalu.

Mr. Eden said again that he would check into this question on Friday and get off a wire to both Rome and Washington.

1. The conversation took place at the American Embassy. The memorandum was drafted on November 29.
4. General BradleyMarshal Sir John Slessor
5. Chief of the Air Staff (U.K.).
6. Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
7. Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot, Chairman of the British Joint Services Mission in Washington and British Representative on the Standing Group of the Military Committee of NATO.
2. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
8. Evelyn Shuckburgh, Principal Private Secretary to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
3. Vice Adm. Arthur C. Davis, U.S. Deputy Representative on the Standing Group of the Military Committee of NATO.
9. November 29.
10. Winston S. Churchill.