Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/6–2851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

top secret

[Washington,] June 28, 1951.

Subject: Korean Armistice. (Meeting with JCS at 10:30 A. M., June 28)

Participants:	General Bradley	Vice Admiral Davis
	General Vandenberg	Major General White
	General Collins	Major General Taylor
	Admiral McCormick1	Mr. Dean Rusk
	General Bolte2	Mr. U. A. Johnson

Mr. Rusk opened the meeting by distributing the attached informal memorandum from which he talked at some length, particularly emphasizing the desirability of keeping the matter at the military level in Korea so as to avoid the introduction of extraneous and political subjects.

General Bradley suggested that there was another alternative of direct communication with the Chinese, but agreed that this was not practicable or desirable as it would inevitably involve governmental and therefore political discussions.

General Collins stated that he saw considerable advantage to the suggestions Gromyko had made to Kirk. He pointed out the difficulty of the Chinese Government’s agreeing to any terms that we might put forward, but that the de facto Chinese commander in the field could perhaps agree with them. He pointed out that it was essential to have a commission of some type to observe whether the Communists introduced additional personnel and matériel into North Korea and conceived of observation teams of such a commission being stationed, for example, on the Yalu bridges. If the other side would not agree to such observation, he saw no hope for an armistice. In response to Mr. Rusk’s tentative suggestion that consideration should possibly be given to the use of a subcommittee of the UN Peace Observation Committee, on which the Soviets had accepted membership, General Collins expressed his strong opposition to any system which would permit Soviet observers to enter South Korea and the opinion that the commission should be composed of those having troops on each side, including each of the UN member nations having armed forces in Korea.

Mr. Rusk stated that the Department had given much thought to this question of the composition of any armistice commission, and that there was no ideal answer.

General Vandenberg stated that he was “unalterably opposed” to Alternative A of the attached memorandum—that is, a message from General Ridgway to the opposing command. He felt that the US should use the Soviet proposal as a springboard to place the onus on the North Koreans and the Chinese, and that any message from Ridgway would in effect mean that we are asking for peace, instead of the Communists. He stated that we are now hurting the Communists badly and that any respite given them by an armistice would only permit them to build up to start fighting again. The Communists have had serious losses of officers, non-coms and troops, and their present situation is very precarious. However, they are building up their air force, and recently for the first time they carried out a coordinated air attack on an island held by us. In addition to giving the Communists a breather to build up in Korea, an armistice would permit them to divert their attention to such areas as Indochina. Whenever the Communists want to stop fighting we should be careful to impose sufficiently tough restrictions on them to make sure that there is no build-up. If we say anything at all, it should not go beyond signifying our willingness to listen.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that the build-up of Communist forces was a permanent part of the problem, whether the end of the fighting came within Korea or on the northern borders of Korea.

General Vandenberg expressed the opinion that the drain of hostilities was now beginning to tell on the Communist forces and that we should in no sense be put in the position of suing for peace at this point or stopping the fighting just when it was beginning to hurt the other side.

General Collins stated that we were now on a good defensive line in Korea and that we should take advantage of this apparently possible opportunity to end the fighting.

General Bradley stated that although an armistice might give the enemy a chance to build up and that we might continue to drain his resources by continued hostilities, we could not ignore the effect on the will of our people and other contributing UN member nations to continued support of the hostilities if we in effect turned down what appeared to be an opportunity to end the hostilities.

General Vandenberg expressed the fear that we stand to lose more than we gain by the proposed statement by Ridgway.

General Bradley stated that it was his own personal feeling that the Soviets “mean this” and that the suggestions by Gromyko were designed to give China a chance to save face. He felt that a simple statement from our side to the opposing side to the effect that if they agree with the proposals made by the Soviets, let us know and we will arrange a meeting did not in any sense mean that we were suing for peace.

General Collins expressed the opinion that we should reach a governmental decision on the terms of an armistice and immediately draft an instruction to Ridgway.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that in fact the first move in the immediate situation had been made by governments, viz. Malik’s speech, our inquiry of the Soviets and the Soviet replies.

General Bradley expressed the opinion that a message should be issued by General Ridgway making it clear that he was acting under instructions and that he understood the other side might want to talk, and if so to let us know so that he can arrange a place.

After some general discussion it was the consensus that General Ridgway’s first message might omit reference to time and place of meeting.

It was decided that a working group would draft a message to General Ridgway including the text of a proposed statement by him, to be considered by State and the Joint Chiefs the same afternoon.

[Note: Subsequent to the meeting, Admiral Davis and Mr. Johnson drafted a radio and suggested message to be issued by Ridgway, which was informally discussed with General Bradley and subsequently with Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Rusk, and the Secretary.

[At 2:30 P. M. another meeting was held with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at which General Marshall was also present. The draft was discussed, revised, and approved. The approved text is attached. Following approval by the President it was dispatched to General Ridgway.]³

[Attachment]

Check List on Action To Meet Present Korean Situation

i. the major alternative lines of action

a. Invitation by Ridgway to meeting between Military Commanders.

b. Further diplomatic effort at clarification, either at Moscow or Peiping or both.

c. Effort at clarification by public declaration of U.S. and UN attitude toward cease fire.

d. Straight propaganda treatment.

Comment: There appears to be sufficient substance in Soviet statements thus far to hold out some prospect of an acceptable armistice and to make a prompt resort to straight propaganda treatment unwise and difficult.

It is unlikely that real advance toward a settlement could be made by a series of public declarations on both sides; in any event, this technique might subject us to the charge that we are merely making propaganda out of a reasonable effort on the part of the USSR to reach a settlement.

Further diplomatic effort at clarification in Moscow is likely to be unproductive; such an effort in Peiping offers little more prospect of success in light of Peiping’s position that Chinese in Korea are volunteers; in any event, diplomatic moves on our part would be time consuming while the communists run away with the propaganda situation.

More importantly, there are advantages from the U.S. point of view in having the Korean problem settled for the short run on a military basis without involvement with a wide range of complex political issues now confronting us in the Pacific. We should not lightly turn down the USSR suggestion that Korea be dealt with in the first instance on a military basis.

An invitation by General Ridgway that representatives of the communist command attend a military conference would constitute a dramatic initiative on our part, would keep the Korean question on a military plane, and could put the matter of a satisfactory peace squarely up to the communists.

On balance, therefore, the first alternative appears the most advantageous.

ii. arrangements for a meeting between the military commands in korea

a. The first step would be a public announcement, as soon as possible, by General Ridgway at CINCUNC, inviting representatives of the communist command in Korea to meet with representatives on CINCUNC on board the Danish Hospital Ship Jutlandia at (Location) at (Time); Jutlandia to be under the full operational control of the Danish Government which has undertaken to make this ship available on a neutralized basis for this purpose. Note: An alternative would be a suitable location ashore near the front, such as Kaesong.

b. CINCUNC Representative, whose name should be included in the original announcement if possible, should be an officer of the rank of Major General or higher. He should be assisted by an officer of the ROK Army and by suitable staff.

c. CINCUNC Representative should operate under directions from CINCUNC, who would himself be instructed by JCS on the basis of governmental decisions made in Washington. Negotiations with other UN Governments should be handled exclusively in Washington; CINCUNC should not negotiate with UN representatives in Tokyo or Korea on the subject matter of cease-fire discussions.

d. Instructions to CINCUNC should be based on NSC 48/5⁴ and on the JCS memorandum of March 27,⁵ as adapted, with the approval of the President, to meet the present military and political situation. A rough outline of the essential elements in such instructions is attached.⁶

iii. un military operations before and during cease-fire discussions

General Ridgway should be allowed maximum freedom of action in the conduct of military operations until such time as a satisfactory cease-fire shall have been arranged. He should continue to be guided by his existing military directives and should not be inhibited by cease-fire negotiations in taking such action as is necessary to maintain his military position and protect his forces in relation to enemy action. If he considers it advisable, he should feel free to reduce the scale of his operations while talks are in progress.

iv. related political steps

a. Consultation with UN Members with troops in Korea on nature of Moscow response and proposed U.S. line of action.

b. Possible consultation with countries such as India with diplomatic representation in Peiping.

c. Notification to UN and to GOC just prior to Ridgway broadcast, giving text of his broadcast and texts of exchange with Moscow.

d. A special instruction must be sent to Muccio as basis for dealing with the difficult ROK aspect of the problem.

v. information and propaganda action

A special inter-departmental task group should be established under P leadership to prepare an effective information and propaganda program in support of the above line of action.

On Thursday, June 28, our line should be that we are considering Ambassador Kirk’s report and are consulting UN governments with troops in Korea.

1. Adm. Lynde D. McCormick, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
2. Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolté, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, U.S. Army.

3. The message was sent as telegram JCS 95174, June 28 at 3:40 p. m. to Tokyo and is printed on p. 577.

   No record has been found in the Department of State files of the meetings here referred to nor the various drafts of the message to General Ridgway. Brackets in the source text.

4. Approved May 17; for text of a memorandum containing the sections on Korea, see p. 439.
5. See the enclosure to the letter from Lovett to Acheson, March 31, p. 285.
6. Attached to the file copy of the source text was the “Outline of Action Regarding Korea”, dated February 11, 1951, drafted by Mr. Rusk (p. 165); the attached copy bore a notation by Mr. Battle, undated, that the Secretary of State had seen it.